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In the accepted use of the word, militancy expresses a sense of 
combativeness and aggression. It has a ring of the military about it, 
and of warfare and hostility. When the term is transferred to the field 
of industrial labour relations, many of these overtones remain, with the 
result that strike action is generally regarded as the characteristic 
trait of a militant union. 
In Australia, the word and its derivatives are in general use to 
describe certain types of industrial behaviour and to identify certain 
kinds of unions, union leaders and their supporters. In this popular 
sense, militant is applied loosely and often inaccurately as a synonym 
for Communist, Neo-Communist, or extreme "left-wing". It is assumed 
that a militant union is one which frequently strikes or threatens 
direct action of some kind. It is further implied that the basis for 
this activity is the ideological position of the union's leaders - a 
position on the extreme left wing of the political spectrum. Finally, 
it puts forward the view that the aims of the union so described are 
both political and radical and that industrial means are being used to 
further not industrial, but political, ends. 
It will be argued that militancy in this guise and the Implications 
which flow from it, is based on unjustified assumptions about its 
causes, and when applied to individual unions, the term may be misleading 
1. For a typical example, see The Australian, 30/10/1969, p.5. 
"Militants out to capture A.R.U. posts". 
or fallacious. While a union engaged in strike action is obviously 
behaving militantly, it does not follow that all other modes of union 
behaviour are non-militant. Confrontations between employer and 
employees may be of a highly combative nature and yet not involve the 
withdrawal of labour. Likewise, to consider all militancy within the 
trade union movement as having a political or ideological basis is to 
suppose a similarity in beliefs, values and ideas, and a unanimity of 
opinion on the part of large numbers of employees, engaged in a variety 
of pursuits with often wide differences between them in terms of 
salary, working conditions and status. 
To illustrate: the Queensland branch of the Australian Railways 
Union and the Australian Federation of Air Pilots are unions to which 
the label 'militant' has been attached. Both unions have brought 
their members out on strike in the past, and are quite prepared to do 
so again, if necessary. The majority of members of the A.R.U. are 
semi or unskilled workers, while the Federation represents men who 
consider themselves part of a highly trained, specialist, professional 
elite, who, despite their strong organisation, retain many of the 
individualistic characteristics typical of many professionals. The 
railway men operate within the State arbitration system, are affiliated 
with the Queensland Trades and Labor Council, and with the Queensland 
branch of the Australian Labor Party. The pilots, on the other hand, 
divorced themselves from the Commonwealth conciliation and arbitration 
system in 1958,^ and are linked through affiliation, with only one body, 
the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations. 
It would seem likely, therefore, even from this superficial 
comparison, that there would be few common attitudes between these two 
groups, beyond the fact that both are organisations of employees-^ whose 
primary reason for existence is to come to terms with their employers 
over salaries and wages, hours and conditions of work. Consequently, 
it would be dangerous to assume that the militancy of these unions 
sprang from identical causes (and, in the case of the Federation, that 
it was ideologically based), until both unions had been studied in depth 
and the causes of their militant attitudes traced. 
As will be argued in this thesis, the proposition that militancy 
must of necessity, be equated with radical political views, falls to 
the ground immediately one begins to scrutinize closely the trade union 
movement in Australia. In this country many organisations of employees, 
which are accepted as trade unions, whether registered as such or not, 
disclaim any political commitment, while others, equally a part of the 
trade union movement, have quite frank and overt political aims.*^  It 
2. The original association was the Australian Air Pilots' Association 
registered with the Commonwealth Arbitration Court in 1947. Some 
years later, this body took industrial action which rendered it 
liable to penalties imposed by the Arbitration Commission. The 
great bulk of the membership resigned in 1958 and left the Air 
Pilots' Association without its office bearers or funds. 
3. One doubts whether pilots even consciously think of themselves as 
employees in conflict with employers. Certainly this attitude did 
not come out strongly in interviews with individual pilots and 
executive members of the Federation, conducted 1967, 1968, 1969 and 
1971. 
4. D.W. Rawson: "The Frontiers of Trade Unionism". Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 1, No. 2, May, 1956, pp. 196-
209. 
1+. 
would be a most exceptional case for unions in the former group to take 
part in party politics,^ and just as rare for the term, militant, if 
applied to any of these unions, to represent a charge of ideological 
commitment to left wing politics. This is not to say that militant 
could never be a correct description for these kinds of unions, but only 
that it would have to have another meaning to be of any relevance. 
To get away from these ambiguous and confusing views on militancy, 
first and foremost it will be necessary to frame a definition which will 
be precise and yet generally applicable. The logical place to begin 
such a task is with those who have already attempted it, who have 
studied and observed militancy, and who have come to certain 
conclusions about it, against which one can test one's own hypothesis. 
Not surprisingly, the Marxist interpretation of militancy bears 
some resemblance to popular use of the term in Australia. Marxists use 
militant, descriptively of the proletariat, of a special part of the 
proletariat. As Kautsky explains it, 
"there has gradually formed from skilled and unskilled workers 
a body of proletarians who are in the movement of labor or the 
labor movement. It is the part of the proletariat which is 
fighting for the interests of the whole class, its church 
militant, as it were...in this growing mass of workers, the 
militant division increases not only absolutely, but also 
relatively. No matter how fast the proletariat may grow, this 
militant division of it grows still faster. 
But it is precisely this militant proletariat which is 
the most fruitful recruiting ground for socialism. The 
socialist movement is nothing more than the part of this 
militant proletariat which has become conscious of its goal. 
5. Rawson points out an obvious exception, the Bank Officers' 
Association Campaign against bank nationalization, 1948-49, 
ibid., p. 198. 
5. 
In fact, these two, socialism and the militant proletariat, 
tend constantly to become identical."^ 
Thus, translating from Marxist phraseology, the militants are the 
hard core revolutionary socialists among the workers, and militancy 
encompasses both methods of achieving ultimate goals and the goals 
themselves. While it may well be that this is an apt enough description 
of some militant Australian trade unionists, not all those to whom this 
term is applied are revolutionary socialists and Marxist thinking on 
militancy is not entirely helpful in the search for a general 
definition. Obviously, the full answer to the question, "what is 
militancy" lies elsewhere. 
An examination of the writers on industrial labour relations is a 
somewhat more fruitful exercise, though most are concerned with special 
aspects of what is an extremely wide field of interest, and many have 
not found it necessary to investigate or even mention militancy. One 
of the few who does concern himself with militancy and militants by 
virtue of the subject matter of his work, is Turner."^  He says, 
"'militant' and 'moderate' describe the methods by which 
particular aims are to be accomplished: the former signifies 
industrial action rather than reliance on arbitration or 
legislation, an uncompromising attempt to win all that is 
demanded rather than to settle for a part, an attitude which 
asserts the clash of class interests rather than a community 
of interests.' 
6. Karl Kautsky: The Class Struggle (Erfurt Program). Charles H. 
Kerr and Co., Chicago, 1910, pp. 183-84. 
7. Ian Turner: Industrial Labour and Politics: the Labour Movement 
in Eastern Australia, 1900-1921. A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1965. 
8. ibid. , p. XV. 
6. 
This is useful but still inadequate for our purposes as all 
militant trade unions can not be categorized in this way. Again, 
within the measure of Turner's definition come together not only methods 
but also particular aims. Therefore its weakness lies in its assumption 
that militancy is based, in part, upon a conception of industrial 
conflict as a manifestation of the class struggle. In this sense, it 
assumes, not only a political ideology for militants, but also one 
that sees the employer-employee relationship from the viewpoint of a 
class war, and the clash of class interests. 
Now the militant Australian Federation of Air Pilots is not without 
a consciousness of class; but the pilots do not view industrial conflict 
or management-union relations as being an expression of class conflict. 
It is highly improbable that they see themselves as part of a working 
class proletariat, with a community of interest with all other 
workers, and one would be just as sceptical of their likely support for 
the "clash of class interests" thesis. Their concern is entirely 
with industrial matters, particularly those having to do with 
conditions of work, flight pay and safety,^ and with the more general 
question of their acceptance as professionals within the community, 
rather than specialist technicians. They consider themselves to be a 
professional elite among the work force, and have been extremely 
anxious, in their confrontations with management, to have their status 
acknowledged and reinforced by appropriate remuneration and conditions. 
In the protracted negotiations between the Federation and the Air 
9. Interviews (1967) with the immediate past President of the 
Federation, Captain R.T. Holt. 
Line Operators in 1966, over salaries, great importance was attached by 
the President, Captain R.T. Holt, and his Executive, to achieving 
recognition for the pilot of "his place in the salary hierarchy in 
Australia."-^ '^  The submissions of the Federation contained strong 
"community standard" arguments, backed up by elaborate charts and graphs 
showing the position of the Australian pilots, with regard to salary, 
relative to those of service chiefs, professors and both Federal and 
State judges, in New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America.-^ -^  Under these circumstances it would appear 
that the Federation would conform, in all probability, to parts one 
and two of Turner's definition of militancy but that the final part 
would not be applicable. The Federation's standpoint is not unique, 
and while the heterogeneous nature of white collar and professional 
unions makes it impossible to generalize, enough evidence of a similar 
kind from other "militant" unions can be found to cast further doubt 
upon the third element of the definition. 
10. Australian Federation of Air Pilots: The President's Address to 
Extra-ordinary general meetings on July 11th, 1966. Concerning 
contract negotiations between the Federation, Ansett/A.N.A., T.A.A., 
Airlines of New South Wales, Queensland Airlines, Airlines of South 
Australia, MacRobertson Miller Airlines, East West Airlines. 
11. By the agreement reached in 1966, parity was achieved with the 
salaries of certain categories of people, high in the Australian 
work force. The failure to maintain this position was the alleged 
cause of a strike called by the Federation in December, 1969. Cf. 
Courier Mail, 13/12/69 in which Captain Holt is quoted: "People 
whom we use as our yard-stick on the salary hierarchy have kept 
their position there. We have no intention of slipping down the 
ladder." Cf. A.A. Congalton: Status and Prestige in Australia. 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1969. Appendix B. "Status Ranking List of 
Occupations in Australia", pp. 143-158. Air Line Pilots are 
ranked B (4 point scale) and 3 (7 point scale) while Departmental 
Heads, Government Service, rank B and 2, and Judges, Barristers, 
University professors and doctors all rank A and 1 on the same 
scales. 
Another who has studied particular aspects of militancy is 
Silverman, in her work on political strikes in Australia.-^^ She adopts 
a dichotomous approach to this question of definition, listing those 
things which militant unions do, which are different from those things 
which non-militant or moderate unions do. This leads her to suggest 
that 
"most trade unions are prepared to obey and conform to the 
conventions and laws which regulate their activities for 
various reasons...[while] militant unions deviate from this 
general pattern of activities and are prepared to wage 
a vigorous, all-out fight for their aims and objectives, 
without necessarily stopping at the borderline of propriety."-^^ 
This line of reasoning brings her close to a definition of 
militancy, which she sees as a 
"[preparedness] to rely upon direct industrial action, 
particularly the strike, when compliance with arbitration 
procedures, legislative enactments or other traditional 
forms would be more acceptable and more conventional."-'-'^ 
This is a similar position to Turner's, without the ideological or 
political motivation for militancy implicit in his work. Despite this, 
it must be made clear that the whole tenor of Silverman's study of 
political strikes is set from her belief that the militant unions are 
those which are prepared to strike for political reasons, over and 
above industrial issues; that they are those that see the strike as 
12. Sondra Silverman: Political Movements - Three Case S-tudies of 
Protest. Unpub. Ph.D. thesis, A.N.U.; "Australian Political 
Strikes", Labour History, No. 11, November, 1966. "Political 
Strikes in Australia", ed. J.E. Isaac and G.W. Ford: Australian 
Labour Relations - Readings, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1966. 
13. Silverman: Australian Political Strikes, p. 28. 
14. ibid. , pp. 28-29. 
their chief weapon in the class struggle, and that many have an 
ideological view of society which would deny the hope of any real 
improvements for the working class within the existing capitalist 
framework. 
At the risk of labouring a point, it must be reiterated that though 
one can assume that the ideological factor would be the most important 
cause of militancy in those unions studied by Silverman, too much 
reliance should not be placed on this as the only or even the principal 
explanation for militancy. It will be argued that militancy may spring 
from many causes, not all of which need to be operating at the one 
time, and some of which may be of more importance than others at 
different periods in a union's history. The problem is a many-faceted 
one which does not lend itself readily to a single-factor answer.-^ ^ 
However, one would agree with Silverman and Turner, that if we are to 
arrive at a general definition of militancy, it must be tied to the 
willingness of a union to take direct action to achieve specific ends, 
whether these be industrial or political or a combination of both; and 
to use methods less acceptable and conventional than a non-militant 
union would use. In other words, in the context of militancy, what a 
union hopes to achieve is not as important as how it goes about it. 
This agrees with Allen's conclusions that "the term militancy 
clearly refers to methods and not aims... It is not what unions are 
15. R.J. May: "Deteritdnants of the Industrial Relations Pattern in 
the Australian Stevedoring Industry." The Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 3, No. 2, October, 1961, pp. 157-165, where he 
argues the fallacies of the unifactoral approach to the causes of 
industrial unrest. 
10. 
pressing for which matters so much as how they are pressing."-^^ It is 
less easy to support him when he suggests that the term is, in general 
usage "synonymous with good trade union practice."-^^ jie sees militancy 
as evidenced by not only active participation in union affairs (the 
mark of a militant), but also by 
"a taking of the initiative, of exploiting fully whatever 
power or influence they possess, of pursuing a possibly 
successful policy in a prompt and speedy manner. In other 
words, militancy relates to achievement as well as method."-^^ 
Here, his emphasis is on activity - of pressing union demands and claims 
energetically and fully and by whatever means are appropriate to the 
situation and to the conditions under which a particular union operates. 
Now Allen, in discussing militant trade unionism, has drawn upon 
the experience of the British trade union movement, and its operation 
within what is mainly a collective bargaining system, and it does not 
necessarily follow that his statements can be applied with the same 
degree of accuracy to the trade union movement in this country. 
Certainly most Australian trade unionists would use the term 
militant to describe the active participant in union affairs; they might 
even agree that a union was acting militantly if it were vigorously 
pressing the claims of its members, whatever they might be. However, 
in its widest and most general application, militancy has a touch of 
opprobrium about it, being reserved for activity that is outside the 
16. V.L. Allen: Militant Trade Unionism. The Merlin Press, London, 
1966, p. 18. 
17. ibid. , p. 18. 
18. ibid., p. 19. 
11. 
established norms and practices, and the traditional framework for 
industrial labour relations, and for action considered to be inappropriate 
to both the particular situation and to the particular union or unions 
involved. 
Our traditional framework is the arbitration system whose purpose 
is the settling of industrial disputes. As, in practice, it also 
establishes National standards of wages and conditions at its major 
hearings, the majority of trade unions, whether willingly or unwillingly, 
operate under its strictures and within its heavily legalistic 
structure.-^ ^ Even those which are to all intents and purposes outside 
the system are not completely untouched by it. The Australian 
Federation of Air Pilots which placed itself outside the jurisdiction 
of the Arbitration Commission in 1958, has now, under the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act of 1967, to take any interstate industrial dispute 
before a Flight Crew Officers' Industrial Tribunal, appointed by the 
Commonwealth Government, and having the power to prevent or settle such 
disputes by conciliation or arbitration.'^ '^  Even in Broken Hill where 
the Barrier Industrial Council is the ultimate authority in industrial 
matters, and where these are regulated almost entirely by agreement,^-^ 
19. J. Hufeson: Penal Colony to Penal Powers. Amalgamated Engineering 
Union, Sydney, 1966, p. 77 and following. 
20. Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1967. (No. 101 of 1967). 
Commonwealth of Australia. Assented to 10/11/67. 
21. All State awards exclude the Coionty of Yancowinna in which Broken 
Hill is situated. Cf. S.C. Taylor: "Industrial Relations in the 
Broken Hill Mining Industry", The Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 7, 1965, pp. 101-111. W.E. Hotchkiss: "The Broken Hill 
Mines Agreement - a Study of some objective factors in Industrial 
Negotiation", The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 12, No.l, 
March 1970, pp. 9-19. 
12. 
it is usual for a member of the Industrial Commission of New South Wales 
or a Conciliation Commissioner to assist in the formulation of the 
22 
agreements. 
Also, as part of the governmental process, the arbitration system 
has attracted to itself a high degree of legitimacy, and even those 
imions which, for a variety of reasons, are becoming increasingly 
disenchanted with its operation, use it still. As well, enshrined 
within the provisions of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act is the 
notion of "the public interest", which has meant that the operators of 
the arbitration machinery, in coming to their decisions, are expected 
to be mindful, not only of the desirability of maintaining production 
and employment, but also of all the possible effects of various 
proposals upon the public welfare.'^ -^  The implication flowing from this 
is that trade unions, when they are parties to a dispute, bear, along 
with employers, a wider responsibility to society generally, than to the 
membership of their unions alone. Indeed, the "responsibility" of 
22.^ Cf. Mark Perlman: Judges in Industry. Melbourne Univ. Press, 
Melbourne, 1954, p. 48. "In point of fact, what is unique about 
the Australian way of handling industrial relations is the willing-
ness to accept the principle of governmental intervention. The 
Australians do have considerable collective bargaining most of which 
is carried on by national rather than local officers. But this 
collective bargaining is generally practised in the shadow of the 
Court. Thus it is the presence of the Court system which lends to 
Australia's industrial relations their characteristic form." Also, 
Ian Sharp: "Some Features of the Australian Industrial Relations 
Scene", The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1, April, 
1959, pp. 1-7. 
23i Paul L. Kleinsorge: "Public Interest as a Criterion in Settling 
Labor Disputes: The Australian Experience", The Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 6, No. 2., July, 1964, pp. 1-22. 
13. 
trade unions for the health and general prosperity of the economy is a 
belief which attracts a solid core of support, even vjithin the trade 
union movement itself. Union activity which cuts across these 
traditional attitudes, is therefore likely to be considered inappropriate 
and irresponsible by the community at large. 
Because industrial relations have been institutionalized^^ to a 
large extent, by these means and for these reasons, the majority of 
unions support and operate through the system, despite in many cases, 
their disappointment with the gains achieved, and "methods of direct 
action common to other countries, such as the United States and 
Britain, are, to a degree, less characteristic of union activities 
[in Australia]."26 
There may seem to be an ambivalence between the concept of 
legitimate and responsible actions within the bounds of the arbitration 
system and "the right to strike" - an article of faith which is 
jealously guarded by most trade unionists, even those accepted as non-
militant and operating through established channels. The lack of 
harmony between these two principles is, however, more apparent than 
real. 
"The strike is an incident of collective bargaining, and its 
isolation as a 'right' arises only when that incident is 
24. Cf. D.W. Rawson: "Politics and 'Responsibility' in Australian 
Trade Unions", Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
Vol. IV, No. 1, November, 1958, pp. 224-243. 
25. R.S. Parker: "Power in Australia", The Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 1, No. 2, October, 1965, pp. 85-96. 
26. Silverman: op.cit. , p. 28. 
14. 
divorced from the totality of the process and brought into 
question thereby."^' 
Furthermore, as Sorrell emphasises, the retention of the strike as a 
weapon available to unions is necessary as a pressure upon the employer 
to fulfil his obligations to bargain. Any seeming conflict is usually 
resolved by a non-militant union, in considering the strike as armament 
to be used as a last resort, when all the established methods of 
resolving industrial conflict have failed to provide a solution. A 
militant union would have less compunction about using the strike 
weapon, seeing it as one of a number of choices open to it, and using 
it if it seemed more appropriate, or likely to be more effective in 
particular circumstances, than traditional procedures.•^^ 
To this point it has been suggested that, over the years, a 
pattern of conduct and procedure for industrial labour relations has 
been laid down, in Australia, of which the arbitration system is the 
cornerstone; further, that this has been widely, if at times 
reluctantly, accepted by most unions, employers and successive governments 
both Federal and State. At this stage, it could then be said that a 
union would be regarded as militant, if it consistently, and over a 
period, adopted means of achieving specific goals which were contrary 
to, or outside of, these accepted norms and procedures. 
So far, no specifications have been laid down for methods which 
27. G.H. Sorrell: "The Dispute at Mount Isa" , The Australian Quarterly, 
Vol. XXXVII, No. 2, June, 1965, p. 24. 
28. It also needs to be borne in mind that the arbitration system itself 
does not demand either the complete renunciation of the right to 
strike, or penalisation for all strikes. 
15. 
are considered to be outside the traditional pattern, and an attempt 
will now be made to Identify them. In the course of such an 
examination it may be possible to clarify even further the definition of 
militancy suggested above. With regard to the means adopted by unions 
to achieve specific objectives, it needs to be pointed out that what 
may be apposite at one period of time for a particular group of 
employees, may not seem appropriate to another, either at the same 
instance or at another point in time. 
In addition, beliefs and values of long standing do change, albeit 
slowly and imperceptibly; those governing the conduct of industrial 
labour relations are no more immune to the passage of time than others. 
So it can happen that methods which are appropriate to a union at one 
time in its history may not be considered suitable at another. Or 
unions may be caught in a transitional period, when the established 
ways are coming under strong criticism and when a new procedural pattern 
has not yet been evolved. Such a period may well be upon us in Australia 
at the present time. Condemnation of the arbitration system is mounting, 
and calls for a wider use of collective bargaining or for some other 
scheme are increasing.^^ 
The Australian Workers Union provides a case in point. This union 
"has stood firmly by the principle of arbitration ever since it was 
established, despite considerable dissatisfaction within the \mion at 
29. Though it should be noted that a substantial area of collective 
bargaining is already accepted. Cf. J. Hu<tson, p. 78. See also 
The Australian, 31/1/1970 and 26/2/1970 for reports that the 
A.C.T.U. will discuss the possibility of trade iinions withdrawing 
from the arbitration system and seeking wage settlements by other 
means. 
16. 
times",-^^ and there is ample evidence over the years to support Walker's 
assessment.-^ -^  Yet in January, 1970 at the A.W.U. Federal Convention, 
the general secretary, T. Dougherty, launched the strongest attack ever 
made on the arbitration system by the union, threatening that unless 
changes in its operation were speedily brought about, that the union 
might be compelled to withdraw its support. •'^  
It is not suggested that such a drastic step is likely to be taken 
in the immediate future, but dissatisfactions of this kind increase the 
likelihood of moderate unions acting out of character, and occasionally 
using means which, under normal conditions, they would consider 
inappropriate. However, this would not mark such a union as being 
militant, until a pattern of such activity had been well established 
indicating that it was not a temporary aberration, but it does mean 
that our definition of militancy, once finally devised, will have to be 
flexible enough to embrace possible future changes in traditional values 
and procedures for the conduct of industrial labour relations. 
With regard to the methods used to achieve desired goals, direct 
action is usually regarded as one of the major weapons in a union's 
armoury. What is meant by 'direct action', a term which tends to be as 
loosely applied as that of militancy? Does direct action consist only 
of the strike - of the withdrawal of labour? 
30. Kenneth F. Walker: Industrial Relations in Australia. Harvard 
Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, pp. 260-61. 
31. Walker: ibid., pp. 255-265. Mark Perlman, op.cit., pp. 55-94. 
C.w. (Edgar) Williams: The 'Isa' - Yellow, Green and Red. The 
Worker Newspaper Pty., Brisbane, 1967, pp. 395-406. 
32. The Canberra Times, 30/1/1970. Sydney Morning Herald, 30/1/1970. 
The Australian, 31/1/1970. 
17, 
Communists, in their study of revolutionary tactics saw direct 
action as going much further than mere withdrawal of labour. 
"By 'direct action' we mean all forms of direct pressure of 
the workers upon the employers and the State: boycott, strike, 
street demonstrations, seizure of factories, uprisings and 
other revolutionary activity, which tend to unite the working 
class in the fight for socialism. The aim of the revolutionary 
trade unions, therefore, is to turn direct action into a 
weapon of education and to stimulate the fighting ability of 
the working masses for the social revolution and the 
institution of the dictatorship of the proletariat."^^ 
One doubts that this broad interpretation of direct action would 
elicit a common and favourable response from all Australian trade 
unionists. While Communists remain a militant minority in the trade 
union movement they are likely to take the intelligent and practical 
view that they would be unable to find enough support from fellow 
unionists to implement all of what they themselves consider to be the 
essentials of direct action. 
As a result, direct actionists in Australia have, to date, shown 
little tendency to use revolutionary tactics to achieve their ends, 
relying mainly on the strike, boycotting (declaring "black"), picketing, 
and, on rare occasions, marches and street demonstrations. 
Not all militants, however, use even these forms of direct action, 
and at this point one must differentiate, in a general way, between 
groups of unions and their attitudes to direct action, in particular, 
33. Decisions of the Third Congress of the Cowmmist International, 
Moscow, July, 1921. Communist Party of Great Britain, London, 
n.d. p. 69. For a more up-to-date discussion of direct action 
see P. Clancy: Unions and Today's Challenge, Twenty-first Congress, 
Commimist Party of Australia, 9-12, July, 1967. Modem Unionism 
and the Workers' Movement, Twenty-second Congress, Communist Party 
of Australia, March, 1970. 
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to the use of the strike. The basic distinction drawn between unions 
is that between manual and non-manual workers, while the latter group 
can be further divided into non-manual or white collar unions, on the 
one hand, and professional unions on the other. 
"Traditionally it has been assumed that non-manual and manual 
imions behave in quite different fashions, with the non-manual unions 
being much less militant." Whether this is the result of 
identification by manual workers with working class values and attitudes, 
and of white collar unionists with those of the middle class is still 
debatable,-^^ and much empirical research remains to be done before the 
question can be finally settled. 
Certainly many writers on the subject hold the view that social 
class and differing social values are responsible, in some measure, for 
differences in industrial behaviour. Allen asserts that "when 
employees, whoever they are, adopt collective action to protect their 
interests, they use the methods of trade unionism, within the context 
of their own social class values,"-'^ while Williams and Paterson feel 
that both class and status are important determinants of attitude for 
at least part of the white collar work force.^^ Barry Hill, in his 
34. Ross M. Martin: "Australian Professional and White Collar Unions", 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 5, No. 1, October, 1965, p. 93. 
35. Cf. D.W. Rawson: "The Frontiers of Trade Unionism", op.cit. and 
R.M. Martin: "Class Identification and Trade Union Behaviour: 
The Case of Australian White Collar Unions", Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 7, No. 2, July, 1965, and White Collar Unions in 
Australia, A.P.S.A. Monograph No. 5, 1965. 
36. V.L. Allen; op.cit., p. 15. 
37. Rees D. Williams & John Paterson: "White Collar Unionism", Dissent, 
Winter, 1965, No. 14, p. 43. 
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study of secondary school teachers in the Victorian Education Department, 
sees them as self-identifying with the middle class, and having the 
material preoccupations and aspirations of that class.-^ ^ All that can 
really be said with any degree of confidence about this aspect of non-
manual unions is that they form an extremely heterogeneous group, with 
some of them finding it less difficult to identify with and accept the 
industrial methods of manual unions than others. 
Professional unions, by and large, have been even less likely to 
strike than other non-manual unions. "To strike like a manual worker is 
to damage one's professional self-esteem."-^^ "Unprofessional" conduct 
in industrial matters may also retard the full acknowledgement, within 
the community and by employers, of professional status, where, as in the 
case of school teachers, this has not been completely achieved. The gap 
between professionals and employers, with regard to class distinctions 
and life style, is usually much narrower than that between employers and 
other non-manual workers, with the result that it would be more natural 
for professional groups to seek their ends by means of consultation and 
negotiation, as between equals, than by direct action.'^ '^  
Broadly speaking, and on past evidence, it can be said that the 
38. Barry Hill: "Hot White Collars", Dissent, Autumn, 1967, No. 19, 
pp. 25-29. 
39. Barry Hill: op.cit., p.26. 
40. Cf. Joseph Ben-David: "Professionals and Unions in Israel, 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 5, No. 1, October, 1965, for a discussion 
of certain components of professionalism and occupational patterns 
which would seem to be inconsistent with trade unionism itself. 
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right to strike and its use has been more solidly entrenched in manual 
unions, many of which were involved in the early struggles of the trade 
union movement, than in those composed of white collar workers, or 
whose members hold a professional status within the community. The 
approach of the latter types of union to strike action has usually been 
one of timidity and caution. This is not to say that white collar and 
professional unions will not strike. Recent examples of the Bank 
Officers' Association and the Victorian Teachers' Union in Australia, 
and of the same groups in the United Kingdom over the last five years 
are evidence that they will. Nevertheless, Walker-^ -^  and Dufty'^ ^ have 
shown from their survey research into attitudes of blue and white collar 
workers to strike action that there are marked differences between these 
two groups, the opinions both of rank and file members and of the 
leaders of white collar unions being consistent with the known actions 
of white collar unions in attempting to achieve their aims - that is, 
a disposition to defend and advance their interests by negotiation and 
resort to constitutional procedures. "^-^  
41. Kenneth F. Walker: "Attitudes of Union Leaders and Business 
Executives to Industrial Relations", Occupational Psychology, Vol.33, 
No. 3, July, 1959, pp. 157-165; "Conflict and Mutual Misunderstanding: 
A Survey of Union Leaders and Business Executives' Attitudes", The 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1, April, 1959, pp. 20-
30; "Executives' and Union Leaders' Perceptions of each others' 
Attitudes to Industrial Relations: The Influence of Stereotypes", 
Human Relations, Vol. 15, No. 3, August, 1962, pp. 183-196; 
"Personnel Officers' Perceptions of the Industrial Relations 
Attitudes of Union Leaders and Business Executives", The Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 7, No. 1, March, 1965. 
42. N.F. Dufty: "The Skilled Worker and His Union", The Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2, Oct., I960; "The white Collar 
Unionist", The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 3, No. 2, 
October, 1961, pp. 131-156. 
43. K.F. Walker: "White Collar Unionism in Australia" ed. A. Sturmthal: 
White Collar Trade Unions, Univ. of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1966, 
pp. 20-23. 
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It must be acknowledged, however, that changes in the traditional 
attitudes to direct action of some sections of the white collar work 
force have become evident in Australia within this decade. The reasons 
for this will be discussed later in this study when the causes of 
militancy are examined. Even so, as a general rule, militant, non-
manual unions have tended to use methods of direct action other than 
the strike, and these have been outside the conventional pattern of 
procedure accepted as being appropriate for their particular callings. 
Most Public Service unions, in Australia, for example, have 
seldom indulged in strike activity, but some do involve themselves in 
practices which would be regarded as outside the accepted norms of 
industrial behaviour for these unions. To exemplify: the calling of 
mass meetings to protest decisions of their employers (as the 
Queensland Teachers' Union did in 1966); adoption of a public stand of 
an ideological kind on particular issues, such as the Vietnam war or 
conscription; the public attack on government policies in fields in 
which the union is directly concerned (again, as the Queensland Teachers' 
Union did in 1966 over some of the Department of Education's policies 
on recruitment, and also as exemplified by the advertising campaign 
mounted by the New South Wales Teachers' Federation in 1969-1970, 
protesting against the failure of the government to provide enough places 
for all prospective teacher trainees); public demonstrations (in the 
manner in which members of the Association of Architects, Engineers, 
Surveyors and Draughtsmen of Australia protested outside the Canberra 
offices of the Public Service Board in February, 1970). 
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It has been suggested that these sorts of activities on the part 
of white collar organisations should be 
"placed more in the category of the public relations activity 
of a pressure group than in the conventions of militant trade 
unions. There is a close parallel between the white collar 
protest meeting and that of the outer suburban Progress 
Association protesting against indifference to their needs on 
the part of water, sewerage and road-making authorities."^^ 
While the common denominator for most public service unions and outer 
suburban progress associations would presumably be membership of the 
middle class, and a probable acceptance of what are generally believed 
to be values and attitudes common to that class, no close correlation 
necessarily exists between the infrequent outbursts of protest by 
progress associations, and the sustained use of any or all of the above 
mentioned practices by white collar organisations of this kind, As 
long as it is widely held, both within and outside the organisations, 
that consultation and negotiation are the proper means by which aims 
are achieved and conflict resolved, then activities such as those 
recorded above must be considered to run counter to the usual attitudes 
and procedures of the unions concerned, and provided they are 
consistently maintained over a period, should be regarded as an indicator 
of militancy for those unions. 
Other signs of a union's willingness to cut across accepted values 
may be found in affiliation with bodies outside their own field of 
interest. Thus, for State teachers' unions to be affiliated with a 
Federal organisation of teachers, or even with a body like the Australian 
44. R.J. O'Dea of the Professional Engineers' Association, quoted in 
K.F. Walker: ibid. , pp. 25-26. 
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Council of Salaried and Professional Associations would be considered 
normal, but ties, such as the N.S.W. Teachers' Federation has with the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions would be more unusual. This is 
particularly so in Australia, where affiliation with Trades and Labor 
Councils is considered to have political implications, and many non-
manual groups have held themselves aloof from such affiliations for 
this reason. In the same way, a distinction can be made between unions 
affiliated with a political party, such as the Australian Labor Party, 
and those which are not, though both these differentiations need to be 
treated with caution as indices of militancy. The Australian Federation 
of Air Pilots, a militant union in terms of the definition, is 
affiliated with neither the A.C.T.U. nor the A.L.P.; whereas the 
Australian Workers' Union, by all counts a moderate among unions, has 
been heavily involved in political activity since the early days of the 
labor movement, is usually affiliated with all State branches of the 
A.L.P., yet could not be persuaded to join forces with the A.C.T.U. 
until 1967. "^5 The various State teachers' unions offer another example 
of diversity in attitude. The N.S.W. Federation is the only one with 
a link to the A.C.T.U. None is affiliated with the A.L.P. The 
Queensland Teachers' Union which has shown a marked tendency towards 
militant action in recent years is, however, affiliated with the 
Combined Industrial Unions Committee of Queensland, "which links ten 
Queensland unions of very different kinds, but which have in common an 
45. 0. De R. Foenander: Trade Unionism in Australia: Some Aspects, 
The Law Book Co., of A/a sia, Sydney, 1962, p. 15. This reluctance 
is still evident. Cf. Courier Mail, 31/1/1970; The Australian, 
31/1/1970 where the A.W.U. warned it would consider disaffiliating 
with the A.C.T.U. if the latter joined the Communist-front World 
Federation of Trade Unions. 
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unwillingness to affiliate with the Queensland Trades and Labour 
Council.'"^ 6 So it would seem that associations of the above-mentioned 
kind between unions, or the lack of them, on their own, tell us little 
about the degree of militancy exhibited by a union, but they can form 
a link in the chain of evidence provided from other sources, and for 
this reason, should not be over-looked. 
Summing up, it would seem that "there is no precise, universally 
valid form of militant action."^^ Unions have a variety of means 
available to them by which to press for desired ends. Even so, the 
difference between the militant and non-militant union lies in the 
willingness of the former to adopt tactics and methods which lie outside 
the procedures accepted by custom as appropriate for that particular 
union. Based on these assumptions and on the argument and evidence 
already presented, militancy, as finally defined, becomes a preparedness 
to step outside the accepted norms of negotiation and action, for one 's 
calling, in order to achieve one's objectives,whether these be 
ideological or industrial or both. This interpretation of militancy 
will be just as apt for past and present situations as it will be for 
any future occasions when conventional practices for the conduct of 
industrial labour relations and the resolution of industrial conflict 
may change. It will apply equally as well to employers as to unions, 
as a description for management tactics which lie outside what is 
customary and "responsible", such as the lock-out. 
46. D.W. Rawson & Suzanne Wrightson: A Handbook of Trade Unions and 
Emcployees' Associations. Occasional Paper No. 5, A.N.U. Press, 
Canberra, 1970, p.17. 
47. Allen: op.cit., p. 20. 
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Naturally, it is understood that others may see militancy from a 
different standpoint, and draw conclusions from their view which may be 
as valid as those derived in this thesis from the definition as stated 
above. The fact that there are varying approaches to a topic such as 
militancy is hardly surprising and it seems unnecessary to assert the 
primacy of one definition over another. What is important is that the 
formulation arrived at be consistent with the examinable facts, and 
capable of being applied to arrive at conclusions of a general kind. 
The rendering of militancy adopted in this thesis forms the foundation 
on which the body of the study is built, the discovery and examination 
of the causes of militancy in unions. To this end, means of 
identification of militant unions now need to be indicated. 
There are at least three ways of amassing evidence of militancy in 
a union. The first can be called the "reputational" assessment, i.e. 
the public image which the union has acquired. The incidence of 
strikes within an industry, and the number of times a union has 
participated can be counted. Finally, occasions on which piiblic acts 
or statements of an unusual nature are made, such as the calling of mass 
meetings or public criticism of policies, can be noted from a study of 
the press. None of these sources will furnish positive proof of 
militancy, but each, or all of them together, can provide a starting 
point for further and more reliable research into whether a union has 
been appropriately categorized or not. 
The reputational grounds for militancy are often tenuously based, 
relying as they mainly do on the possibly prejudiced testimony of 
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politicians, trade union, business and industry leaders, and on press 
reports, all evidence which needs to be treated with some degree of 
caution, if viewed on its own. More substantial data is available in 
the statistics on strike incidence, and facts of this kind have provided 
the basis for several specialised studies on industrial labour relations, 
specifically in terms of international comparisons of industrial conflict. 
However, at this level, it is not difficult to fall into error in 
interpretation of the available statistics. Variations will occur 
between countries, in the methods used to compile data, the complex web 
of industrial labour relations will not be the same from country to 
country, due to national variations in causes of strike activity; 
consequently, the whole question of an international industry comparison 
of industrial conflict, based on statistics only, needs to be treated 
with discretion. "^^ 
For Australia alone, the picture is clearer, both in terms of 
material available and the accuracy of the conclusions that can be drawn 
from it, though even here a note of warning should be sounded.-^ "^  The 
48. Clark Kerr & Abraham Siegel: "The Inter-industry Propensity to 
Strike", ed. A. Kornhauser, R. Dubin & A. Ross: Industrial Conflict. 
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1954. A. Ross & P. Hartman: Changing 
Patterns of Industrial Conflict. John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1960. 
49. Kerr & Siegel: ibid. , pp. 189-212; D.W. Oxnam: "International 
Comparisons of Industrial Conflict: An Appraisal", The Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 7, 1965, pp. 149-161; O. De R. Foenander: 
Solving Labour Problems in Australia. Melbourne Univ. Press, 
Melbourne, 1941, p. 6. 
50. D.W. Oxnam: "The Incidence of Strikes in Australia", ed. J.E. 
Isaac & G.W. Ford: Australian Labour Relations: Readings. Sun 
Books, Melbourne, Second Edition, 1971, pp. 19-57; N.R. Conn: 
"The Statistics of Industrial Disputes", The Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1, April, 1959, pp. 55-58. 
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Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, together with the 
appropriate Federal and State Departments , collects and compiles much 
statistical data on industry. ^-^  Unfortunately, the break down of 
figures from these sources is not as helpful as it might be. To instance 
one or two examples only, work stoppages of less than ten man days are 
normally excluded from the official assessment of industrial disputes. 
This means that the record will not show time lost through "rolling" 
or "lightning strikes", .and "working to regulations", nor the slowing 
down effects of an "overtime ban". Yet these are tactics which some 
unions have used more frequently in recent years. As a form of direct 
action, all of these methods are being used by the Amalgamated Postal 
Workers' Union, in preference to prolonged work stoppages, and have 
effectively created chaos on occasions in the mail sorting and delivery 
sections of the Post Master General's Department. 
Second, information on strike incidence is made available on an 
"industrial group" basis, which is an inappropriate unit for the 
analysis of industrial strife. As a result, railway and tramway 
services are lumped together, as are road and air transport, though it 
may well be that unions within these groups have little in common with 
each other as regards industrial attitudes. Similarly, engineering, 
metals, vehicles etc. are grouped in the one industry. This would 
include some of Australia's biggest and most active unions, like the 
51. One of the most useful would be Department of Labour and National 
Service, Industrial Disputes in Australia, Melbourne, 1958, with 
additions to 1963, together with Labor Reports and the Quarterly 
Sunmary of Australian Statistics, issued by the Commonwealth Bureau 
of Census and Statistics, Canberra. 
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Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Electrical Trades Union and the 
Federated Ironworkers' Association, and yet there is nothing in the 
statistics to indicate which of these unions was involved in work 
stoppages, and to what extent. Finally, when the attempt is made to 
attribute causes to industrial disputes, the distribution of figures 
under such headings as "wages, hours and leave", "physical working 
conditions and managerial policy" and "trade unionism" is too general 
to be of as much use as it could be. However, while taking criticisms 
of this nature into account, it needs to be stressed that a great deal 
of valuable information can be determined from official sources. 
The third method of evaluation, that of assessment of press 
reports on the "extra-curricular activities" of unions and their 
leaders, and of their public stance, if one is taken, on matters and 
policies which do not necessarily have to do with strictly industrial 
issues will round out the picture of the union and its interests. 
All the methods outlined above, and others can be used to identify 
unions indulging in direct action, but what is far more critical to an 
understanding of industrial labour relations, industrial conflict and 
the effects of militancy in these circumstances is why unions sanction 
direct confrontations with management in the first place. Why is it 
that unions like those in the coal mining and stevedoring industries 
have had a reputation for this kind of activity; why do some unions use 
this method sparingly while others have virtually no record of industrial 
conflict? A further and even more interesting question requires an 
answer. Why do some unions change their attitude to direct action? 
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Unions like the Australian Federation of Air Pilots, and, to a lesser 
extent, the Queensland Teachers' Union, with a past history relatively 
free from industrial conflict, have, in the last five years, acquired a 
reputation for militancy, while others, such as the unions forming the 
Barrier Industrial Council at Broken Hill, with a record over many years 
of bitter and sustained clashes with management have more recently 
enjoyed a "period of substantial tranquility."^^ This study hopes to 
provide at least tentative answers to these questions through an 
examination of the causes of militancy in trade unions. 
The choice of methodological approach has not been an easy one 
because "labor-management relations as a whole make up a constellation 
of inter-related types and patterns which are joined together by a 
complex of social, economic and political forces."^-^ Research has 
tended to concentrate upon certain aspects within this galaxy: the 
power structure within unions or within the managerial organisation, 
ideological motivations, the effects of work conditions, conflict 
situations. It is to the last mentioned feature that attention must 
necessarily be directed, as militancy has to do with union-management 
confrontations of various kinds. 
Many overseas studies of industrial unrest have adopted a "human 
52. S.C. Taylor: op.cit., p. 102, and Kenneth F. Walker: op.cit., 
pp. 77-135. 
53. Frederick H. Harbison, Robert K. Burns & Robert Dubin: "Toward 
a Theory of Labor-Management Relations", ed. Richard A. Lester 
& Joseph Shister: Insights into Labor Issues, The Macmillan Co., 
New York, 1949, p. 7. 
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relations" approach,^^ and concerned themselves with the interaction 
and relationships between the actors in a dispute. Some, like Gouldner,^^ 
have been fortunate enough to be able to follow the course of direct 
action, within a plant, from beginning to end, and to draw meaningful 
conclusions from "on the spot" evidence. Yet such exercises, while 
adding to the sum total of our knowledge of conflict situations, cannot 
produce universal rules which will apply with equal validity to all 
cases and at all times. The literature on Australian strikes, in itself 
limited, suffers, for our purposes, from the same shortcomings.-^^ 
Now, both unions and management are structured organisations within 
and between which a complex system of association develops. In the case 
of unions with a long history behind them, these relationships will have 
formed, over the years, into a pattern, which may alter, however, due 
to other factors. At the same time the union-management connection does 
not operate divorced from the larger industrial environment. The union 
will, in all probability, have links with one or more other unions; the 
54. Cf. for example, W.F. Whyte: "Hiaman Relations Theory - a Progress 
Report", Harvard Business Review, Vol. xxxiv. No. 5, 1956, pp. 125-
132. Industry and Society, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1946. "Patterns 
of Inter-action in Union-Management Relations", Human Organisation, 
Vol. VIII, No. 4, 1949, pp. 13-19. 
55. A.W. Gouldner: Wildcat Strike. Antioch Press, Yellow Springs, 
1954, and W.F. Whyte: "Framework for the Analysis of Industrial 
Relations: Two Views" (with J.T. Dunlop), Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, Vol. ill, 1950, pp. 383-412. 
56. Cf. Silverman: op.cit., C.W. Williams: op.cit., A. Stewart: Mt. 
Isa: In Search of a Culprit. Hill of Content, Melbourne, 1965. 
Gordon Sheldon: Industrial Siege: The Mount Isa Dispute. F.W. 
Cheshire, Melboiorne, 1965. ""Arbitrator" - The Steel Strike -
January, 1961", The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 3, No. 1, 
April, 1961. Helen Hughes: "Industrial Relations in the 
Australian Iron and Steel Industry, 1876-1962", The Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 4, No. 2, October, 1962, et al. 
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same will apply to management, and both will operate within an economic 
and political system which is itself subject to change. Nor do they 
operate apart from the micro-situation, i.e. the small, informal groupings 
within an organisation. Finally, because industrial labor relations 
have to do with relationships formed between human beings, not only as 
workers or employers, but also as individuals with a life outside the 
work place, they need to be placed within the total environment of the 
whole community. It can be argued, then, that any attempt to isolate 
the causal factors of militancy will involve taking an ecological view 
of industrial relations as the inter-action of management and 
employees in an economic, technological and socio-political environment. 
Some methodological constructions along these lines have been 
suggested or used already,^ '^  but Dunlop's analysis, in a very broad sense, 
has been adapted for this study.-^ ^ Dunlop's thesis is that industrial 
relations behaviour is the result of the process of accommodation of 
management and union organisations in a particular environment. Hence, 
if at any given time, one were to analyse the two social systems (union 
and management) and the total environment within which they operate, 
meaningful results, in terms of explanations of industrial relations 
57. F.H. Harbison, R.K. Burns & R. Dubin: op.cit., pp. 3-24. A.M. Ross 
& P.T. Hartman: Op.cit., pp. 34-81. Kenneth F. Walker: Research 
Needs in Industrial Relations. F.W. Cheshire, Sydney, 2nd (revised) 
edition, 1964, and "Some Trends in American Research on Industrial 
Relations", The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
April, 1959, pp. 59-61. R.J. May: op.cit. Maxine Bucklow: 
"Psychology and Sociology in the Teaching of Industrial Relations", 
The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 6, No. 3, November, 1964, 
pp. 203-224. 
58. J.T. Dunlop: "Framework for the Analysis of Industrial Relations: 
Two Views" (with W.F. Whyte), Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
Vol. Ill, 1950, pp. 383-412. 
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behaviour would be obtained. If one adds two other factors, i.e. what 
might be called the historical or institutionalized background to the 
relationship 5 and also the lines along which the relationship has 
developed, then the results are relevant not only to one point of time 
within the relationship, but over a long period. 
Dunlop's hypothesis thus provides the following seven point framework 
for the analysis of industrial relations behaviour: 
1. The union and management organisations and their respective 
internal procedures for decision making. 
2. The total context in which the parties accommodate to each 
other, conceived in terms of four environmental elements, 
viz: 
(a) the technological and physical conditions of the 
work community; 
(b) the conditions in the labor market in which the 
labor services are purchased by the management, 
and the conditions in the product market in 
which the output or service is sold; 
(c) the industrial relations setting of the parties, 
which includes the relation of the union to other 
unions and the management to other managements 
in its labor relations policies; 
(d) the ideas, beliefs and value judgments in the 
community and in the industry in which the 
parties bargain. 
3. The origins and beginnings of the relationship as they 
are institutionalized and have come to have a continuing 
effect on the parties. 
4. The particular axes or directions along which the 
relationship between the parties has grown. 
There are several other factors which may affect militancy and yet 
59. J.T. Dunlop: op.cit., pp. 386-7. 
which do not fit with facility into this structural arrangement. In 
terms of the definition we are interested in the "accepted norms of 
negotiation and action". This will require an investigation of the 
role of the State, particularly as observed in the impact of the 
arbitration system and the possible effect on industrial relations of 
preferential or (de facto) compulsory unionism. Though Dunlop evolved 
his conceptual framework in the first place for use within the 
environmental context of a collective bargaining system. Walker has 
shown that it can be used successfully within the framework of the 
Australian arbitration system,^ '^  and it may well be that the factors 
noted above can be dealt with under the second heading. Rather than 
force the material to fit the structure, however, when necessary, 
another section will be added to Dunlop's four environmental elements. 
It would have been impossible to scrutinize all unions within the 
confines of this thesis. One union, reputationally militant, has been 
chosen as a case study for intensive investigation - the Australian 
Railways Union (Queensland Branch). By way of comparison and contrast, 
material has been included which deals with the activities of other 
unions, with emphasis on another transport union, the Australian 
Federation of Air Pilots. Other unions will be used in a general way, 
as illustration. Some adjustment to Dunlop's original plan has been 
made, in the interests of more logical sequence, and the number of his 
criteria reduced to five. The origins and beginnings of the union-
management relationship and their axes of development have been taken 
60. Kenneth F. Walker: Industrial Relations in Australia, op.cit. 
3H., 
together and investigated first; point 2(b)^-^ has been eliminated and 
an examination of conditions in the labor and product markets 
incorporated in Chapters 5 and 6. 
61. Cf. supra, p. 32. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ORIGINS AND BEGINNINGS OF THE UNION-MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONSHIP AS THEY ARE INSTITUTIONALIZED A N T I W E 
COME TO HAVE A CONTINUING EFFECT ON THE PARTIES! 
TOGETHER WITH THE PARTICULAR AXES OR DIRECTIONS" 
ALONG WHICH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTlFS 
HAS GROWN.-i 
PART I: THE QUEENSLAND RAILWAY SERVICE 
From the beginning, railways have been important in the political 
life of Queensland; conversely politics has been a leitmotif running 
through the whole history of railway development in the State. It is 
natural that this should have been so, at least in the beginning when 
political decisions had to be made about the form of ownership for the 
railways, finance, the choice of railway routes and generally the areas 
to be served; and because these "first inland railways were pioneer 
rather than pioneering railways"^ it was also natural that individuals 
and groups should have a personal interest in and concern for the 
decisions made, and should attempt to influence these decisions in 
favour of their own interests and areas. 
The first political decision taken was the most important: when 
to commence railway building and it was made only four years after 
Letters Patent created the separate colony of Queensland.^ On May 19th, 
1863, A. Macalister, the Secretary for Lands and Works introduced a 
1. J.T. Dunlop: "Framework-for the Analysis of Industrial Relations: 
Two Views", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. Ill, April, 
1950, p. 387. 
2. Geoffrey Blainey: The Tyranny of Distance. Sun Books, Melbourne, 
1966, p. 234. 
3. June 6th, 1859. 
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Railway Bill^ into the Lower House of the Queensland Parliament, which 
when passed, would authorise and regulate general railway construction 
in the State. At the same time the government made known its 
intention to build the first railway from Ipswich to Toowoomba, with 
later extensions to Warwick and Dalby. Given the fact that this was 
done early in the life of the new colony, whose resources were, to a 
large extent, unproven, and whilst its finances were still in a 
precarious state, it would seem an act of some courage on the part of 
the government to initiate a costly railway programme at this stage. 
There was a hint, too, of chauvinism in Macalister's statement that 
"the purpose of carrying the line through to Dalby was to tap the 
Maranoa and Warrego, whose whole trade and traffic at the present was 
with New South Wales or South Australia."^ New South Wales was pushing 
a line up towards the Queensland border, and it was important that this 
challenge be met before a fiorther siphoning off of commerce from the 
south western area of the colony occurred. 
The proposal to initiate railway building did not meet with 
universal approval. Most supported the government's arguments that 
railways were necessary for the triple purposes of immigration-settlement-
transport; as an inducement to immigrants, and therefore, closer 
settlement, by offering cheap and fast transport, not only for the 
incoming settlers, but more Importantly, for their produce to market. 
4. "A Bill to Make Provision for the Construction by the Government 
of Railways and for the Regulation of the Same." 27, Victoria, 
No. 8. 
5. A. Macalister, Minister for Lands and Works: Qld. Pari. Debates 
(Hereafter Q.P.D.). First Series, Vol. 1, 1864, p. 68. 
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Few should have argued with the decision to drive this first 
railway through to Toowoomba and the Darling Downs. A permanent 
population and an assured traffic would seem to be prerequisites for a 
successful railway, and two-thirds of the traffic of the colony was 
concentrated in the area to be served by the proposed railway. Some 
critics, while agreeing in principle with the purposes of the Act, 
queried its timing. In their view it was too early in the life of the 
colony to contemplate such extensive capital expenditure; consolidation 
of governmental finance would be necessary before public works of such 
magnitude could be undertaken.^ 
More importantly, a concentrated attack on the Railway Bill was 
laid down by the members from the Northern Districts, with the support 
of those from the Brisbane constituencies. The metropolitan members 
saw the proposed linking of Ipswich and Toowoomba by rail, as a further 
round, which they stood to lose, in the continuing fight between 
Brisbane and Ipswich for primacy within the colony.'^  Macalister, the 
Minister for Lands and Works, was one of the members for Ipswich, and 
the railway line was thought to be an attempt on the part of Ipswich 
interests, backed by the squattocracy of the Downs to further Increase 
their wealth and Influence. John Douglas, the member for Port Curtis 
and chief parliamentary spokesman for what was then seen as the 
northern districts, denounced the proposed railway as part of "a 
conspiracy to defraud the unsettled districts of their due. It is but 
6. Q.P.D. First Series, Vol. 1, 1864, pp. 59-62. 
7. ibid. , p. 70. 
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natural that the occupants of these districts should look with 
suspicion on a Bill which appears to favour one portion of the country 
at the expense of another."^ The arguments of Douglas and his 
colleagues were backed by a petition, signed by 210 residents of 
Rockhampton and the adjoining districts,^ from which it was clear that 
they were fearful that branch lines from the Ipswlch-Dalby line would 
tap areas whose natural egress should be through Rockhampton. The 
petitioners asked that legislative action on the proposed Bill be 
suspended until further representation be granted to the northern 
districts; falling this they wanted another railway to be commenced, 
"mile for mile with the southern one, to extend westwards from 
Rockhampton in the direction of the Peak Downs."-^ '^  
When, after considerable debate, the Railway Bill was finally put 
to the House, it divided evenly so that the government secured a 
majority of one only by the Speaker's casting vote. Deciding it was 
futile to proceed on this basis, the Premier, R.G. Herbert, obtained a 
dissolution and went to the country on the railway question. The 
elections gave the Government a slightly larger majority and the Railway 
Bill on re-siibmission was passed by three votes.-^ -^  
The battle had been won and the principle of an immediate start to 
railway construction in Queensland conceded, however narrowly. It was 
8. ibid. , p. 245. 
9. Votes and Proceedings, 0d., Session II, 1863, p. 599. 
10. ibid. 
11. September 12th, 1864. This Act, 28 Victoria No. 24, was passed 
as an amendment to the Railway Act of 1863. See footnote 4. 
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the first of a series of political conflicts over aspects of railway 
construction and development. Because some of these questions recur 
throughout the history of the Queensland railway system, it is necessary 
to look at them in some detail. 
There were three main Issues which aroused hostility: the width 
of gauge to be used, the method of financing railway development, and 
the prospective routes and areas to be served by future railway 
construction. The "width of gauge" question presented problems all 
over Australia. Victoria had begun building its first railways in the 
1850's and used the Irish gauge of 5 feet 3 inches. New South Wales, 
after a false start at 5 feet 3 inches reverted to the English gauge, 
and laid its railway lines with a 4 feet SJg inches width of track. By 
the time Queensland had to give thought to railway construction, an 
even narrower gauge, that of 3 feet 6 inches, had become popular 
overseas, particularly in India. Lighter and cheaper than the wider 
systems, the narrow gauge track was also able to curve with greater 
facility, enabling cheaper crossings of the Great Dividing Range. 
Considerable opposition was mounted to the proposed use of the 
3 foot 6 inch gauge for the Queensland railway system, principally on 
the grounds of safety and "its fitness to meet, not only the present, 
but also the future wants of the colony."-^ ^ j^ the event, the 
government acted upon the advice and report of its first Commissioner 
for Railways, A. Fltzgibbon, a civil engineer, who had had extensive 
railway experience in various countries, including the U.S.A. Fltzgibbon 
12. Resolution of the Legislative Council, received and read by the 
Legislative Assembly, September 2nd, 1863, Votes and Proceedings, 
Qld., Session II, 1863, p. 123. 
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preached the advantages of the narrow gauge,-^ -^  and his views were to be 
endorsed thirty years later by another railway engineer, George 
Phillips, a man with much experience of the Queensland railway system. 
It was Phillips' view that 
"to expend unnecessary capital upon railways (by adopting 
the expensive methods used in many other countries) which 
can only be expected for many years to command sufficient 
traffic to provide interest upon the least possible outlay 
compatible with certain well-known axioms of railway 
management, is a folly which can only result in loss to the 
promoters, whether they be Governments or private 
individuals."14 
It would seem that, ultimately, the question of the necessity for the 
less expensive gauge could never have really been in doubt. "For 
Queensland, or any colony with a vast territory and small funds, the 
savings of a narrow gauge seemed inviting; even on the wide plains 
where these savings were often slight, Queensland adopted the narrow 
track."^5 
In Introducing the first Railway Bill, Macalister had offered 
potent arguments in favour of government establishment and control of 
railways, in preference to private companies or individuals. Basically, 
his case was that in new countries there were various public works 
essentially required to be undertaken for the benefit of the community 
generally, which had to be carried out by government, because they were 
13. Cf. Report from A. Fltzgibbon Esq., C.E. upon proposed line of 
Railway from Ipswich to Dalby and Warwick, via Toowoomba, ibid. , 
p. 589. See also, Queensland Railways First Half Cen-tury 1864-
1914. Govt. Printer, Brisbane, 1914, for biographical sketch of 
Fltzgibbon. 
14. George Phillips: Pioneer Railways for Queensland. Watson-
Ferguson & Co., Brisbane, 1892, p. 5. 
15. Blainey; op.cit., p. 248. 
not sufficiently remunerative (where the rate of interest upon capital 
was so high as in the colonies) to induce private individuals or 
companies to embark upon them.-^ ^ It followed from this that financing 
of the Queensland railway system would be by loan, as it was only 
reasonable to expect that posterity should bear some of the financial 
burden for benefits which would accrue ultimately to all, future 
generations as well as present. 
This decision to finance the railways by loan raisings created 
less of a political storm than might have been expected. One would 
have thought that the citizens of Queensland might have been troubled, 
by this willingness, even eagerness, on the part of their government 
to saddle itself at such an early stage with large capital debt and 
interest payments on railways alone. At the time, Queensland's credit 
in England was good, and the "home" loan market buoyant. Consequently, 
the fact that the raising of the required sums appeared to present 
little difficulty probably accounted for the optimism. Certainly the 
government's decision was in line with the thinking of other colonial 
governments in Australia on railway financing. Private promotion of 
early lines in New South Wales and Victoria had proved unsuccessful,-^7 
so that ultimately "governments came to build their own railways with 
borrowed English money. Unlike the railways of the United States, 
Great Britain and many European countries, all but a few Australian 
16. N.G. Butlin: Investment in Australian Economic Development. 
Cambridge University Press, 1964, Chapter 5. 
17. For an account of corruption and scandal associated with private 
promotion of early Victorian lines, see Michael Cannon: The Land 
Boomers, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1966, particularly 
Part I, Chapter 6, and Geoffrey Serle: The Golden Age. Melbourne 
University Press, Melbourne, 1963, Chapter 8. 
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railways were to be built by the Crown."-^^ 
Though the government had made it clear that the land grant system 
would not be Introduced in Queens land,-^ ^ Intermittent attempts to do so 
were made by individuals both in and outside Parliament in the years 
that followed. The proposal of Robert Tooth £ Co. in 1862 to build a 
light railway between Ipswich and Toowoomba had not been taken up by 
the government yet others persisted with the idea of private railway 
building through land grants, and several private members' bills were 
Introduced into the early Parliaments, to that end.'^ ^ All were 
unsuccessful. 
The action of the South Australian Parliament, early in 1858, in 
granting leave to a firm of private capitalists to construct a railway 
in the Northern Territory caused considerable agitation in Queensland 
for similar permission to private companies for railway building in the 
northern parts of the state. On a later occasion a proposal from a 
Melbourne firm to build a line from Dalby to Normanton (the so-called 
Continental Railway) was widely canvassed and received considerable 
support, even from within the government. The proposers' demands that 
large areas of land on either side of the line be granted to them in fee 
18. Blainey: op.cit., p. 232. 
19. In reply to a parliamentary question at the time of introduction of 
the first Railway Bill, the Secretary for Lands stated that "it is 
the intention of the government to reserve from non-competitive 
sale the land immediately on each side of the line authorized to 
be made." Votes and Proceedings, Qld. Session II, 1863, p. 87. 
20. Typical was the private members Bill introduced by the member for 
Port Curtis, John Douglas. See Q.P.D. , 1st Series, Vol. 1, 1864, 
p. 244. This embodied the principle that railways should be 
constructed by local land trusts and corporations, the costs to 
be defrayed by the sale of lands in the several districts. 
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simple, without encumbrance, proved too outrageous and the project was 
rejected. Mcllwraith, the Minister for Works, who had been the plan's 
chief advocate in Cabinet resigned over this. His continuing sentiment 
for land grant railways led to the fall of his government in 1883, 
when, as Premier, his Transcontinental (Land Grant) Railway Bill was 
defeated by 27 votes to 16. A preliminary agreement had been made by 
Sir Thomas with an English company to construct a railway from 
Charleville to Point Parker on the Gulf of Carpentaria, with a twelve 
million acre land grant as part of the bargain, a project which 
Parliament refused to ratify by defeating the enabling Bill and bringing 
down the Mcllwraith government.^i 
These periodic outbursts of demand for the land grant system 
usually coincided with times when the colony was passing through one of 
the cyclical fluctuations between prosperity and depression which marked 
colonial finances and fortunes until well into the present century. The 
political masters of Queensland's destiny had placed themselves in a most 
vulnerable position, from the very beginning, by their decision to 
embark so precipitously on railway building through borrowings, and this 
at a time when the colony's financial position was not stabilized. A 
contracting loan market overseas, particularly in England, could have 
repercussions in Queensland which might be well nigh disastrous, both 
politically and economically. 
This danger was dramatically brought home before the first railway 
21. C.A. Bernays: Queensland Politics during Sixty Years 1859-1919. 
Govt. Printer, Brisbane, no date, p. 91, and Q.P.D., Vol. XXXIX, 
1883, p. 60, pp. 66-155. 
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had been pushed even half way to Toowoomba. The failure of Agra 
and Masterman's Bank, in 1865, with which the government had an 
agreement with regard to loans, stopped short the supply of funds for the 
railway. The resulting financial crisis in England badly shook also 
the financial stability of the contractors for the Ipswich-Toowoomba 
line, Messrs. Peto, Brassey and Betts.^^ Work on railway construction 
was brought to a virtual standstill, and the majority of the experienced 
Scots and English navvies brought out by the contractors to work on 
railway construction in Australia were dismissed, along with local 
23 
labour. Depression and labour troubles were to dog the government for 
several years more, and to defeat the Macalister government at the 
elections of 1867, just as railway matters were to bring about the fall 
of the Palmer Ministry in 1870 and Mcllwraith in 1883. 
This early crisis, established a pattern for the remainder of 
the "construction" era, a period which was to extend into the 1930's. 
In times of prosperity railways were pushed ahead, but railway finance 
22. For a full account of the effect of the bank failure on this 
world famous firm of railway contractors, see R.K. Middlemas: 
The Master Builders. Hutchinson, London, 1963. "The most 
spectacular case was that of Peto in 1866 ... associated with 
the fall of Overend, Gurney and the London, Chatham and Dover 
Railway. At that period Thomas Brassey is said to have lost 
£1 million." 
Harold Pollins: "Railway Contractors and the Finance of Railway 
Development in Britain", The Journal of Transport History, 
Vol. Ill, 1957-58, pp. 41-51, 103-110. 
23. Queensland Railways, First Half-Century, 1864-1914, pp. 44-45: 
Brassey had himself paid the passages of 2,000 navvies to work 
on the western line from Sydney, which was the firm's first 
Australian contract. It is not suggested that all of these were 
employed on the Ipswich-Toowoomba line, though undoubtedly many 
were. First dismissals on the railway works accoixnted for 
about 1,000 men. Further dismissals followed. 
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became more and more a source of political controversy, forcing the 
government of the day, on occasions, to put forward schemes to keep 
railway construction going, other than by borrowings, so that the 
continuing demands for railway services from the scattered districts in 
the state might be partially met at least. 
"The Western Railway Act of 1875"^^ was a case in point. Its 
purpose was to authorize the making of a railway from Dalby to Roma and 
to provide funds for the construction of the same by the alienation and 
sale of Crown lands. To this end the Western Railway Reserve was 
created, an area of land stretching for fifty miles on either side of 
a line drawn between Dalby and Roma, and fifty miles beyond the latter 
town. Money from the sale of land within the Reserve was placed in a 
separate Trust account and used to meet the costs of building the line.^^ 
Somewhat similar reasons prompted the passage of "The Tramways 
Act of 1882."^^ Though its official title belied its provisions, the 
Act granted local authorities or a company registered under the companies 
Act, the right to construct tramways, or light railways, and to borrow 
from the Treasurer, under the provisions of the Local Works Loans Acts, 
for the purchase, construction or extension of same. With this sort of 
24. Assented to, August 31st, 1875: 30 Victoria, No. 7. 
25. Cf. Votes and Proceedings, Qld. 1876, Vol. 2, and Votes and 
Proceedings, Qld. 1878, Vol. 1, for abstracts of the Public 
Accounts of the Colony of Queensland for the financial years, 1875-76 
and 1876-77, for amounts credited to the Western Railway Trust 
Account from sale of Crown lands. 
26. "An Act to authorise the Construction Maintenance and Working of 
Tramways on Public streets and roads in such manner as not to impede 
ordinary traffic." 46 Victoria, No. 10. 
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encouragement at least thirteen such lines were built, some by mining 
companies; many of them, being 3 foot 6 inch gauge light railways, 
were later taken over by the government and Incorporated in the public 
railway system.^' 
At no time were politics played harder than over the determination 
of areas to be served by new railways, and site allocations within these 
broad and general limits. Successive governments showed themselves 
especially sensitive to pressures from the central and northern districts, 
particularly when these exhibited separatist tendencies. It was as 
well for the peace of mind of politicians in Brisbane that many of 
these groups were too engrossed in out-pressuring and out-manoeuvring 
each other to realize that in unity lay strength. Even so, enough 
useless line was built to placate interests in one district because 
another area had gained a railway.•^^ 
27. By 1950, the end of the period with which this study deals, the 
following 3'6" private tramways were still in use: Owned by local 
authorities: Aramac Tramway, 41 miles; Mackay Harbour Board Tramway, 
4 miles. Owned by private companies: Mount Bauple Tramway, 7 miles; 
Tannymorel Tramway, 4 miles; Bowen Consolidated Mine Tramway, 3 
miles. At time of writing the only shire line remaining is the 
Aramac Tramway. A 2 foot gauge system of 30 miles, the Innisfail 
and Mourilyan Tramway was bought by the government in 1914-15 and 
is still in use, principally for sugar loading from Mourilyan Harbour. 
28. For example, the Bowen Railway, opened to Wangaratta in 1890 to 
mollify Bowen for building the line to Charters Towers from 
Townsville. Cf. ed. A.G. Austin: The Webbs' Australian Diary 1898. 
Pitman & Sons, Melbourne, 1965, pp. 41-42, where they write of 
Queensland politics and of J.T. Bell, "a member of the Legislative 
Assembly, a nominal lawyer, and an "independent" supporter of the 
Government. His sole idea of politics was to secure the 
expenditure of public money in his constituency; he had intimated 
to the Government that if they failed to bring the railway to the 
principal town, he "should have to reconsider his position"." 
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An early example of this kind of political exercise occurred less 
than a month after the official opening of the first 21^ miles, on the 
Ipswich-Toowoomba line. In August, 1865, a tender was accepted for the 
construction of 33 miles of railway between Rockhampton and Westwood. 
This piece of track was given the grandiose title of the Great Northern 
line (later to be known as the Central Railway) and although it 
terminated in nothing more than a bullock-team staging camp,^^ was 
intended to appease those Rockhampton and district interests, which, 
as previously mentioned, had been outraged by the placement of the 
first railway line in the south-east corner of the state. Happily, 
this line was eventually extended beyond Westwood to serve the Peak 
Downs copper mines and grazing areas, reaching Clermont in 1884 and 
Longreach in 1892, and proving ultimately to be a necessary and 
successful route. On the other hand, it took almost ten years for 
agreement to be reached between opposing factions over the necessity for 
closing the gap between Ipswich and Brisbane. It was not until 1875 
that the link-up was completed, and Brisbane became the terminus of 
the Southern and Western Railway. 
The most anxious rivalry existed between the necklace of ports 
which had sprung up along the long eastern coastline of Queensland. The 
topography of the State clearly indicated that development and progress 
29. Westwood was the point where three teamster's tracks converged -
from Taroom, Springsure and Peak Downs, and as J. Douglas (Port 
Curtis) pointed out, in debate on the Northern Railway Bill, it 
was hardly likely that the bullock drays would unload at Westwood 
for transhipment when they had only one additional day's journey 
to make to reach the port of shipment. Q.P.D. , First Series, 
Vol. 1, 1864, p. 317. 
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would come to these embryonic towns in proportion to their ability to 
tap the resources of their hinterlands, and provide outlets for the 
wool or minerals or sugar for the export trade , and a point of entry for 
interstate and overseas imports.•^ '^  All indications were that the 
railways must run westward from the coast to open up the back country, 
but what was not as clearly indicated was where these lines should be 
placed; and which ports should flourish or wither, live or die, 
depended largely on these decisions. The coastal shipping trade was 
well established and provided a comparatively cheap means of transport, 
particularly for heavy goods. It would be many years before the 
railways, by means of regularity of schedules and low freight rates, 
could hope to challenge competitively the supremacy of sea transport 
for the transit of goods and passengers up and down the Queensland 
coast. So it was well into this century before any determined effort 
was made to link the northern ports with Brisbane, by driving a railway 
up the coastal plain, on a north-south axis, and it was not until 1924 
that the final section of line was built to bring Townsville and Cairns 
in direct contact by rail with the capital. 
Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that intense 
competition should exist between the inhabitants of the northern ports, 
some of them, like Port Douglas but newly opened.-^ -^  
"Editors and deputations from Mackay to Cooktown raised 
their voices in demands for what nobody could keep from 
30. Cf. Blainey: op.cit.,pp. 247, 252. 
31. G.C. Bolton: A Thousand Miles Away, a History of North Queensland 
to 1920. The Jacaranda Press in association with A.N.U., Brisbane, 
1963, pp. 160-161. 
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calling the iron horse. Long and tedious were the intrigues 
and quarrels over routes. Townsville and Bowen each had 
hopes of becoming the gateway to Charters Towers and the 
pastoral west. Bowen had the better harbour, Townsville 
had the better politicians and was on the right side of 
the Burdekin. In 1877 a Liberal government decided to 
start the inland railway from Townsville."-^^ 
And so the struggle went on: between Cairns, Port Douglas and Mourilyan, 
between Cooktown, Bowen and Mackay. Gratitude for a few miles of 
railway might bring votes for anxious politicians; when all else 
appeared to have failed, the Northerners could always cry "Separation". 
Nor was it only the merchants, the bankers, and the businessmen 
of the ports who lobbied for railways. The mining operators and 
speculators of the Atherton Tableland and more western fields were even 
more anxious for the precious raii to carry their ore to the smelters, 
cut costs of production and, in some cases, they hoped, prolong the 
life and the share prices of a worked out and dying field. Strong 
pressiires were applied in government circles and, at times, these 
proved Irresistible. Thus the government was moved to grant to the ill-
fated Chlllagoe Company, in December, 1897, permission to construct a 
private railway from Mareeba to Chlllagoe, on most generous terms,-^ -^  
and again came to their rescue in 1905 with an authorization to extend 
their line to Etherldge.-^^ Other mining companies laid branch lines to 
32. ibid. 
33. Q.P.D., Vol. LXXVIII, 1897. Mareeba to Chlllagoe Railway Bill, 
pp. 1778-1784; 1821-1847; 1864-1882 and 1889-1901. 
34. Q.P.D. , Vol. XCVI, 1905. Chillagoe-Georgetown Railway, pp. 2195-
2210. 
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connect with this system and the district was criss-crossed with 
rickety two-foot tramways. With the collapse of the mining boom and 
the Chlllagoe Company, the railway had to be taken over by the 
Government. The opening of the Chlllagoe State Smelters in 1919-20, 
revitalized the Chlllagoe and Etherldge mining fields, and greatly 
benefited the railway revenues of the Cairns district ,-^^ but this 
revival was short-lived, the smelters closing down in 1927 to leave 
the railway department with another unprofitable line on its hands.^^ 
Having learned their lesson from these experiences, in future 
Parliamentarians approached applications from mining companies for 
railway lines with greater caution, and demands for suitable guarantees. 
The Mount Morgan mines had to provide such security before obtaining 
their branch line, and tougher conditions were forced upon Mount Isa 
Mines Ltd. before the extension of the Cloncurry line to the company's 
leases was agreed upon. Both the Royal Commission on Public Works 
and the Commissioner for Railways recommended the construction of this 
railway, only 
"if the companies interested in the field are prepared to 
guarantee to spend a sum of i.200,000 on development before 
the line is completed and the same amount within six months 
after it is opened for traffic, and to undertake to make up 
35. Appendix 2, Northern Division Annual Report, 1919-20; Report of 
the Coiranissioner for Railways, year ended June 30th, 1920; Qld. 
Parliamentary Peepers, Vol. II, 1920. 
36. Railway Commissioner's Report, June 30th, 1927; Qld. Parliamentary 
Papers, Vol. i l , 1927. 
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any loss in working up to an amount of 113,000 per annum 
for a period of ten years."^"^ 
Somewhat late in the day the principle of profitability was being 
accepted as one of the most important criteria for further railway 
construction. Yet even this could not protect politicians from pressure, 
nor prevent them from using railway building as a vote catcher. Much 
of the intensive branch line construction which took place between 1905 
and 1924-^ ^ would have been hard put to justify itself on the grounds of 
profitability, either then or in the future. 
Were further proof needed of the intrusion of politics into 
railway affairs, and of the extent to which railway matters were a 
continuing source of political controversy it could be provided by the 
number of Royal Commissions-^^ and Select Committees'^ '^  which dot 
railway history in the State, testimony to the validity of Parker's 
contention that politics in Australia, in the main, have been economic 
politics, and that conflicts over the "allocation of values" have 
tended to be damped down and diffused through their "Institutionalization" 
by governments. Thus, Queensland politicians, frequently under fire 
37. Report of the Commissioner for Railways on proposed Railway from 
Duchess to Mount Isa. October 16th, 1925. Qld. Pari. Papers, 
Vol. II, 1926. However, for the past thirty years, the haulage 
of the production of Mount Isa Mines over the 604 miles to 
Townsville has dominated the mineral traffic of the Queensland 
Railways, and been a lucrative source of income for its Northern 
Division. This traffic had become so important to State revenues 
that the present government agreed to the complete reconstruction 
of this railway to make it a modern, heavy-duty line. 
38. See Appendix A. Branch lines, p. 315. 
39. See Appendix C. pp. 317-20. 
40. See Appendix D. pp. 321-26. 
41. R.S. Parker: "Power in Australia", op.cit. 
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for one reason or another, over railways, have tried to de-pressurize 
the situation, from time to time, by setting up Royal Commissions or 
Select Committees to enquire into proposals for new lines, irregularities 
in the department, railway finances, economy, maladministration, and 
many other things. 
"Railways in Queensland, then, have continued to be a part of 
politics and it is difficult to see the pursuit of any consistent 
policy.""^ ^ As a result, the price of over-capitalization and political 
"log-rolling" has had to be paid, and in terms of profitability it has 
been steep. Problems of lasting consequence have arisen for which 
political solutions have been found, or, more frequently, no solutions 
at all. 
The primary difficulty was overcapitalization, even though as 
has been noted previously, Queensland adopted a narrower and less 
expensive gauge than Victoria and New South Wales. The reduction in 
construction cost per mile of railway was offset in this State by the 
vast distances to be traversed (see Table I), and by the fact that 
except in Western Australia, railways in Queensland have served a much 
smaller and more scattered population than in any other State (see 
Table II). 
"The railway mileage required to connect the interior with 
ports and markets is therefore abnormally large in relation 
to population and production, even for Australia. There are 
three main lines terminating in the remote interior. None 
of the other States has so large a proportion of distant 
42. J.W. Knowles: "One Hundred Years of Railways in Queensland", The 
Australian Railway Historical Society, Bulletin No. 338, Vol. XVI, 
New Series, December, 1965, p. 238. 
53. 
terminals. Even in Western Australia, where the mileage 
is greater in proportion to population, the railway system 
can be shown on a map of the south-western corner of the 
state. For its sparsely populated area, Queensland is 
lavishly equipped with railways.""^^ 
TABLE I 
COMPARISON OF GREATEST DISTANCE BY RAIL FROM CAPITAL 
State 






Sydney to Murwillumbah 
Melbourne to Werrimill 
Adelaide to Mount Gambler 
Perth to Meekatharra 








Taken from Qld. Pari. Papers, Vol. Ill, 1925. Railway Commissioner's 
Report. 
TABLE II 
POPULATION PER RAILWAY MILE 



















Taken from Qld. Pari. Papers, Vol. II, 1920. Railway 
Commissioner's Report. 
43. The Bureau of Economics and Statistics: Railway Economics, Govt. 
Printer, Brisbane, 1931, p. 37. 
54. 
The problems of over-capitalization and crippling interest 
payments were not confined to Queensland. Throughout the Australian 
Railways "the burden of interest on railways unproductive of their 
costs" has been heavy. "In 1925 the interest absorbed 28.2 per cent 
of railway revenue, and in 1930, 34.9 per cent."^ "^  However, the 
situation in Queensland has been more critical. By 1920, "the capital 
cost was then the highest in Australia per head of population, at £57. 
It is now [end of 1930] much higher, and still the highest in Australia 
at about £64 per head. Railway Interest was then the highest in 
Australia, per head of population, at £2.13.2 per year. It is now [end 
of 1930] much higher and still the highest in Australia at £3.4.2 per 
year."'^ ^ In the thirty one years (1920-50) encompassed by the present 
study, on only nine occasions did the railways show a surplus, after 
paying interest on capital indebtedness. Two of these years fell 
within the period 1939-45, when wartime demands for the services of the 
railways created unusually high profits. The other four occasions 
followed immediately upon the implementation of "The Railway (Capital 
Indebtedness) Reduction Act of 1931,""^ ^ under which the sum of twenty-
eight million pounds was written off the capital indebtedness of 
railways ."^^ 
From the point of view of the Railway Department, this situation 
44. ibid. , p. 31. 
45. ibid. , p. 43. 
46. 22 Geo. V. No. 33. At this time, the capital indebtedness of the 
Queensland Railways stood at £64,184,569. 
47. See Table III, p. 56, for yearly tabulation of deficit/profit for 
the period 1920-50. 
55. 
need not have been of concern if the State - and this would include the 
general public - had been prepared to acknowledge and carry this burden 
as a cost, and an unavoidable cost, of development.*^^ "This is part 
of the cost to the community of government enterprise in railways, and 
in their extension and rating as developmental agencies. The 
community gained the benefits during construction and still gains whatever 
may be the net addition to production.'"^^ It is not enough, however, 
for the government merely to pay lip service to the developmental role 
of the railways. An acknowledgement in governmental accounts of those 
expenses which may clearly be claimed to be developmental, would have 
given a much more exact picture of railway finances, and gone some 
little way towards meeting the continued criticism. Only the Victorian 
system has made any real attempt "to be honest to the railway as a State 
and business enterprise,"^0 by reimbursing railway finances for losses 
incTirred in working new lines or in implementing a governmental policy 
directive. 
No such allowances have been made in Queensland, where the basic 
conflict between the developmental theme and profitability has raged 
from the earliest days of railway building. Successive governments have 
emphasized that the railway system formed an essential part of planning 
48. It would seem that the general public was not prepared to do this, 
e.g. Railway Commissioner's Report, 30/6/1929 inter alia: "The 
public generally are unable to visualise the railways as a means 
of developing the country, but appear to expect them to be 
conducted as a commercial undertaking, and to show a return at 
least equivalent to the cost of operation and interest on capital 
invested. This leads to adverse criticism." 
49. Railway Economics, ibid., p. 43. 
50. ibid. , p. 35. 
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Compiled from Reports of the Commissioners for Railways, 1920-1950. 
57. 
for opening up the country and increasing production. 
"If we want to arrive at a true balance of the assets and 
liabilities of our railway system, and the part that it 
plays in national economy, then land settlement, land 
revenue, agricultural development and population must all 
be added to the credit side. Viewed from that standpoint 
we realize that the Railway Department has played, and 
will continue to play, a very important part in the 
development of this country."^-^ 
Year after year Railway Commissioners, thrown on the defensive by wide-
spread criticism of railway losses, have reiterated the developmental 
theme. "It will be seen that the Railways, which are the State's 
greatest instrumentality, are being used as an expression of government 
policy in the development and protection of the Industries of the 
State."52 "These factors should be taken into consideration when the 
financial position of the railways is under review, because it is 
Impossible to dissociate the financial aspect of State-owned railways 
from pijblic policy."^^ 
On the whole, however, these factors have been given very little 
weight, either by the parliamentarians or the general public. Beyond 
the remission of £28 million from the capital Indebtedness of the 
railways in 1931, governments have done nothing of a practical nature 
to overcome the problem.^ "^  On the other hand, the general public, 
including, frequently, people in the country who have stood to benefit 
the most from railway services, have continued to criticise railway 
51. The Premier, (Hon. W. Forgan Smith, Mackay): Q.P.D., Vol. CLXXIII, 
1938, p. 1,400. 
52. Qld. Pari. Papers, Vol. II, 1923. Railway Commissioner's Report. 
53. Qld. Pari. Peepers, Vol. II, 1926. Railway Commissioner's Report. 
54. Cf. Report of the Commissioner for Railways, 1929. 
58. 
losses. They have expected that railways should pay their way, more 
particularly as they are, in this case, a government enterprise, and 
as such, losses must be met, in the end, out of the pockets of all. 
"The general policy of the government ... has been not to 
make the users of the railways only, pay for the additional 
unavoidable cost of operation, but to allow others, too, 
who have shared in the advantages resulting from the 
expansion of the railways to bear a share of the added cost 
through the medium of taxation."^^ 
It is one thing to point out that if the railways are a significant 
developmental factor, their financing should take account of this; it 
is quite another to demonstrate that the railways have indeed played a 
developmental role. In other words, the theme running through the 
Railway Commissioners' Reports and Ministerial statements needs to be 
looked at with some scepticism and not simply accepted at face value. 
If development means opening up parts of a country to settlement where 
none existed previously, then with very few exceptions,5^ the 
Queensland railways have not been of this kind. They were not pioneering 
railways, as in most instances, they were built to connect existing 
settlements, across and through country already taken up, even if only 
sparsely settled. ^^^  Indeed, the three main western lines passed, on 
the whole, over country that is not conducive to closer settlement. It 
55. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations of the Royal Commission 
on Railways (Mr. W.A. Hooper), 1938, and Comments of the Commissioner 
for Railways (Mr. C.A. Murton) thereon. Govt. Printer, Brisbane, 
1939, p. 12. 
56. Some of the mining railways would possibly fall into this category. 
57. "It will be readily admitted that railway construction in 
Queensland has in most cases preceded settlement." Qld. Pari. 
Papers, Vol. II, 1926. Railway Commissioner's Report. It is argued 
that statements of this kind are an oversimplification of the 
situation. 
59. 
can be argued that the greatest need which the railways met was rather 
that for a faster and cheaper means of transport to and from the 
coastal areas and ports than could be provided by bullock teams. Along 
with this and at some cost to the department in profits, the railways, 
under political pressure, have provided country dwellers with numerous 
"fringe" benefits: freight concessions of all kinds. Including 
tapering rates on long hauls, concessions on the transport of fodder, 
and the carriage of starving stock, and many others.-55 
This is not to say that this is an iniquitous situation. Until 
recently, Queensland has depended almost exclusively on the produce 
of the pastoral and agricultural sectors for its prosperity, and under 
these circumstances it would seem natural that the greatest amount of 
encouragement and assistance be given to those engaged in primary 
production. It does cast doubt on the complete validity of the 
developmental theme as it applies to the railways, and also calls into 
question the whole problem of the extent to which this subsidization of 
the man on the land by the city dweller should be taken. As more people 
live outside the capital city than within it in this State,^^ it is, 
perhaps, somewhat easier to achieve a wider agreement on support for 
sectional Interests, than may be possible in the southern states. 
Certainly there is evidence to show that with regard to railway 
policy, over the period of this study, governments took action to placate 
58. Cf. Qld. Pari. Papers. Reports of the Commissioner for Railways, 
1920-50. 
59. "Politics at State-Level - Queensland", Current Affairs Bulletin, 
University of Sydney, 1968, Vol. 41, No. 6, pp. 93-94. 
60. 
country interests and court the rural vote regardless of the economics 
of good railway management. This applied equally to Labor and non-Labor: 
Indeed it would not be too much to suggest that Labor politicians threw 
themselves into the task with even greater energy and success than their 
political opponents. 
The problem of subsidizing primary Industry in the light of railway 
losses can be seen most clearly in regard to branch lines. ^'^  
"The policy pursued by Parliament in 'authorising' the 
construction of railways is responsible for the above 
losses, and not railway management. Lines are constructed 
and concessions are made in rates of freight, on the 
assumption that the lines may ultimately pay, and that 
even if they never pay the production they develop will be 
profitable to the community. The weakness of these 
assumptions is that no limits are recognised, and it seems 
to be assumed that all production must be profitable to 
the community."^-^ 
These losses are not easily discernible from the railway accounts 
where branch line figures were lumped together,^^ to show a profit, on 
occasions. 
These surpluses came from no more than half a dozen lines at most, 
whose profitability tended to conceal to a large extent the heavy 
deficits on all other branch lines.^ -^  
"Quite half of the losses of the lines have their sources in 
branch lines serving agricultural areas, in which are included 
farming of all kinds, dairying, sugar and also timber. All 
60. Cf. Table IV, p. 61, and Table V, p. 63. 
61. Railway Economics, op.cit., p. 47. 
62. Until, under the provisions of "The State Transport Act of 1938", 
the Commissioner was required in his annual report "to deal fully 
with each section of railway for which the revenue does not exceed 
working expenses and shall justify its closure or retention." 
63. Cf. Table IV, p. 61. 
61. 
TABLE IV 
SOURCES OF RAILWAY LOSSES, 1929-30 






6-8 . . . . 
B. - 9-11 
C . - 12,13 . , 
D . -
14(a) . . . . 





(14(a) to 18) 




























Interstate Line (to Wallan-garra) 
Maryborough-Townsville 
Main Inland Lines (to Roma, Longreach, 
and Hughenden: Pastoral) 
Inland Extensions and Branches 
(Pastoral) 
Mining Lines (West of Cairns and 
Cloncurry) 
Other Lines (in Districts) within 150 
miles of coast: chiefly Agricultural 
Areas. 
South-Eastern -
West through Toowoomba . , . . 
East of Toowoomba . . . , . . 
Whole of South-Eastern . . . . . . 
Maryborough and Bundaberg . . . . 
Central (Rockhampton District) . . . . 
Mackay 
Total for Agricultural Disuicts . . . . 
Total, Class D 
Total all Lines (Less 1 (fractions)) 
Add - Interest on Unopened Lines, etc. 






































































Note: The above losses do not provide anything for depreciation. 
The Bureau of Economics and Statistics; Railway Economics. Govt. 
Printer, Brisbane, 1931, p. 40. 
52. 
of these areas are within 150 miles from the coast. The main 
through lines where losses are heavy also pass through 
agricultural territory. It is clear that the main ultimate 
source of railway loss is the lavish provision made for 
agricultural settlement and to assist farming. The cost of 
closer settlement is to be found in the railway deficits as 
much as in the direct costs of other assistance."^'^ 
The construction of branch lines has been more susceptible to 
political pressure and lobbying than any other aspect of railway policy, 
As has been previously noted, the peak period of branch line building 
was between 1905 and 1924, when 1728 out of a total of 2983 miles 
constructed were for this purpose.^^ It is of Interest that this 
period is evenly spanned by both non-Labor and Labor governments, each 
equally as anxious, presumably, to consolidate the farming vote of the 
south-east comer of the State behind their own party by means of 
liberal hand-outs from the "pork barrel". 
Even before the virtual cessation of railway construction in the 
mid 1930's, the continued maintenance of unprofitable branch lines had 
become a source of controversy, but one to which governments turned 
a deaf ear. In setting up the State Transport Commission in 1938,^^ 
the Forgan Smith Labor government attempted to disarm the critics by 
giving to the Commission the power "to examine the position of branch 
working lines that are earning less than working expenses, and to 
recommend on the same."^^ p^-\- no time did the Commission recommend the 
64. Railway Economics, op.cit., pp. 41-42. 
65. Cf. Appendices B, C and D. 
66. Under the provisions of "The State Transport Act of 1938", 2 Geo. 
VI. No. 15. 
67. ibid. Section 14, paras. 3 and 5. 
63. 
TABLE V 
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(a) includes purchases of private and shire lines 
{b) includes £28 million written off in 1931 
(c) includes Interstate 4'8^" gauge line of 68.8 miles. 
Adapted from J.W. Knowles: "One Hundred Years of Railways in Queensland", 
The Australian Railway Historical Society, Bulletin No. 338, Vol. XVI 
(New Series), December, 1965, p. 233. 
closure of any such sections,^^ and the continued subsidization of the 
68. E.g. from their report, included in the Separate Report of the 
Commissioner for Railways on Sections of Railways for which 
Revenue did not exceed working expenses, year ended June 30th, 
1946, p. 116, the Commissioners said inter alia, "the Commission 
expressed doubt as to whether the value of non-paying branch lines 
could be judged purely on a railway accounting basis. The 
Commission pointed out that an analysis of the position in 1938-39 
indicated clearly that in the great majority of cases examined, 
the lines carried almost exclusively rural products at a rate 
which was unprofitable to the Railway Department. Motor Transport 
could not carry the products at the railway rates but had the 
railway not been functioning it is doiobtful whether the districts 
could have continued in full production and the result would have 
been a substantial reduction in the quantity of food-stuffs 
available to the general community." 
54. 
operation of most branch lines remained an integral part of government 
policy. It was not until Ford, Bacon and Davis Inc., a firm of 
American consulting engineers, were commissioned by the Nicklln 
government in 1950 to fully investigate the operation of the Queensland 
railway system that the question of the contribution which branch line 
operations were making to railway deficits was squarely faced. The 
Ford, Bacon and Davis report recommended the immediate closure of 
certain unprofitable, branch railways^^ and the government took action, 
along the lines suggested in this portion of the report. 
The whole question of railway finances and more particularly, the 
causes of railway deficits has been a complex one, rooted in the concept 
of political control. Competition from other means of transport may 
well have been another contributory factor to railway difficulties, but 
the place for discussion on this lies elsewhere. '^  
What is relevant at this point is to note certain of the long term 
effects that these questions at issue have had on what is the theme of 
this study - Industrial labour relationships. In the matter of close 
political control over railway policy making, and its concomitant 
problems, it is suggested that a resultant development was the tendency 
on the part of both management and union to take a political view of 
69. Summary of Recommendations and Conclusions contained in the Report 
of Ford, Bacon and Davis Inc., on the Organisation, Facilities and 
Operations of the Queensland Railways , pp. 23-24 and 27. cf. Colin 
A. Hughes: Images and Issues. The Queensland State Elections of 
1963 and 1966. A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1969, p. 256 for the 
consequent political complaints. 
70. Cf. Chapter VI. 
55. 
what were often essentially industrial matters, and to seek, more often 
than not, a political solution to these questions. This tendency was 
fortified by the fact that the employer was, in this Instance, not a 
private Individual or group, but a political entity - the government of 
the day. It will be argued later in this thesis, as a corollary to the 
above statement, that the situation was exacerbated when the government 
of the day happened to be a Labor government: in that case further and 
complicating expectations were held by both parties. 
The issue of railway losses produced a sensitivity to criticism 
which in turn was reflected in labour-management relations. Railway 
Commissioners, on various occasions noted the effect on employee morale 
that year after year deficits were having. "To stimulate cooperation 
and initiative in both the management and the staff of the railways it 
is necessary to present them with a task that can reasonably be 
accomplished. The writing down of capital would, therefore, have a good 
influence upon efficiency."^-^ Be that as it may, management's reaction 
to condemnation of railway losses was to be seen in a greater emphasis 
on intra-departmental economy and on a professed expectation that 
railway employees would set a standard for efficiency and service to 
the community higher than that required of workers in the private 
sector. Railway workers were expected to be better employees than others 
for their part, railway unions expected the Department to be a model for 
other employers, a presumption which assumed the certitude of a Gospel 
truth when the employer was a Labor government. 
71. Professor D.B. Copland, quoted by the Commissioner for Railways in 
his Annual Report for year ended June 30th, 1930. 
55. 
Two further points should be mentioned in view of their connection 
to arguments which will be developed subsequently. The decentralisation 
of the railway system^^ which was caused by the physical configuration 
of the State and the ad hoc construction policy of governments determined 
to a large extent, the type of administrative framework set up to 
regulate and direct the railway system; a form of structure which in its 
turn influenced the unions in devising their own institutional 
organisations. 
It is also of some Importance to note that sixty years elapsed 
between the passage of the first Railway Act, and the passage of the 
first through train between Brisbane and Townsville. Until 1924, 
communication in person between the North and the capital involved 
several breaks in journey^ -^  - by ship from Townsville, usually to Port 
Alma, and thence from Rockhampton by rail to Brisbane. It is suggested 
that, as a consequence, the comparative Isolation of the northern 
districts until late in railway history had a pronounced effect not 
only on union-management relations but on infra-union associations as 
well; and not only were these Influences to be felt prior to 1924, but 
they could be clearly distinguished until the end of the period under 
scrutiny. 
72. Cf. Appendix B, p. 316. 
73. The question of the break-of-gauge between the State railway 
systems and its effect on the development of Australia as a whole 
has not been raised in this chapter, which is concerned only with 
intra-State railway matters. For a general discussion on the 
question, however, see Michael Robbins: The Railway Age. Penguin 
Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1965. N. McCosker: "Standard 
Gauge Railway Systems", Public Administration, Sydney, Vol. XXI, 
No. 1, March, 1962. 
57. 
Isolation was an important factor in breeding independence of 
spirit and action and the northern divisions of the principal railway 
union were to reflect the effects of their separation for many years. 
68, 
PART I I : THE AUSTRALIAN RAILWAYS UNION (QUEENSLAND BRANCH) 
The construction, operation and maintenance of the Queensland 
railways necessitated the employment of a sizeable work force. Whereas 
in 1865, at the beginning of the "railway era", the total number of 
employees was two - the Commissioner for Railways and a Railway 
Conveyancer^-^ - by 1950 there were 25,574 on the Railway Department 
payroll. 
Within twenty years of the laying of the first miles of railway 
line,, unions of employees had been established within the labour force. 
While some, like the Engine Drivers, Firemen and Cleaners, followed 
the familiar craft organisation pattern, a determined and conscious 
effort was directed towards the organising of all railway employees 
from top to bottom of the department into an "all grades" industrial 
union. By 1885 such a union was functioning under the name of the 
"Queensland Railway Employees' Association".'^^ 
The basis of this form of unionism was an awareness of the great 
economic power that could be exercised by railway workers in Industrial 
and political matters, together with a belief that all employees within 
the service had a consciousness of class solidarity and a community 
of Interest which would be best served by the one mass union covering 
the whole Industry. The Q.R.E.A. attempted to embrace a complex range 
74. Estimates of Expenditure, 1867, p. 38 in Votes and Proceedings, 
1866, p. 932. By 1866 the number of employees had risen to 15. 
75. The Daily Standard, September 9th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in The 
Railway Advocate (hereafter The Advocate) Vol. XLVI, No. 1, 
January 1966, p. 1. 
69. 
of occupation and status, but it was, in effect, the lack of unanimity 
of attitude which proved the greatest stumbling block to the complete 
fulfilment of "all-grades" unionism within the railways. 
Employer reaction to union formation in these early years was 
predictable, following a similar pattern to that in the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America.'° The right to organise, let alone 
to strike,'^' was in some doubt until the advent of the Ryan Labour 
Government in 1915 brought open encouragement of trade unionism.'^^ The 
Railway Commissioners were not alone in their antagonism to trade unions, 
76. Philip s. Bagwell: The Railwaymen - the History of the National 
Union of Railwaymen. Allen & Unwin, London, 1963. No permanent 
trade union was established within the railway industry in the 
U.K. until 1871. Ownership was in the hands of private railway 
companies who used every inducement to secure the loyalty of their 
employees as a buffer against "insubordination". Very real risks 
were incurred by engaging in any form of trade union activity: 
loss of bonus, company housing, company sponsored friendly 
societies, free clothing in the form of company livery. 
77. Trade unions were first legalised under the Trade Union Act, 1886. 
However, following the Taff Vale decision in Britain, and two 
cases in Brisbane in 1906, Heggie v. Brisbane Shipwrights' 
Provident Union and Standley v. Queensland Typographical 
Association, the protection of union funds and the right of unions 
to levy members for political purposes were placed in doubt. The 
A.W.A. and the A.W.U. de-registered themselves in 1911 for fear 
that, under the Trade Union Act, they would be prevented from 
paying money to the Labor party. The General Strike of 1912 and 
the Industrial Peace Act which folloived, heightened these fears. 
Cf. S.K. Proctor: "Brisbane Unionism and the Plumbers' Union, 
1904-15", ed. D.J. Murphy, R.B. Joyce, Colin A. Hughes: Prelude 
to Power. The Rise of the Labour Party in Queensland 1886-1915. 
The Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1970, pp. 142-144. J.H. Portus: 
The Development of Australian Trade Union Law. Melbourne Univ. 
Press, Melbourne, 1958. 
78. A Trade Union Act and an Industrial Arbitration Act overcame most 
of the obstacles of previous legislation, though the Industrial 
Peace Act (1912) was still in force. 
70. 
Prospects within the service were good for regular employment and job 
security, and "most men, once they had been fortunate enough to secure 
such posts were careful not to jeopardize their positions by such reckless 
indiscretions as joining a trade union and taking part in strikes."'^^ 
The early Commissioners harried the embryonic organisation through 
a policy of victimisation of its leaders; in retaliation, the workers 
tried to place the Q.R.E.A. in a position to withstand attack by 
removing at least one of its officials beyond the reach of the Commissioner. 
Jimmy Wilkinson resigned from the railway service to become secretary of 
the union and at about the same time, the decision was taken to establish 
a union paper to aid in propaganda work. The first number of "The 
Queensland Railway Times" was issued on October 1st, 1889.^ *^  
The harassment of the union continued, and was taken to the point 
where the Commissioner issued an order to all "officers-in-charge-of-men", 
that they must choose between their membership in the union and their 
position in the service. Many skilled personnel resigned from the union 
at this stage - station masters, head gangers and chargemen - leaving 
behind only those who were not in positions of responsibility.'^ -^  Forced 
transfers of union activists to remote areas of the state was another 
method used by management to undermine the viability of the union.^^ 
79. Philip S. Bagwell: op.cit. , p. 20. 
80. The Daily Stondox-d, September 9th, 1922, p. 8. Reprinted in The 
Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 1, Jan., 1966, p. 1. 
81. The Daily Standard, ibid. 
82. ibid. Also interviews with Ernie Sampson, W. Morrow and George 
Rymer, ex-Executive officers of the A.R.U. August-September, 1957, 
May-June, 1969. 
71, 
This and other forms of victimisation, together with the devastating 
effect of the great strikes of 1890-94 on trade unionism generally,^^ 
put the Q.R.E.A. out of existence, though Wilkinson, on his own, kept 
the paper going as a monthly. 
In 1896 a move to reconstitute the Q.R.E.A. on the basis of 
Brisbane and Ipswich branches was successful. Thereafter, for some years 
the union had an up and down existence. Branches were formed in 
different centres and died as interest dwindled or as the heads of the 
service forced officials out. Others were resuscitated by some 
enthusiast who happened to be transferred to the particular centre. ^'^  
However, direct and unconcealed hostility to all-grades unionism 
continued.^^ So long after the event, one cannot be certain of the 
reasons for this antagonism on the part of management. It is not clear 
whether their dislike was for unionism per se, or for all-grade or 
industrial unionism as against craft unionism. 
In the United Kingdom, where railway workers were organising 
themselves in all-grades unions - the Amalgamated Society of Railway 
Servants (1871) and the General Railway Workers' Union (1889) - as well 
83. Ian Turner: op.cit., p. 14. 
84. Note the analogy with the foundation years of the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union where "a branch was formed only when there were 
already a dozen or more members in the particular town, and the 
initiative came with the arrival of an active and trusted member 
from anotlier Australian branch." K.D. Buckley: The Amalgamated 
Engineers in Australia, 1852-1920. Australian National University 
Press, Canberra, 1970, p. 25. 
85. Ernie Sampson who had become secretary of the Brisbane branch of 
the Q.R.E.A. was transferred to Normanton in 1905 and there is 
evidence of similar victimisation of other union activists. 
72. 
as into craft unions, the hostility of management motivated by a desire 
"to keep the most perfect control over their servants",^7 ^ ^g directed 
against trade unionism in any form. These views were those of private 
ownership, however, and it might be expected that in Queensland, where 
the railway service was a state-ovmed enterprise, that the heads of the 
various sections would have been anxious to see the organisation of 
the workers, the better to achieve cooperation in the efficient 
operation of the industry. While it can also be said that in the United 
Kingdom, "the closing years of the nineteenth century were marked by 
the increasing militancy of the rank and file railwaymen and their 
growing support for the A.S.R.S.,"^^ militancy in the Q.R.E.A., at a 
similar stage in its development, was inhibited by lack of a stable 
organisation and membership. 
Nevertheless, it was active In its support for reforms to improve 
working conditions and pressed hard for the establishment of a Board 
to which appeals could be made against punishment by the heads of the 
department. The Railway (Employees' Appeal) Act of 1905 went a good 
deal of the way towards satisfying the railwaymen's demands.^^ The next 
year, a Workers' Compensation Act came into operation, to be followed 
86. Philip S. Bagwell: op.cit., pp. 44-69, 132. 
87. ibid., p. 26. 
88. ibid. , p. 175. 
89. The Daily Standard. September 9th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in The 
Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 2, 1966, p. 2. Cf. C.A. Bernays: 
Queensland Politics during Sixty (1859-1919) Years. Government 
Printer, Brisbane, n.d., p. 478. The Board was to consist of 
five members, the general traffic manager, chief engineer, locomotive 
engineer, a police magistrate and an employees' representative -
three of whom would constitute a quorum. 
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by the memorable Order-in-Council of July, 1907, granting to all 
government employees earning dally wages an eight hour day and fortnightly 
wage payments. The Q.R.E.A. took some of the credit for these 
achievements. 
By 1910 three separate and Independent Q.R.E.A.s existed, the 
Southernp-^  Central and Northern Divisions. Distance, difficulty of 
direct communication with the northern areas, and the decentralisation 
of the railway system must all have played a part in creating this 
unusual situation. A cogent argument put up against amalgamation with 
the Southern Division was that such an arrangement would mean loss of 
power and independence to the Brisbane based Q.R.E.A. This was 
reinforced by a belief, in some quarters, that the flame of industrial 
unionism burned brighter north of, say, Bundaberg, than elsewhere. To 
be sure, much of the energy of the Ipswich and Brisbane branches in 
particular was dissipated "in combating the evils of crafts and scabs, 
[while] Central and North Queensland are in a better position to more 
closely solidify railway forces, the latter not having antagonistic 
90. idem. "The agitation for an eight hour day and fortnightly pay 
had commenced in 1890 and had been kept going during the 17 years 
that had intervened before they were granted." 
91. At June 30th, 1910, the membership of the Q.R.E.A. (Southern 
Division) was approx. 1,200, with branches at North and South 
Brisbane, Ipswich, Toowoomba, Roma, Charleville, Maryborough, 
Bundaberg, Gympie, Cairns and Mackay (the two latter surprisingly 
attaching themselves to the Southern Division rather than to the 
respective Northern and Central Divisions). The Daily Standard, 
September 16th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in The Advocate, Vol. XLVI, 
No. 4, 1966, p. 2. 
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organisations."^^ The railway building programme which concentrated 
men in large but isolated groups, for months on end, assisted in 
fostering the growth of unionism in these areas. The department's 
previously mentioned policy of forced transfers had also inadvertently 
contributed to the vitality of industrial unionism in the northern 
railway districts. The exile of the more active and militant leaders, 
while it weakened the spirit of the organisation in the metropolitan 
area, had animated and brought into focus all-grades unionism in other 
areas of the state.^-^ 
In 1911 some degree of consolidation was achieved by the 
amalgamation of the Q.R.E.A. (Southern Division), Q.R.E.A. (Central 
Division) and the Traffic Association which had been established in 
the railway service as an offshoot of a similar organisation operating 
in the southern states. In the process a new name was adopted - that 
of the Queensland United Railway Employees' Association. Further 
attempts to widen the union were interrupted by the 1912 General Strike, 
92, Report of the Secretary of North Brisbane branch of Q.R.U. The 
Daily Standard, January 8th, 1920, p. 3. "Railway unionism in 
Brisbane should 'set the pace' for the other centres in Queensland. 
Notwithstanding the educational facilities such as the Workers' 
School, the Socialist League, Workers' Educational Association and 
free lectures on working class subjects, we find that outside of 
Brisbane there is a better feeling of class-consciousness and 
solidarity, particularly in North Queensland. Brisbane is the home 
of sectional unionism as far as the railway is concerned. Within 
an area of 25 miles there are over a score of craft tmions. Whereas 
in outside centres railway unionism is practically confined to the 
Q.R.U., A.S.E. and A.W.U." 
93. Cf. interviews with E. Sampson, W. Morrow & G. Rymer: op.cit. p. 70. 
The Daily Standard, September 9th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in The 
Advocate, Vol. XLVI, NO. 1, 1966, p. 4. "The North was the railway 
Siberia, to which were exiled all railwaymen who dared to support 
their claim for citizen rights." 
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but in its aftermath the Northern men, now more aware of the futility 
of divided organisation, agreed to amalgamation. Two years later, 
trouble between the Council of the Q.R.U. and the Townsville Branch 
led to the latter's breaking away and forming another all-grades union -
the Amalgamated Railway Union. The resultant overlapping was detrimental 
to the fortunes of industrial unionism in the north, but by 1915, the 
errant branch had returned to the fold and organisational unity was at 
last achieved.^ -^  
The general strike,^^ over the right of workers to organise and 
the recognition of trade unionism generally, affected the Q.U.R.E.A. 
The Railway Commissioner set up a Board of Enquiry to which each striker 
had to make application for reinstatement. Most were re-employed but 
transferred immediately to other centres, forfeiting their previous 
service in the process. Yet, in the long run, this strengthened the 
union, as these men were active in reforming or establishing branches 
wherever they went and a general revival of interest in the Q.R.U. 
94. The annual conference of the Q.U.R.E.A. in 1913 had agreed to a 
further name change to Queensland Railway Union. 
95. Its return hastened, one suspects, by the passage of the Industrial 
Arbitration Act of 1916. See supra, p. 69. 
96. For a full account of this strike see A.A. Morrison: "The Brisbane 
General Strike of 1912", Historical Studies: Australia and New 
Zealand, Vol. 4, No. 14, May, 1950; Ian Turner: op.cit.. Chapter 
2. In the Southern Division 1956 railwaymen struck work (1511 
permanent, 445 casuals) and the majority of them were members of 
the all-grade union. The Daily Standard, September 16th, 1922, 




With the election to office of a Labour government in 1915 and the 
passage of the Industrial Arbitration Act in the following year, the 
labour movement in Queensland entered a new era. The enthusiasm and 
promise for the future with which trade unionists generally greeted both 
a labour administration and the arbitration system were shared, initially. 
by the Q.R.U.^^ 
The appointment of Tim Moroney as paid General Secretary of the 
union in 1917, followed by that of George Rymer as paid President and 
editor of The Railway Advocate in 1921, brought changes. Neither man 
saw anything of value to be gained by the workers through political 
organisation. They believed that the only key to unlock the future was 
strong economic organisation based on Industrial unionism, leading to 
self-government within each industry and eventually workers' control. 
In their view, the arbitration system was simply the tool of the employer. 
97. Immediately following the strike there was a period of confusion 
within the Q.U.R.E.A. The strike committee set up within the union 
had been "unconstitutional", causing the resignation of the official 
executive, and a special conference had to be called to choose a new 
executive. The railway strike committee had been chaired by Ned 
Hanlon, Tim Moroney was secretary, other committee members were:-
Mick KiriAjin, Joe Sherry, Jack Kelvin, Joe McCarthy, Charlie Knight 
and Tom Brown. The Daily Standard, idem. 
98. "The hope of the railwaymen seemed to lay (sic) in securing the 
return of a Labour Government." Tim Moroney writing of the period 
after the 1912 strike in The Daily Standard, September 16th, 1922, 
p. 8, reprinted in The Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 6, 1966, p. 1. Cf. 
ibid. , September 23rd, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in The Advocate, Vol. 
XLVI, No. 7, 1966, p. 6. "Great interest was centred in the 
Industrial Arbitration Bill, ... which it was hoped would give 
railwaymen the opportunity of having their wages assessed and 
their conditions laid down by an independent tribunal." 
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whether government or private, emasculating union militancy and 
independence. Only through direct action, backed by the power of 
organised unionism could gains be made by the workers.^^ 
Ideological beliefs of this kind held by the leaders of the all-
grades union - tenets which the Railway Advocate propagated in every 
edition thereafter - were one of the reasons why, from 1917 onwards, 
the one big union, embracing all workers within the railway service, was 
never a viable possibility. They ran counter to the more moderate, even 
conservative, views of many other unions, particularly the railway craft 
unions and the A.W.U. which were prepared to support both the arbitration 
system and the gradual reformism of the A.L.P. as it developed from the 
1920's onwards. 
It is doubtful whether the establishment of one union covering all 
grades in the railways was ever a workable hypothesis even prior to 1917, 
no matter the amount of fervour and enthusiasm its supporters used to 
state its case. While their efforts were being frustrated at every turn, 
it must have been small consolation to the Queenslanders to know that, 
though beset originally by the same difficulties of craft unionism, the 
majority of British railwaymen were able, by 1913, to reject both 
regionalism and sectionalism in favour of amalgamation within one 
99. A full discussion of the relationship of the union with the A.L.P. 
and other unions, and of the ideology of its leaders is undertaken 
in Chapters 5 and 6 following. Cf. also M. Bridson Cribb: Some 
Manifestations of Ideological Conflict within the Labour Movement 
in Queensland (1924-1929). unpub. B.A. (Honours) Thesis, Univ. 
of Qld., 1964. 
industrial union - the National Union of Railwaymen.-^ *^ ^ 
There was little affinity between the railway staff men, or even 
the "running grades" employees, and the semi-skilled and unskilled 
labourers. For the former groups the railway was a career service and 
they chose to organise along professional or craft lines.-^ '^ -^  
Craft unions had been established within the railway service at an 
early date. The Engine Drivers, Firemen and Cleaners were already 
operating when the Q.R.E.A. was founded and the guards, station masters 
and operating porters (the equivalent of the present day night porters) 
each had their own organisation by 1908 at the latest. The all-grades 
union tried to combat sectionalism in two ways: firstly through 
constant attempts to bring about amalgamation, and secondly by writing 
into its rules the provision that "branches may form guilds composed of 
six financial members. These guilds may meet and transact their own 
business and submit their decisions to their branches in the form of 
concrete resolutions, which, if necessary, shall be forwarded to the 
general secretary for action."^"^^ By making provision through the guilds 
100. Bagwell: op.cit., pp. 339-35. The N.U.R. was officially 
inaugurated on March 29th, 1913, with a membership of 180,000, 
though it must be admitted that some craft organisation remained -
notably that of the loco-enginemen and firemen. Any person employed 
on any railway or in connection with any railway in the U.K. was 
eligible for membership in the N.U.R. 
101. Turner: op.cit., pp. 13-14. "The typical problems of industrial 
unionism were the seeming clash of interests between staff men, 
skilled craftsmen and unskilled workers; the wide range of 
attitudes to political and industrial affairs, which tended to 
hold the whole union back to the pace of "its most moderate section". 
102. Quoted by Tim Moroney in The Daily Standard, September 9th, 1922, 
p. 8, reprinted in The Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 3, 1966, p. 2. 
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for sectional interests and attaching them by the lightest possible 
organisational bond it was hoped to keep them within the union. The 
ploy was successful, for a time, in the case of the clerks and 
labourers, but although a separate signalmen's branch remained within 
the Q.R.U. , the main body broke away in 1916 to form a signalmen's union. 
Offers of amalgamation were made frequently in the early days, the 
most serious attempt in 1916 being once again rejected by all the 
recipients.-^ "^ -5 , The Q.R.U. officials were of the opinion that 
"snobbishness, stupid ignorance or foolish prejudice alone"-^ ^^  prevented 
the attainment of a closer relationship, yet there were other more 
practical reasons for the continued refusal of amalgamation offers by 
the craft unions. They feared that within one union they would be 
swamped by the larger membership of the unskilled and semi-skilled 
grades and pulled out on strike over every dispute within the service. 
As well, and in addition to their consciousness of superior status 
within the service j-^ *^ ^ the vested interests of the officials of the 
craft unions was probably the most serious stumbling block to the creation 
103. In reply to a letter from Q.R.U. secretary Callaghan, the Station 
Masters' Association "regretfully advised that their rules 
precluded their amalgamation with any organisation whose members 
are subordinate in rank to the position of station master." The 
Guards' Association was of the opinion that "the time was not ripe" 
for an amalgamation and other organisations made similar excuses. 
The Daily Standard, September 16th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in The 
Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, 1966, p. 2. 
104. Tim Moroney: idem. 
105. "The guards wanted to be separate because they considered themselves 
a sort of aristocrat - "my train" and all that rubbish - they were 
inflated with their own egos." Interview with W. Morrow. 
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of one big union.-^ '^ ^ After 1920 the fact that they did not like the 
political and Industrial views of the leaders of the A.R.U. or the 
militant activity of the union would have reinforced their earlier 
assessment of the situation and their determination to retain their 
independent craft identity and their power within their own small 
empires. 
By 1920 the pattern of organisation of workers within the railway 
service was firmly established. It consisted of three kinds of union: 
1. The industrial union, which by then had become the Queensland 
branch of the Australian Railway Union, whose membership was open to 
all workers in the industry, no matter what their calling. 
2. Craft unions of a particular type, such as the Amalgamated Engineers 
Union, the Vehicle Builders, Painters etc. These craft unions organised 
the workers on the basis of his craft or skill and in a number of cases 
admitted the semi-skilled and unskilled to membership. They also 
covered workers outside the railways, in fact, the bulk of their 
membership lay outside the service and some of these unions were prone 
to involve the railway unions in their disputes outside the industry, 
e.g. the A.E.U. , while others, such as the Vehicle Builders, were not. 
3. Sectional unions, such as the Station Masters, Maintenance, Traffic 
Employees, Guards and Shunters, Railway Officers etc. These were 
confined exclusively to the railway service; some were to be found only 
106. The Q.R.U. proposed that the officials of the other organisations 
would head their own departments within the one big union, if they 
came in, but they were not to be tempted. This endorsed by Messrs. 
Morrow, Rymer and Sampson in interviews. 
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in Queensland, and were formed as breakaway unions from the A.R.U. The 
workers in these unions were organised on the basis of class of work 
107 
performed. 
Sectionalism ensured that solidarity was much more difficult to 
achieve in the approach of workers to management, and encouraged the 
latter to adopt a "divide and rule" policy in industrial relations. On 
several occasions, a loose organisation of railway unions was formed to 
discuss matters of mutual interest.-^^^ 
The Grand Council of Queensland Railway Unions was the first of 
these, whose high-sounding title was not matched by its effectiveness.'^ '^ ^ 
A more recent body, the Combined Railway Unions' Central Committee set 
up in 1936, is still in existence, but only on rare occasions has 
complete unity on major industrial matters been achieved through it.-^ -^ *^  
In terms of inter-union relationships, multiplicity of organisation 
led to "body-snatching" and demarcation disputes, which also undermined 
107. Interview with Mr. Frank Nolan, then General State Secretary of 
A.R.U. (Q'ld. branch), June 28th, 1967. Cf. Railwaymen and 
Unionism - A case for Amalgamation, A.R.U. (Q'ld. branch), Sydney, 
n.d., and files of the Industrial Commission, Brisbane. While it 
is clear that a union like the F.E.D.F.A. would be placed in 
category two, the A.F.U.L.E. is not as easily classified, though a 
case could be made for including it with the other sectional 
unions. There are also several professional unions within the 
service. 
108. At the lowest level the most useful of these was probably the 
"Ipswich Railway Workers' Industrial Conference" centred arotind 
those unions who had members employed in the Ipswich Railway 
Workshops. 
109. Evidence indicates that this body existed in 1905 and in 1917, but 
when it was formed and ceased to exist has not been ascertained. 
110. Pamphlet. "United We Stand, Divided We Fall". Reprint from the 
Railway Advocate, October, 1965. 
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solidarity. As the union representing the majority of semi-skilled and 
unskilled railway workers ,-^-^-^  many of whom were employed in country 
areas, the A.R.U.'s principal opponent in the struggle for numbers was 
the A.W.U., a fact which exacerbated tensions already present after 
1920 between the two unions over Industrial and political beliefs. 
Regardless of the vievjs of the Q.R.U. leadership on the arbitration 
system and the extent to which it could benefit the workers, there were 
certain features of the Arbitration Act of 1915-^ -^ ^ and the first railway 
award under the new legislation in 1917, which made it imperative, even 
obligatory, for the union to register under the Act and become a party 
to the award. These factors were de facto compulsory unionism and 
"bracketing". 
The Inclusion of a preference clause in the railway award, which, 
incidentally the Q.R.U. claimed was Incorporated at their request ,-^-^-^  
affected trade unionism and its operation thereafter, not only within 
the railway service, but in terms of Industrial relations generally 
throughout the State. 
The variety and extent of these effects have been the subject of 
much speculatlon-^ -^ ^ and little unanimity. Many on the management side 
111. Cf. Appendix H, p. 342^ showing occupational breakdown of Q.R.U. 
membership at time of registration in 1917. 
112. 1 Geo. V. No. 16. The Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916, Part III, 
sec. 26-37. 
113. Tim Moroney: The Daily Standax'd, September 9th, 1922, p. 8, 
reprinted in The Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 2, 1966, p. 1. 
114. Cf. V.L. Allen: Power in Trade Unions. Longmans, Green & Co., 
London, 1954, Chapter 4; Allan Eraser: "Compulsory Unionsim", 
Voice, Vol. 2, No. 9, April, 1953, p. 12; Voice, Vol. 2, No. 11, 
July, 1953, p. 4; Ross Anderson & Tom Truman: "Compulsory Unionism 
in Queensland", Voice, Vol. 3, No. 6, March, 1954, pp. 14-15. 
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of the relationship have been happy enough with compulsory unionism, 
seeing it as "watering down" unionism generally and militancy 
particularly, by forcing into union membership not only the apathetic 
and uninterested, but also those of a more conservative frame of mind, 
less likely to be swayed by the inflammatory oratory of the mass meeting. 
From a union's point of view, solidarity based on a shared conception of 
the function and philosophy of the union is of the utmost importance, 
but it is not naturally Increased in proportion to the increase in 
membership brought about by compulsory unionism. Card-holders and trade 
unionists are not necessarily synonymous. 
As it operated in Queensland, compulsory unionism meant that, as 
a matter of general principle, union officials did not have to "sell" 
trade union membership to the workers. The oversight of a twice yearly 
show-of-tickets in the railway service was, in this respect, the limit 
of the recruitment responsibilities of officials. But the position of 
the all-grades union was unique in that it offered to those men and 
women employed in the railways an alternative to the unions covering 
their own craft or calling. In this way compulsory unionism served 
to intensify inter-union rivalry as the unions competed with each other 
for the right to represent workers forced by the Act to join a union. 
It may have been a factor in the battle for membership that a union had 
to prove itself better than other unions at achieving substantial gains 
for its members and looking after their interests, but as an argument 
for militancy it is largely suspect. 
Indeed, compulsory unionism may have acted as a counterweight 
84. 
to militancy through its encouragement of bureaucracy in unions."^ '^ ^ 
The situation of the union official becoming tied to his desk, solving 
the petty problems of every Tom, Dick or Harry among the membership, 
when he should have been out on organising tours, propagandising to 
keep the spirit of militancy and direct action alive, was not unknown 
within the A.R. U.-^ -^ ^ In retrospect, compulsory unionism enriched the 
unions, financially and in membership - in particular, the A.W.U. -
while, by encouraging inter-union rivalry, it aggravated the tensions 
already existent between the all-grades union and others. To these, 
"bracketing" and its application in practice were also contributing 
factors. 
The Industrial Arbitration Act of 1915"^ -^ ^ provided among other 
things, for the registration of unions of employees, as industrial unions, 
and also for the registration of "a list of callings comprised in the 
115. Anderson and Truman: ibid. 
116. Both Rymer and Morrow agree that many A.R.U. officials, particularly 
those at district level, became office bound. However, in their 
view this was because these officials were invariably "weak and 
wishy-washy" types concerned only with the bureaucratic side of 
union organisation and with building their own empires, however 
small. Such men did not see their role as that of the active and 
peripatetic organizer, nor were they concerned with the vital 
principles of industrial unionism or with the need to personally 
convince the workers through organising tours, that they must use 
their economic power through direct action to get what they wanted. 
The question of the aims and aspirations of the early trade unionists 
and their leaders, and the arguments on this theme recently 
presented by H. McQueen: A New Britannia. Penguin Books, Ringwood, 
Victoria, 1970, will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
117. An Act to Provide for the Regulation of the Conditions of Industries 
by means of Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration; to Establish a 
Court of Industrial Arbitration and certain Subsidiary Tribunals, 
and Define their Jurisdiction; and for purposes consequent thereon 
or incidental thereto. 7 George V. No. 16. Asserted to December 18th, 
1916. 
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membership or objects of the union."-^ -^ ^ One of the responsibilities of 
the Industrial Registrar was to see that when an industrial union applied 
for registration for a calling for which another industrial union was 
already registered, both should be registered for the calling and 
"bracketed" together, subject, of course, to a right of appeal against 
this action. Bracketing thus gave unions joint rights under the Act of 
representing the people included in those callings and of participating, 
on their behalf, in the making of awards by the Industrial Court. 
Though it was held that the reason behind the inclusion of 
"bracketing" in the Act was to prevent overlapping, to avoid unnecessary 
duplication within an industry and demarcation disputes ,-^-^^ in practice 
it meant a perpetuation of sectionalism within the railways. By 1920 
the Court had "bracketed" twenty-four unions with the A.R.U. even 
though, in each instance, this union had lodged a vehement appeal against 
such action.-^ ^^  The practice had other long term results as well. 
118. ibid. Part III. Sec. 27E. At the time of its registration under 
this Act (17/2/1917), the Q.R.U. listed 96 callings, together with 
a blanket cover of "generally all those trades and occupations 
necessary in the conduction of the Queensland Railway system." 
Appendix F. p. 328. 
119. ibid. Cf. Transcript of a hearing in the Industrial Court of 
Queensland, before the Registrar: Brisbane, July 28th, 1933: In 
the matter of an application by the Queensland Railway Traffic 
Employees' Union to amend its callings. File 57, p. 9. Mr. T. 
Moroney (for the A.R.U.): "The purpose of it [the registration of 
callings under the Act] is to restrict the spheres of influence of 
a union and to avoid unnecessary duplication; and in order to avoid 
that, it will be seen from this Act that the probable duplication 
of Organisation in any industry is foreseen by the framers of the 
Act, and they have given the Registrar power over the registration 
of organisations, not in respect of industries, not in respect of 
their rules, but in respect of their callings, and the purpose of 
that is to ensure that there will be no over-lapping." 
120. Cf. Appendix G. p. 340. 
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Firstly, the A.W.U. and the A.R.U., as the only unions in a position to 
represent a wide range of callings in the railway service, notably those 
concerning semi and unskilled work, were forced even further into rivalry 
over membership. 
More importantly, both compulsory unionism and "bracketing" must 
have been influential in impelling the A.R.U., against the personal 
desires and beliefs of its leaders, into participation in the State 
arbitration system. It would have been vital to the continued growth 
and success of the all-grades union, for it to show that it was in the 
vanguard of the union movement when it came to achieving practical 
benefits for its members. This required frequent and purposeful advocacy 
before the Industrial Court, which Tim Moroney and Frank Nolan, his 
successor as A.R.U. Secretary provided in full measure. However, it 
meant that the union's leadership became trapped in the ambivalent 
position of having to work within and help to prop up a capitalist 
system with its ancillary bodies such as the arbitration system and the 
Industrial court, while intellectually and emotionally repudiating the 
system and all it represented.-^ -^^  
While, personally, Moroney and Rymer saw nothing of value to be 
121. It is this writer's opinion that Communist trade unionists must 
find themselves caught in a similar conflict of interests. While 
they feel they are using the State and its instrumentalities, such 
as the arbitration system, for their own ends, they are, in 
reality, assisting in the perpetuation of a system, to whose 
ultimate destruction they are committed. 
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gained by the workers from either the Arbitration system,-^ ^^  or through 
affiliation with the A.L.P., they were forced to admit that many of 
their rank and file thought otherwise-^ -^^  and this acted as something of 
a restraint upon their own militancy, and checked, to some extent, the 
use of direct action by the union; at the same time, the union's use 
of the arbitration system meant that workers' control of the railway 
system became more Utopian as each year passed. 
Little of this was evident, hov7ever, before 1920. In fact, all 
indicators pointed to a short life for the arbitration system; 
Industrial unionism was about to be achieved through the establishment of 
the One Big Union (O.B.U.). 
It is not pertinent to the theme of this.chapter to enter into a 
discussion of the changes which were taking place within both the trade 
union and labour movements throughout Australia, from 1910 to 1920, 
especially as this has already been done with brilliance and at length 
by Turner.-^ "^^  It should be enough to state that the idea of industrial 
122. The Advocate, September 21st, 1927, p. 2. "The Crisis in Trade 
Unionism". "The War Upon Trade Unionism was being made by political 
action and by direct action. The State as such, and its 
instrtimentalities, like arbitration and the machinery of 
employerdom were all in the fray, for the retention, exercise and 
development of monopolistic privilege and profit." Cf. M. Bridson 
Cribb: op.cit.. Part II, and Chapter 5 following. 
123. The Advocate. April 15th, 1929. Addressing the State Council of 
the A.R.U. Moroney said that "he was not one of those who believed 
that it was necessary that they should have an Organised Political 
expression. They had got on fairly well without one during the 
last four years. However, he was forced to recognise that his 
members desired some form of Political expression, but he thought 
that it was not in their interests that it should take the form of 
support of the Labour Government." 
124. Ian Turner: Industrial Labour and Politics, op.cit. 
unionism and of one big imlon had been gaining support steadily during 
the war, for a variety of reasons, and that by 1918, even those trade 
union leaders who were basically unsympathetic to these ideals deemed 
it wise to support the movement, with a view to ultimately controlling 
its strength and direction.-^^^ 
The wave of Interest in and commitment to industrial unionism 
probably peaked in late 1918 with the formation, in New South Wales, 
of the Workers' Industrial Union of Australia - or O.B.U., drawing much 
of its Inspiration from the De Leonite version of the Industrial Workers 
of the World (I.W.W.). It was not to last, breaking upon the rocks of 
the mixed motives of its original supporters; on the desire of the A.W.U. 
to use the O.B.U. to expand its own hegemony, on the reluctance of the 
craft unions, and on the conflict between those industrialists who 
125. Report of the annual convention of the A.W.U. (Q'ld. Branch). 
Daily Standard, January 30th, 1920, p. 5; Report of A.W.U. 
Convention, Sydney. Daily Standard, March 11th, 1920, p. 3. These 
reports bring out clearly the lack of ideological support for 
industrial unionism and the O.B.U. among a majority of A.W.U. 
delegates. The point is repeatedly made that industrial unionism 
already exists in the shape of "that greatest of all Australian 
Industrial Organisations, the A.W.U." {Daily Standard, March 11th, 
1920, p. 3.) Rather than support an O.B.U. set up on syndicalist 
or I.W.W. lines, the leaders of the A.W.U. wished to alter the 
constitution of their own union in order to allow for expansion by 
taking in additional unions. It was also clearly stated that the 
A.W.U. intended to "strike hard at direct action methods and will 
have no truck with these methods at all, preferring to adopt the 
methods of conciliation and arbitration which it is contended, 
bring better and more lasting results to the workers." {Daily 
Standard, January 30th, 1920, p. 5.) Re political action, see 
Senator Barnes, delegate to A.W.U. Convention, Sydney: "But he 
would like to point out that they should never neglect political 
action. It would be useless to be closely organised on industrial 
lines, and allow the "other fellow" to have charge of the 
political machine. What chance would industrialists have if Mr. 
Hughes or Sir Joseph Cook decided to turn the machine guns on them." 
{Daily Standard, March 11th, 1920, p. 3.) 
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eschewed political action and those who wished "to award Parliament a 
much more considerable role in their plans for the reconstruction of 
society."-^ ^^  
On this issue it was quite clear where the Q.R.U. stood and, 
conceivably, would continue to stand. The union was an all-grades one, 
and from its inception its leaders had worked tirelessly toward the 
achievement of the one.big union, embracing the whole of the railway 
industry. The philosophy of both the President and Secretary, Rymer 
and Moroney, was heavily syndicalist, committing them to a reliance on 
direct industrial action to secure their social objectives - the 
socialisation of industry and workers' control. 
The rank and file of the Q.R.U. had been balloted as early as 1915 
on their views on one big union, and had responded favourably. It seems 
clear that Rymer and Moroney still expected to see the extension of 
industrial unionism in the immediate future, even though evidence to the 
contrary was mounting, including the abortive attempt by the A.W.U. in 
1920 to form one union from a number of those operating in the 
Queensland railway service.-^^^ Certainly the Q.R.U.'s support for the 
federation scheme in 1920, which resulted in the change from the Q.R.U. 
to the Australian Railway Union (Queensland Branch) was conditioned 
largely by the belief that a national organisation would advance the 
126. Turner: op.cit., p. 184. 
127. Daily Standard, April 7th, 1920, p. 3. w.j. Riordan (A.W.U.): 
"The A.W.U. had about 2,000 members at present engaged in the 
railway service, which section of the A.W.U., the union was 
prepared to let join up with one big union of railway workers." 
90. 
cause of industrial unionism. ° 
All things considered including the failure of the O.B.U., one is 
still astonished at the degree of apparent success achieved by the 
A.R.U. in the next five years (1920-25). The membership figures speak 
for themselves, climbing from 9,094 in 1922 to reach the all-time peak 
of 13,190 for the years 1925-26.-^ 29 p^^ -^ hg ^^^^ ^^.^^ -^ g^ A.R.U. was 
spearheading a campaign to bring the parliamentarians under a large 
measure of rank and file control, and to force the Labour government to 
legislate for a 44-hour week and other Industrial claims, including the 
restoration of the £4.5,0. basic wagc-^ -^ C* 
At the Emu Park Labour-in-Polltlcs convention in 1923, the A.R.U. 
delegates , in alliance with the Industrialists on the Trades and Labor 
Council, narrowly failed to have passed resolutions which would have 
given the party's central executive (Q.C.E.) power to instruct the 
parliamentarians on interpretation of any plank in the platform, and 
others which would have similarly bound them to the dictation of the 
extra-parliamentary wing. 
On the industrial front, the agitation for restoration of the wage 
cut, also led by the A.R.U., finally culminated in strike action 
128. Cf. The Advocate, official organ of the A.R.U. (Q'ld.) for 1920. 
Also Daily Standard, September 27th, 29th, and October 5th, 1920. 
The formation of the federal body is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3, Part I. 
129. Cf. Table VI, p. 91. 
130. In February, 1922, the Industrial Court had reduced the basic wage 
to £4.0.0., taking into account both widespread unemployment and 
the Commonwealth Statistician's cost-of-living figures. Cf. 




















































































































































































































































Sources: Railway Commissioner's Reports, 1920-50, Queensland Parliamentary 
Papers; Queensland Year Book; A.B.C. of Queensland and 
Australian Statistics - compiled by George Porter, Registrar-
General, (Government Printer, Brisbane),1928-34. 
within the railway service in 1925. The government of Premier Gillies 
capitulated, conceding to the workers, not only the demanded wage rise 
92. 
but also the principle that a Labor government should legislate general 
industrial reform. It was evident that the leaders of the A.R.U. saw 
this as a triumph for militancy and direct action.-^ -^ -^  
Yet all this was deceptive for the reality was quite different. 
Between 1920 and 1930 the final links were forged in the alliance 
between Queensland Labor governments and the A.W.U., beginning under 
the premiership of E.G. Theodore and continuing into that of W. McCormack, 
It was ultimately a complete victory for arbitration and gradual 
reformism over industrial unionism and workers' control. Less than two 
years after its 1925 successes, the A.R.U.'s delegates had been 
expelled from the Labor-ln-Politics convention,-^^2 the union had 
disaffiliated from the A.L.P.-^ -^ -^  and its power and position of leadership 
within the trade union and labour movements, as well as in the railway 
industry had been seriously eroded in the 1927 strike. The union was 
isolated and forced into the position of a "permanently protesting 
minority".-^^4 While McCormack's "lock out" of the railwaymen in 1927 
alienated the labour movement at the time and was a factor in the defeat 
of his government in the 1929 elections, the effects were not permanent. 
A term in opposition provided an opportunity to unite behind a new 
leader, Forgan-Smlth, and after their re-entry to office in 1932, the 
alignment of Labor governments and the A.W.U. against the industrialists 
131. Moroney in Brisbane Courier, September 5th, 1925. "the great 
victory meant that only a gesture would be needed in future to get 
all that was demanded." 
132. Southport, February, 1926. 
133. The A.R.U. did not affiliate again with the A.L.P. until 1957. 
134. Turner: op.cit., p. 217. 
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of the A.R.U. and the Trades and Labor Council remained constant for 
the next twenty years and more. 
The Depression which followed closely upon the eclipse of the A.R.U. 
disillusioned trade unionists with these traditional instruments for 
achieving their ends - Labor governments and the arbitration system.-^ 5^ 
Yet the rivalry, suspicion and distrust between union leaders, together 
with their Ideological differences, which had destroyed the infant 
O.B.U., also prevented the formation of an alliance with the left wing 
militants, which might have produced, if not workers' control, at least 
some more positive alleviation of the workers' lot than was ultimately 
achieved. Philosophically, a union such as the A.R.U. was perhaps 
better equipped to meet the Depression than those based on more orthodox 
thought. To fighters in the class war, there was little to be lost and 
much to be gained from a situation where capitalists and governments 
alike were, seemingly, being beaten to their knees by economic forces 
which they could not control. Capitalism was destroying Itself, and, 
in the process, leaving the way open for the workers to take control of 
what was rightfully theirs. 
If the opportunity was there, the A.R.U. missed taking it. In part 
this stemmed from the inability to forge a solid working alliance 
within the trade union movement, in part from the failure of the militant 
industrialists to provide practical solutions which would be acceptable 
135. Cf. L.T. Louis: Trade Unions and the Depression: a Study of 
Victoria, 1930-1932. A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1968. ed R. Cooksey: 
"The Great Depression in Australia", Labour History, No. 17, 1970. 
Richard Dixon: "Industrial Policy in the 30's", Australian Left 
Review, October-November, 1970, pp. 19-31. 
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to majority opinion. Union membership was declining alarmingly, 
and it is always difficult, if not impossible to make gains through 
direct action when unemployment is widespread, as economic necessity 
erodes solidarity. Even before the onset of the Depression, the A.R.U.'s 
membership figures had tumbled to 8,072 in 1927,-^ -^ ^ ^ ^^ j ^^ -,-^g following 
years, continued to fall further, relatively, than those of the railway 
sectional and craft unions.-^ -^ ^ By 19 32, they had dropped to 5,789, and 
although the total number of railway employees did not fall as low as 
might have been expected,-^ -^ ^ due to the Introduction into the service 
of the practice of working the men "short time" equal to the man hours 
required,-^ *^ ^ still the union became preoccupied with the economic 
survival of each individual railway worker. 
When the situation was at its worst in July, 1933, the union had 
also to fight off a most determined attempt by the Queensland Railway 
Traffic Employees Union to have its own registration altered "from that 
136. Cf. Alister Davidson: The Communist Party of Australia. Hoover 
Institution Press, Stanford, 1969, Chapter 3. L.L. Sharkey: The 
Australian Communist Party: Outline History A.C.P., Sydney, 1944. 
One tactic proposed by the Communist Party - that of revolutionary 
action - was definitely not acceptable. 
137. Table VI, p. 91. 
138. idem. 
139. Table VI, p. 91. 
140. Cf. Reports of the Commissioner for Railways for the Years Ending 
June 30th, 1929-1933. "In some workshops, married men are working 
as low as seven days per fortnight, single men working only six 
days per fortnight, whilst the running staff must, of course, share 
whatever work is offering." Report of the Commissioner for Railways, 
year ended June 30th, 1929. 
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of a union catering for a section only of the railway service to one 
which would provide an all-grades union to which any employee of the 
Commissioner for Railways could be long. "-^"^-^  Had this application been 
granted, it is likely that the A.R.U.'s membership and power would have 
been further reduced. 
The Second World War finally pulled both the railway service and 
the A.R.U. out of the depression doldrums. At its end, the union's 
membership had doubled to 10,038-^ "^ 2 ^ ^d railway business had increased 
to such an extent that profits of up to £4^ million (1942-43) had been 
made.-^ '^ •5 The price paid for these gains was high in terms of man-hours 
worked, often under the worst of conditions, and in the heavy toll 
taken of the Department's locomotives and rolling stock.-^ '^ '^  
In the Immediate post-war period, industrial grievances mounted 
within the service and the feeling grew among the railway unions that 
the Department was purposely delaying in meeting legitimate demands for 
wage increases and a general improvement in working conditions, so that 
profits could be maintained. At the same time, the shift which had 
taken place in the power relationships within the trade union movement 
in the 1940's was becoming more open and obvious. As early as 1940, 
Communists had gained control of the Queensland Trades and Labor Council 
141. Transcript of a hearing in the Industrial Court of Queensland 
before the Registrar, Mr. P. Wallace, on July 28th, 1933. File 57. 
Records of the Industrial Commission. 
142. Table VI, p. 91. 
143. Table III, p.56. 
144. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for Year ended June 30th, 
1945. In 1943-44, for example, the average time paid for drivers, 
firemen and guards was 116 hours per fortnight. 
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and held executive positions in other unions, notably those of the 
waterside and meat workers .-^'^^ Radicalism, born of the Depression and 
war time experiences was spreading among rank and file unionists, and 
manifesting itself in a new militant spirit among industrial workers.-^^^ 
In turn, this was reflected in the wave of strikes which struck the 
meat, mining and stevedoring industries, in particular, in the late 
1940's. 
As a left-wing militant union, wedded to the principles of industrial 
unionism, the A.R.U. had much in common with the Communists in the trade 
unions, and a close alliance had been forged between them through the 
T,L,C. It was in these circumstances that the A.R.U. essayed its 
longest and most Important piece of direct action against the Government, 
on February 2nd, 1948. The ensuing railway strike lasted nine weeks, 
until April 5th, and was notable for the high level of solidarity 
maintained among the railway workers, due in some degree to the severe 
manpower shortage of the time. It was also marked by the ferocity, 
both verbal and physical, with which both sides contested the issues. 
It is never easy to define precisely the issues in industrial 
disputes, as both management and union put up propaganda screens for 
public consumption. In this Instance, there is no doubt that there were 
145. Robert Murray: The Split: Australian Labour in the Fifties. 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1970. Alastair Davidson: op.cit.. Chapter 6. 
146. R. Dixon: op.cit., p. 23. 
147. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for the Yea:r ended June 
30th, 1948. D. Olive: The Queensland Railway Strike. Communist 
Party of Australia, n.d. The Queensland Railway Strike. 
Queensland Railways Central Disputes Committee, February, 1949. 
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genuine industrial grievances. It is also indisputable that there was 
an underlying political motive on the part of the A.R.U. to embarrass, 
if not undermine, the A.W.U.-dominated Labor government. In addition, 
the Communist Party was convinced at this time that Australia was ripe 
for revolution during the period of post-war reconstruction, and part of 
their strategy for undermining constitutional authority was to foment 
continuous industrial disputes, and to extend each of them as widely as 
possible. 
The highly organised and effective picketing, the size of the mass 
meetings, marches and ptiblic demonstrations which set this railway strike 
apart from its predecessors were more than matched by the hostility of 
the Hanlon Labor government. A state of emergency was declared, a total 
press blackout imposed, and the Industrial Law Amendment Act rushed 
through Parliament giving the police wide powers to arrest without 
warrant and to enter and search union offices and buildings. During 
the strike, union leaders were arrested and gaoled, and numerous 
incidents of bashing and brutality were recorded. 
Politically, the A.R.U. achieved little at that time through the 
strike. It did indicate that the industrialists matched the government 
more evenly than at any time since 1925, and subsequently, with the fall 
of the Galr Labor government in 19 54, and the splitting off of the 
Queensland Labor Party, the balance of power within the labor movement 
swung to the Trades Hall group, which included the A.R.U, 
Industrially, some tangible gains were made by the railwaymen in 
conditions and marginal rates of pay, but the cause of Industrial unionism 
98, 
and workers' control was advanced not one iota. As well as this the 
union recognised that the price paid was too high. "Apart from the 
personal hardship suffered by so many unionists, the bitterness the 
strike engendered went too deep and endangered the whole labor 
movement."-^ "^ ^ Future tactics were to be different. While the union was 
not foregoing direct action, it would use "lightning" and "rolling 
strikes" and see to it that strike action was limited, in each instance, 
to several days at a time. 
From the preceding account, in abstract, of the history and 
development of the A.R.U, possible reasons for its militancy can already 
be detected. In its origins the union was different from many others, 
in that it was conceived as a mass union, based on the industry in which 
it operated, and geared to represent all the workers in that Industry. 
As such, it was rooted in a particular philosophy which saw the 
aspirations and needs of the workers in an Industrial society capable 
of fulfilment only through their organisation into mass industrial 
unions, and the placement in their hands of the management and control 
of these industries. Thus, from the beginning, the union had Important 
social as well as industrial objectives, and from 1917 to 1970 these 
were promulgated on behalf of the union by a tiny handful of men of which 
the two general secretaries, who divided the period between them, were 
the most influential. Another important strand in this Ideology was the 
rejection of political action as an effective means of achieving social 
ends, in favour of direct industrial action. Therefore, possible causes 
148. Frank Nolan, General State Secretary, A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch) in an 
interview June 28th, 1967. 
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of militancy lie in the kind of union it was, and in the ideological 
beliefs and personalities of its leaders. The degree of success which 
it could have through the use of direct action would depend, to some 
degree, on the extent to which leadership beliefs were representative 
of those of the rank and file membership, or on the amount of democratic 
control which its members could exercise over their leaders. For this 
reason it will be of interest to discover along what lines the union 
was organised, and whether or not decision-making was a centralised 
process. 
Other factors have already shown themselves to be of some 
relevance, particularly that of inter-union relationships though this 
may ultimately turn out to be more of a provocative element than a 
prime cause. Finally, it already seems clear that something special is 
introduced into Industrial labour relations when the employer or 
management side is represented by a Minister of the Crown, as head of 
a government instrumentality. This is particularly so when a Labor 
government is in power. Such a singular relationship may well have a 
direct bearing on the development of militant attitudes within a union, 
and warrants a close examination at a later stage of this study. 
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PART III: THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY IN AUSTRALIA 
The airline industry in Australia dates from 1920 only. The 
expansion to its present dimensions is even more recent, lying 
exclusively within the post Second World War period. Therefore, unlike 
the railway service, history will have played a much smaller role in 
shaping general industrial attitudes and the particular relationships 
which have evolved between the airline operators and their employees, the 
pilots. Politics, however, has been as much if not more a part of the 
airline Industry as it has, at the State level, of the railways, and 
has been influential in the determination of its lines of development; 
these, in turn, have to some extent decided the form and substance of 
industrial relationships. 
Until 1920 all commercial flying in Australia was completely 
unregulated. For reasons of safety alone, the need for control was 
becoming widely recognised, but constitutional difficulties seemed to 
prevent regulation by the Federal government, even though the requirements 
of defence and Interstate commerce dictated the exercise of federal power 
in this field. However, as a signatory of the 1919 Paris Convention on 
Air Navigation, "Australia undertook certain obligations with respect 
to such matters as the issue of certificates of airworthiness, 
minimum qualifications for pilots and navigators, admission of the 
aircraft of other contracting States over its territory, and so on."-^ '^ ^ 
It appeared possible that on this basis, when taken together with the 
149. D.M. Hocking & C.P. Haddon-Cave: Air Transport in Australia. 
Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1951, p. 77. 
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Commonwealth's external affairs power, under Section 51, XXIX of the 
Federal Constitution, which Included the right to enforce international 
treaties and conventions, that central government right to control 
flying throughout Australia could be sustained. Accordingly, an Air 
Navigation Act was passed in 1920, which, with its accompanying 
regulations, placed the control and direction of the industry in the 
hands of a Controller of Civil Aviation.-^^^ 
From the beginning the basis of government policies was the dual 
requirements of development and defence. At an early stage, it also 
became clear that. Initially at least, much of the commercial flying in 
Australia would need to be subsidized to ensure future economic 
viability. The federal authority determined routes to be flown and 
entered into subsidization agreements with operators servicing remote 
areas. Direct subsidies took the form of payments on a mileage flown 
basis, while most operators received valuable monetary assistance 
through the granting of contracts to carry airmail. Emphasis was placed 
on non-competition with other forms of transport, particularly the 
railways, so that the first routes for which tenders were accepted in 
1920-21 were those linking Geraldton and Derby, granted to Western 
Australian Airways Ltd., and between Charleville and Cloncurry, which 
150. The Act gave the Controller the power to acquire airport sites 
and to construct the required facilities, but also placed him "in 
the strategic position of being able to dictate the routes to be 
flown through his power to grant or withhold svibsidies. In 
addition, he could, and did, stipulate the natiore and frequency of 
the services, the type and performance of the aircraft to be used 
and even, to some extent, the conditions of employment of pilots 
and mechanics." Hocking & Haddon Cave: ibid. p. 2. 
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went to Queensland and Northern Territory Aerial Services Ltd. (Qantas).-^ -^^  
Subsequently a change in emphasis occurred, with regard to air routes 
reflecting changes in demand for air services. While the need for 
developmental and rural services remained and continued to be met,-^ ^^  
the greatly Increased desire for fast transport between the centres of 
population along the eastern seaboard was matched, in the 1930's, by 
the growth in inter-capital city services, both government assisted and 
unsubsldlzed, in direct competition with land and sea transport. 
The power of the Controller of Civil Aviation to dictate routes to 
be flown was also relevant to the wider field of defence planning, and 
it seems clear that it was used for such purposes, the establishment of 
a subsidized service between Perth and Adelaide in 1929 being a case in 
point. Of more importance was the degree to which the requirements of 
Empire defence and communications were instrumental in the entry of 
Australia into the field of International air transport. 
Flowing on from policies decided at the Imperial Conference in 1926, 
both Australian and British governments accorded a high priority to the 
establishment of an airmail link between London and Australia. At this 
stage, (British) Imperial Airways was extending its London-Karachi 
route eastwards, and the Australian government acting on the advice of 
151. For the story of the establishment of Qantas and its subsequent 
history, see Sir Hudson Bysh's trilogy: Qantas Rising. Angus & 
Robertson, Sydney, 1965, Qantas at War. Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 
1968, and Wings of the World, the Story of Qantas, 1945-1966. 
Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1970. 
152. Though no longer as important, relatively, as it was in the early 
stages of commercial flying Federal governments have continued 
this policy of developmental and rural subsidies. See Appendix I 
for amounts outlaid for these purposes in the period, 1960-1969. 
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an inter-departmental committee which it had set up in 1931 to investigate 
the matter, came to an arrangement with the British government, whereby 
the link, Brisbane-Singapore, was to be operated and subsidized by 
Australia. Qantas became the "chosen Instrument"-^ -^^  of the Australian 
government in this enterprise, and in 1934, a new company Qantas Empire 
Airways Ltd. (Q.E.A.) in which Qantas and Imperial Airways Ltd. had 
equal shares was formed to implement the contract. The introduction, 
in 1938, of the Empire Flying-boat Service, primarily for the carriage 
of first-class mail between England and Australia at the same rate as 
that charged by sea transport further extended the England-Australia 
service, and once again Q,E,A, was chosen as its flag carrier by the 
Australian government. New Zealand was linked in the following year, 
with the creation of Tasman Empire Airways Ltd. (T.E.A.) in which the 
flag carriers of the three countries held the shares. 
Because they are pertinent to subsequent history certain other 
developments in the inter-war years need to be noted. One with far-
reaching implications was the constitutional question. The Federal 
government's power to regulate and control civil aviation throughout 
153. "In the field of international aviation each airline operator 
needs the full backing and bargaining strength of its national 
government in order to secure landing rights, shares of traffic 
and other concessions. On the other hand, the national government, 
because it is concerned with prestige and defence, seeks to use 
its airlines as instriiments of government policy. A government 
tends to choose one airline to be the national flag carrier abroad, 
and then subsidizes it to help it compete with the airlines of 
other nations. A chosen instrtraient airline, therefore, if it is 
privately owned, is private enterprise with a difference. It is 
private enterprise 'affected with a public interest'." Such was 
the position of Q.E.A. Cf. D. Corbett: Politics and the Airlines. 
George Allen & Unwin, London, 1965, pp. 20-21. 
104. 
Australia was challenged in 1934, ^ ^ and part of the Regulations made 
under the Air Navigation Act (1920) declared Invalid by the High Court. 
This decision meant that Commonwealth authority over air navigation was 
now limited to implementation of the Paris Convention, to control of 
air navigation in relation to trade and commerce with other countries 
and among the States, and within the territory of the Commonwealth ,-^ 55 
but did not apply to intra-state flying. An immediate appeal to the 
people, through a referendum, to grant to the Commonwealth government 
the power to make laws with respect to "air navigation and aircraft" 
was made and rejected, and it was only through the cooperation of all 
the State governments that a way around the impasse was finally found. 
The State governments agreed to adopt uniform State Air Navigation 
Acts, which, in effect, applied the Federal Air Navigation Regulations 
to all air operations within the States and vested the administration 
of these regulations in the Federal Department of Civil Aviation.-^ 56 
In this way. Commonwealth control over air navigation, safety, etc. was 
re-established, but the question of the ultimate authority of the 
central government over all aspects of civil aviation was not resolved 
and was to create Impediments to the plans of a later Labor government 
for nationalization of the airline industry in Australia. 
Heavy Investment in civil aviation by shipping and road transport 
Interests was another feature of the inter-war years. The New England 
154. Judgments in this case. The King v. Burgess, ex parte Henry, 55 
C.L.P. 608, were not handed down until November, 1936. 
155. D. Corbett: op.cit. p. 23. 
156. ibid. , p. 24. 
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Motor Co. Ltd., a road passenger transport company, entered the air 
transport field in 1931, with its New England Airways Ltd., operating 
originally between Brisbane and Lismore, but later extended to other 
routes. Another such enterprise which expanded into civil aviation 
and was later to become an important operator in this field was Ansett 
Transport Industries Ltd. Shipping Interests were backers of the 
Holyman brothers who pioneered air services from Melbourne to Tasmania 
in the early thirties. Their original enterprise, Tasmanian Aerial 
Services Ltd. was Incorporated in 1936 as Australian National Airways 
Pty. Ltd., (A.N.A. ) with five steamship companies as major shareholders. •^ '^^  
As in the years ahead, A.N.A., and, to a lesser extent Ansett Airways, 
continued to expand and to absorb smaller airline operators, fears 
were aroused within some sections of the Australian Labor Party that the 
air transport Industry was in danger of becoming totally controlled by 
a few powerful shipping and road transport interests. While, according 
to Corbett,-^^^ the A.L.P. was, in any case, dogmatically attached to the 
concept of nationalisation of industry, this concern for trends within 
the industry must have carried some weight in the final decision of the 
Federal Labor government in 1945 to create a government monopoly of air 
transport in Australia. However, these were to be matters of consequence 
for the future. 
By the time war came in 1939, the air transport industry, though 
still in many ways in its infancy, was yet firmly enough established 
not only to survive but also to benefit from lessons learned tjnder 
157. D.M. Hocking & C.P. Haddon-Cave: op.oit., pp. 25-26. 
158. D. Corbett: op.cit.. Chapter 2. 
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wartime conditions. Inevitably, the international operations of Q.E.A. 
were severely curtailed, though a non-stop ocean flight from Perth to 
Ceylon was maintained under the most hazardous of conditions.-^ -^ ^ 
Internally, the number of passenger miles flown rose from 42,901,209 in 
1938-39 to 142,902,187 for the period 1944-45,-^ '^^  much of this logged 
under contract to the United States military authorities (See Table 
VII below). 
TABLE VII 
GRAND TOTAL OF OPERATIONS BY COMPANIES ON BEHALF OF THE 




































Maintenance facilities also were expanded and perfected: all of 
these factors added up to an invaluable gain in experience in flying 
for operators, pilots, and the travelling public, both military and 
civilian. 
With the projected return to peacetime operations in 1945, the 
159. Cf. Hudson Fysh: Qantas At War. op.cit.. Chapter 23. 
160. Hocking & Haddon-Cave: op.cit., p. 38. 
161. Annual Report of the Department of Civil Aviation: Report on 
Civil Aviation in Australia and New Guinea, 1945-46, p. 25. 
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problems facing the post-war industry appeared to be serious, though 
not Insurmountable. They Included the virtual re-establishment of civil 
air transport,-^^^ allocation of routes, the availability of new 
aircraft and the need to gain permission from the Commonwealth 
government to tap its dwindling dollar reserves should the purchase of 
aircraft of American manufacture seem desirable. Yet, in retrospect, 
these critical questions must have paled to insignificance alongside 
the crisis which suddenly confronted the industry as a result of policy 
decisions re civil aviation taken by the Federal government, and 
announced in Parliament on November 22nd, 1944. Cabinet's decision 
was "that a wholly government-owned statutory authority be formed to 
take over, operate and maintain all inter-state airlines."-^ -^^  In effect 
this meant that the Labor government intended to establish a public 
enterprise monopoly of domestic aviation. 
With this purpose in view, the Australian National Airlines Bill 
was introduced in the House of Representatives in July, 1945 and 
assented to on the 16th August of that year. The Act provided 
"for, inter alia, the establishment and operation by the 
Commonwealth and, subject to the provisions of the Air 
Navigation Regulations, of National Airline Services and for 
the setting up of the Australian National Airlines Commission, 
162. By 1945, there were nine companies operating regular air transport 
services within Australia. They were: Australian National Airways 
Pty. Ltd.; Ansett Airways Ltd.; Aircrafts Pty. Ltd.; Butler Air 
Transport Co.; Airlines (W.A.) Ltd.; Connellan Airways; MacRobertson-
Miller Aviation Co. Ltd. ; Guinea Airways Ltd. ; Qantas Empire Aiirways 
Ltd. Hocking & Haddon-Cave: op.cit., Appendix II, p. 177. A.N.A. 
came out of the war in a stronger financial position than any other 
company. 
163. C.P.D. Australia, 1944, p. 1943. The Acting Prime Minister, the 
Rt. Hon. F. Forde. 
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consisting of five Commissioners, to establish and operate 
such services. The Act included provision for services 
between any place in a State and any place in another state; 
between any place in any Territory of the Commonwealth and 
any place in Australia outside the Territory; between any 
place in any Territory of the Commonwealth and any other 
place in that Territory, and, with the approval of the 
Minister, between any place in Australia and any place outside 
Australia. It also empowered the Commission to enter into 
any agreement or contract with the Minister on behalf of the 
Commonwealth for the transport of mails by air."-^^^ 
These portions of the Act did little more than provide the 
statutory authority for setting up Commonwealth owned air services, 
to operate in all areas other than that of intra-state flying, over 
which Commonwealth jurisdiction was void unless referral of power was 
made to it by a State government. The critical section was Statutory 
Rule, 1940, No. 25, 
"which provided, by an amendment to the Air Navigation 
Regulations that the Director-General of Civil Aviation 
[might] issue an airline licence upon such conditions, in 
addition to compliance with the Regulations, as he considered 
necessary, or he [might] refuse to issue a licence."-'-^^ 
The power to issue, withhold or withdraw licences was to be used to 
eliminate any or all established operators on any inter-state, territorial 
or International (if originating within Australia) route, once the 
Australian National Airlines Commission had established a service 
"adequate to meet the needs of the public for transport by air."-^ ^^  
In the context of this thesis, the motivation for nationalization 
of the airline industry is of less Importance than the attempt itself. 
164. Annual Report of the Department of Civil Aviation: op.cit., 
pp. 1-2. 
165. idem. 
166. Commonwealth Acts, 1945, No. 31. Australian National Airlines Act. 
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However, it must be remembered that government control of monopolistic 
industries was an article of faith for the A.L.P. , and that between 
1942-44 they had energetically pressed for the transfer from the States 
to the Commonwealth of fourteen powers,-^^^ including that over civil 
aviation, to facilitate the implementation of their plans for post-war 
reconstruction and economic planning. As well, the expansionist policies 
of Holyman on behalf of A.N.A. had not escaped the attention of the Labor 
leaders, whose fears that this company was planning a monopoly of post-
war air services-^^^ were exacerbated by their knowledge of the strong 
element of British shipping Interests in A.N.A.'s financial backing, 
and by the pressures exerted on leaders such as Chifley and Drakeford, 
ex-railwaymen themselves, by the railway unions and State governments. 
In the event, the Federal government found its policies on civil 
aviation inhibited once again by the Constitution. The privately 
owned airlines challenged the Australian National Airlines Act and in 
its judgment, the High Court declared that "in Part IV of the Act sub-
section (1) of Section 46, so much of Section 47 (including paragraph 
(a)) and so much of Section 49 as refer to interstate airline services 
were invalid, and that Statutory Rule 1940, No. 25 also was invalid."^^ 
167. The proposal for the transfer of fourteen powers, placed before 
the people at a referendum on August 19th, 1944, was defeated. 
168. Cf. Stanley Brogden: Australia's Two-Airline Policy. Melboiorne 
University Press, Melbourne, 1968, p. 44. "The truth was that 
A.N.A. did plan a complete takeover of all domestic services ex-
cept those of Qantas, and even in 1943 had quite precise plans for 
massive overseas services. Had these ideas developed in 1946-50 
the situation would have been clearcut: a direct clash between 
A.N.A. and Qantas, with A.N.A. by far the greater financial concern." 
169. Annual Report of the Department of Civil Aviation, 1945-46. op.cit., 
p. 2. 
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In broad terms, this meant that while there was no impediment to the 
establishment through the Australian National Airlines Commission of a 
wholly government-owned airline, no moves to restrict competition could 
be made against the private operators, by refusal to issue licences for 
Interstate airline services, so long as safety requirements were met. 
On the other hand, control of Australia's international airline 
was achieved more easily in that there was no constitutional impediment. 
In 1945, the Australian government acquired the British government's 
fifty per cent shareholding in Qantas Empire Airways,-^ 70 ^ ^^ j ^ y juiy ist 
of the following year had bought out all private shareholders to gain 
complete control of the company. Again, there was strong opposition to 
the second part of this transaction, though it is of interest to note 
that Hudson Fysh, co-founder and chairman-managing director of Q.E.A. 
has suggested that as Q,E,A, was the "chosen Instrument" of the Australian 
government in International aviation, a fair case could be made for the 
need to place its ownership in the hands of the government.-^ -^^  The 
Australian government also acquired the Q.E.A, shareholding in Tasman 
Empire Airways Ltd., and, in 1945, became a partner with the New Zealand 
and British governments in a government-owned tripartite organisation, 
known as British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, for the purpose of 
170. Originally the shares were held by (British) Imperial Airways, and 
were acquired by the British government through its takeover of 
that Company. 
171. Cf. Sir Hudson Fysh: Wings to the World: the Story of Qantas, 1945-
66. op.cit., Chapters 5 and 6. Hudson Fysh retained his positions 
in Qantas under pioblic ownership. The corporate identity of the 
Company continued, with members of the Board appointed by the 
government of the day. 
111. 
operating a trans-Pacific air service. Initially the service was 
undertaken by A.N.A. under charter from B.C.P.A., but by 1948 B.C.P.A. 
was able to assume responsibility for the flights. Qantas, in turn, 
took over the routes in 1954 and B.C.P.A. was disbanded. 
Though thwarted in the full realization of its policies with regard 
to Internal aviation, the Federal Labor government, through its agent, 
the Australian National Airlines' Commission, proceeded in September, 
1946, to set up an inter-state airline. Trans Australia Airlines (T.A.A.) 
and to engage in ruthless competition with the existing private 
operators. At the same time it made quite clear its policy with regard 
to Internal air services: 
"The Australian National Airlines Commission is the chosen 
instrument of the Commonwealth Government to operate interstate 
services and services operating within or to Commonwealth 
territories, and Governmental assistance will not be given to 
others to establish or maintain such services, except to the 
extent that the Commission may be unable, for the time being, 
to provide such services. "-^^^ 
T.A.A. was given a near monopoly of Government transport work, 
including freight and airmail, on any routes it served, which 
compensated for its virtual boycott by private business Interests. It 
recorded its first profit in 1949-50, by which time a change in 
government to that of a Liberal-Country Party coalition led by R.G. 
Menzles presaged new policy orientations on civil aviation. 
Contrary to the expectations of many, the new government decided 
to retain T.A.A.; at the same time it had to mount a rescue operation 
172. Annual Report of the Department of Civil Aviation: Report on 
Civil Aviation in Australia and New Guinea, 1946-47. p. 24. 
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for A.N.A. which by now was in serious financial difficulties. 
Governmental policy was expressed in the Civil Aviation Agreement Act 
1952, which attempted to establish rationalised competition between the 
two major domestic operators at that time - T.A.A. and A.N.A. The 
agreement was between the Commonwealth and A.N.A. the Australian 
National Airlines Commission having refused to be a party to an 
arrangement which was designed to assist its competitors, though forced 
by the government to comply with its conditions. The Act "provided 
that both airlines were to have equal access to mails and governmental 
business, and financial assistance by way of loan guarantees was to be 
afforded the private operator to permit re-equipment with aircraft fully 
competitive with the pressurised aircraft procured by the Commission."-^ -^ ^ 
Routes, timetables, fares, etc. were also to be kept under review by 
the airlines. 
While it brought some degree of stability to the industry, the 
legislation failed to achieve its goal of profitable rationalised 
competition, particularly with regard to A.N.A. which was losing out 
in a competitive battle with other interstate operators like Ansett 
Airways Pty. Ltd. and Butler Air Transport Ltd. , private operators who 
were not bound by the rationalisation provisions of the Act. "Because 
of the limitations placed on the Commonwealth by Section 92 of the 
Constitution, these last named operators were free to engage in 
competitive interstate services, thus making unworkable any agreement 
173. Report on Civil Aviation in Australia and Papua-New Guinea, 1952-
1959. The Department of Civil Aviation, Melbourne, p. 6. 
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on capacity designed to Improve the economics of operation by the major 
airlines." '^^ 
The financial position of A.N.A. continued to deteriorate and the 
shipping group controlling the airline decided not to invest additional 
capital in the company without further government guarantees. At the 
same time, they revived an earlier plan for the establishment of a 
mixed private-government holding company to operate all air services in 
Australia; this, too, was rejected by the government. 
The whole complicated situation was relieved in 1957 with the 
purchase of all the shares in A.N.A. by Ansett Transport Industries for 
the sum of £3.3 million. The operations of the two companies, A.N.A. 
and Ansett Airways Pty. Ltd. were subsequently integrated under the 
name Ansett-A.N.A. 
By means of a new Civil Aviation Agreement Act 1957, A.N.A.'s 
rights under the earlier agreement were transferred to Ansett Transport 
Industries and improvements made in the rationalisation machinery, 
through the appointment by the Minister of a three-man Rationalisation 
Committee, under a Co-ordinator.-^ '^ ^ The Government's views on the 
desirable organisation of domestic trunk route services were also 
clearly stated in the Act: 
"One of the objects of the parties to this Agreement is to 
secure and maintain a position in which there are two, and 
not more than two, operators of trunk route airline services, 
one being the Commission, each capable of effective competition 
with the other...".176 
174. idem. 
175. Cf. Appendix J. on the Rationalisation Committee. 
176. Annual Reports of the Department of Civil Aviation, 1952-59, op.cit., 
p. 8. 
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A continuing weakness in the rationalisation scheme lay in the 
presence in the field of interstate flying of private operators who were 
not bound by the terms of the Act. This anomaly was substantially 
corrected when Ansett-A.N.A. gained control of Butler Air Transport Ltd. 
and its subsidiary, Queensland Airlines Pty. Ltd., and restricted their 
operations to routes that did not compete with any Ansett-A.N.A. service. 
By means of further legislation enacted in the period 1958-61, the 
Federal government consolidated its two-airline policy, and did so in a 
way which seemed, to some observers, to be inhibiting the progress of 
its own airline, T.A.A., for the benefit of the privately owned company. 
The Airlines Equipment Act 1958, while providing a government guarantee 
of substantial amounts to be borrowed by Ansett Transport Industries 
for re-equipment purposes, also conferred on the Minister the power to 
determine the number and types of aircraft to be used by the two 
airlines and the capacity that should be provided by each airline over 
the competitive and non-competitive routes. In the Minister's view, 
"the twin aims of the legislation are to limit the importation 
of new aircraft to the real needs of the industry, and to 
increase airline profitability by limiting the capacity, each 
operator being permitted to provide only fifty per cent of the 
total capacity to be scheduled on the competitive routes."-^^7 
At the time, it seemed that the government was using its authority 
under the Act to prevent T.A.A. from purchasing the aircraft of its 
choice - the Caravelle - and to force it to order the same planes as 




Certainly the Cross Charter Agreement of 1950 clearly disadvantaged 
T.A.A. which had to charter three of its Viscounts to A.N.A. in return 
for two of A.N.A.'s propellor-driven DC5B's.-^ ''^  The independent 
judgment of the Commission in matters affecting the operation of T.A.A. 
was further restricted in 1961 when the Australian National Airlines 
Act was amended to provide that the Commonwealth should receive a return 
on its investment in airline operations comparable (after taking into 
account certain cost variables prescribed in the Act) with that gained 
by the shareholders in the private enterprise company. Henceforth "the 
Commission was required to present estimates and the Minister to fix 
a profit target at the beginning of each financial year."-^ ''^  
Finally, prior to the Introduction of pure jet aircraft into 
service on Internal air routes in Australia, the government enacted a 
new agreement with the Commission and Ansett-A.N.A. which further 
strengthened and delineated the two airline policy; at the same time 
rationalisation was introduced to the New Guinea trunk route and 
internal air network. The new jet fleets of the Commission and Ansett-
A.N.A. had to be comparable in quality and capacity, and their 
Introduction rigidly circumscribed, so that the operators had to agree 
that each would introduce its first and second jets concurrently with 
the other's first and second jets. 
178. As Corbett: op.cit., p. 133 points out, "the government was forcing 
their airline to pay for the technical short-sightedness of A.N.A. 
which had made a serious mistake six years earlier in buying DC6Bs 
instead of Viscounts." 
179. 2nd Annual Report of the Minister for Civil Aviation, 1961-62, p. 
15, Profit targets set by the Minister and met by T.A.A. were as 
follows: 1962-3, 6%; 1963-4, 7%; for each financial year from 
1964-1969, 7^ 5%; 1969-70, 8^ 2%. 
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The government's policy of strict rationalisation of routes, 
freight, fares, quality and capacity of aircraft etc. creates, in their 
view, "an atmosphere in which planned competition on the major routes 
can continue with consequent benefit to the operators, to the travelling 
public and to the nation."-^ "^^  Yet much of this argument is specious. 
There can be little competition when most of the factors which go to 
create a competitive situation are rationalised and controlled by the 
government. 
Be that as it may, arguments for and against the two-airline 
policy have no place here. What is of relevance is the extent, if any, 
to which the adoption and development of this policy, and other historical 
factors may have influenced industrial labour relations, as they have 
been determined between the operators and the pilots. More pertinently, 
our concern is to evaluate their effect on the militancy of the 
Australian Federation of Air Pilots. 
Fierce competition in an Industry may act as a deterrent to 
militancy or direct action, from fear of forcing the employer out of 
business; though this may be qualified if there are comparable jobs 
available with other companies. Extensive government control and 
support of an Industry, however, gives it the flavour of a protected 
activity. In these circimstances, it may well be that the pilots will 
feel it appropriate that they should share in the benefits accruing to 
the companies from the degree of protection they enjoy. This may increase 
a tendency to militancy, particularly if management is slow to recognise 
180. ibid. , p. 14. 
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and respond to pilots' demands. 
These suggestions can only be advanced speculatively and it is more 
likely that the evident increase in militancy on the part of the 
Federation in recent years is due to factors of a non-historical nature. 
In all probability, history and the development of the two-airline policy 
have had a more marked effect on the organisation of the industry, and 
it is to this area that one must extend the search for the causes of 
militancy within the Federation. 
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PART IV: THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION OF AIR PILOTS 
The history of the pilots' association is even more recent than 
that of the industry as a whole. The immediate post-war expansion of 
commercial flying in Australia was based in part on the availability 
of wartime pilots, many of whom, for a variety of reasons, wished to 
continue flying in civilian life. Their absorption into the airline 
transport industry was facilitated by the Department of Civil Aviation, 
which for a period of two years after the war's end, licensed, without 
test, service pilots wishing to enter commercial flying.-^ -^^  The 
establishment of T.A.A. in 1945 provided further opportunities for 
wartime flight crews within the airline industry. 
For the first few years, both management and employees were 
preoccupied with the problems associated with the transfer from wartime 
to domestic operations. For the pilots, this meant relating to civilian 
life and work, and for those employed by T.A.A. the need for complete 
identification with a new organisation on whose success or failure to 
survive their own livelihoods depended. Pilot morale in this period was 
high and employer-employee relationships were, on the whole, good, 
181. Exemption from normal flying tests for the issue of a civil pilot's 
licence was given in all instances to R.A.A.F., R.A.F. or 
equivalent service personnel where:-
(a) The applicant for an "A" licence had satisfactorily completed 
an E.F.T.S. course of flying training; 
(b) The applicant for a "B" licence had satisfactorily completed 
a full course of flying training (S.F.T.S.) and had graduated and 
received the flying badge. 
Under these exemptions the Depar-tment Issued 112 "A" licences and 
664 "B" licences in the 12 months ended 30/6/1946. Report on Civil 
Aviation in Australia and New Guinea, 1945-46. The Department of 
Civil Aviation, Melbourne, p. 40. 
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mainly as a result of the transfer to civil occupations of the serving 
officer's training to obey orders. 
By 1947, in many respects, the honeymoon v/as over. In that year, 
the Australian Air Pilots' Association was formed, and pilot attitudes 
towards the operators hardened. The Association was registered under 
the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Acts, and in 1954 approached 
the Court to establish a work value for pilots. Though there was some 
Improvement in salaries as a result of this move the principle of a 
work value was not accepted by the Industrial Court. Thereafter a 
series of skirmishes with the operators followed, and a number of 
Incidents, including the occasional day stoppage culminated in the 
imposition of a £3,000 fine by the Industrial Court as a penalty on 
the Association. 
Feelings within the Association that they were making no progress 
with regard to their claims crystallized into a decision to withdraw 
from the arbitration system. A ballot of members was taken, resulting 
in the payment of the fines, but also in the withdrawal of the membership 
from the Australian Air Pilots' Association, leaving it without office 
bearers, funds or rank and file membership.-^^2 
Having departed from their original association and from the 
arbitration system, the pilots formed themselves into a non-corporate 
organisation - the Australian Federation of Air Pilots - in 1959, and 
182. The Australian Air Pilots' Association remained as a registered 
union though it was only a shell. In 1971 the Federation's 
solicitors were informed by the Commonwealth Industrial Registrar 
that the Association had finally been de-registered. 
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industrial matters were taken up with the operators on an ad hoc 
collective bargaining basis. With the assistance of Sir Henry Bland, 
at that time permanent Head of the Department of Labour and National 
Service, a voluntary agreement on procedures was reached between the 
Federation and the operators in 1955. This "Industrial Relationships 
Procedures-Airline Pilots" Agreement provided a framework for the 
conduct of industrial relations and Included provisions for a cooling 
off period before a strike could be called. 
The major concern of the pilots at this time was the question of 
salaries. These had been fixed initially in 1946 "under circumstances 
in which a large supply of demobilised airforce pilots, unorganised for 
industrial purposes, came into the labour market."-^^^ It was the 
Federation's view that since that time, "using DC3 Captain as a constant 
yardstick, pilots in this country have received only minimum national 
wage adjustments. They had received no salary recognition for the 
increased demands and responsibilities created by the vastly Increased 
complexity and density of air traffic movements and the more critical 
operation of modern aircraft today."-^ "^^  
Consequently, the basis of their demands was the desire "to achieve 
salaries which will give to the Australian pilot a position, relative to 
other salary and professional groups in this country, commensurate with 
183. "Such a starting point, in a comparison with other sections of the 
coiranunity, would, if anything, understate the case for an adjustment 
of pilot salaries." Report of the Inquiry into the Dispute between 
the Australian Federation of Air Pilots and Domestic Airline 
Companies (the Isaac Report), June, 1966, p. 28. 
184. The President's Address to Extra-Ordinary General Meetings of the 
Australian Federation of Air Pilots, July 11th, 1966, p.3. 
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that of pilots in other countries ."-^ ^^  and hence-forward the Federation 
made it abundantly clear that by both threat and deed they were prepared 
to support their claims with direct action in the form of work stoppages. 
As a way around the impasse over salaries the operators suggested 
that both management and pilots investigate the American and Canadian 
systems with a view to Introducing those aspects which appeared relevant 
to Australian conditions. At about the same time, under the "Industrial 
Relationships Procedures Airline Pilots Agreement", Professor J.E. Isaac 
began an Inquiry into some of the matters in dispute between the parties 
with particular reference to the salaries question. The Federation's 
case was based on four factors: community standards, work value, 
productivity and overseas comparisons.-^^^ In his report-^ 7^ Professor 
Isaac conceded productivity and expressed the opinion that pilot 
salaries were at least 15% behind community standards. 
Under the threat of a strike, agreement was finally reached in 
July 1955 in the contract negotiations between the domestic operators 
and the Federation, and the North American bidding system became the 
basis for the computation of salaries and pilot flight hours and routes. 
This scheme replaced the rosterlng of pilots by the companies with a 
bidding system whereby the pilots had the right, 
"in order of seniority, to secure monthly flying blocks of 
varying degrees of financial and work-time advantage. In 
effect, a large proportion of pilots would in this way 
establish their own rosters one month in advance. 
185. idem, 
186. Report from the President, R.T. Holt to all members of the 
Federation, June 20th, 1966. 
187. Isaac Report, op.cit. 
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The advantage of the resulting stability and greater 
certainty of work pattern could be expected to remove much 
of the pressure for reduced hours of work to overcome the 
disabilities of the roster system. The [previous] system 
of standardised work loads devised through a complicated 
and unstable roster system would be supplanted by a system 
which would guarantee a minimum salary related to a monthly 
number of hours (ultimately agreed to by the parties to be 
65 hours for blockholders) for which a pilot would be on 
call for flying duty. Pilots would be able to bid for extra 
hours of flying in particular flying blocks and open flying 
in return for extra pay in accordance with their seniority 
rights, the limit to these extra hours being set by the 
parties. As a result of negotiation, the parties agreed on 
the Canadian limit of 85 credited hours of monthly flying."^^^ 
The Federation's pleasure at the results they had achieved through 
militancy is reflected in Table VIII and in their assessment that "the 
1968 maximum achievable salary agreed for the B727 Captain in the 
National scene is 892% of the maximum achievable rate for the top 
Captain in 1946 while the movement in community salary from 1945 to 
1967 is estimated at 335%?"-^ 5^ 
The successful conclusion of negotiations with the domestic 
operators, and the acceptance by them of the community standards 
principle as a yardstick for pilots' salaries was followed almost 
Immediately by a much more serious dispute between Qantas and the 
overseas pilots' branch of the Federation. Ostensibly the questions at 
issue were those of safety: the need for three man crews on short range 
188. idem. 
189. President's Report to the 1967 Convention of the Australian 





























































































































Source: The President's Report to the 1967 Convention of the 
Australian Federation of Air Pilots, Sydney, September 11th, 
1967, p. 10. 
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707 operations-^^^ and refusal to continue night landings at Djakarta.-^ 9-Z 
The covert and real issues were salaries and the continuing unhappy 
relationship between the Qantas management - and in particular, the 
general manager. Captain CO. Turner - and its pilots. After a secret 
ballot of Qantas pilots expressed approval, the Federation called a work 
stoppage of the overseas group in support of their claims. The strike 
lasted 35 days, cost the company an estimated $8 million loss, and an 
operating deficit of $1.51 million, the first in its history.-^ ^^  It 
gained for the pilots most of what they had asked in salaries and the 
Introduction of a bidding system based on a Pan-American style contract 
which was more suitable for overseas operations. The issue of three 
man crews for 707's was not resolved; to this day these aircraft are 
190. Much literature on this matter was circulated to its members by 
the Federation. Included was: A Summation of the Case for Three 
Crew on the DC9/30 in Australia. Australian Federation of Air 
Pilots, November 24th, 1967, and a brochure explaining "the 
Federation's reasons for insisting on a complete and thorough crew 
complement evaluation of the DC9/30 series aircraft during its 
initial entry to the Australian scheme." Sydney, May 10th, 1967, 
191. The International Federation of Airline Pilots' Association in 
conference in March, 1966 had recommended a ban on night landings 
at Djakarta because of its lack of landing facilities. The 
recommendation was moved by the Australian delegates. The 
Federation argued that DCA used double standards by prohibiting 
B-727s from landing at Hobart and at 20 other Australian airports 
which do not have instrument landing systems or visual glide 
slopes, while approving Djakarta landings for the bigger B-707s. 
They had to admit that other aiirports, such as Cairo and Manila, 
were also not up to standard, though miles ahead of Djakarta 
where, for example, theft of landing lights was a common occurrence. 
192. Estimated loss of revenue was $13 million, against which cost 
savings of less than $5 million were achieved. Seventh Annual 
Report of the Minister for Civil Aviation, 1966-67. p. 12. 
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being flown by two men crews, as they have been from the beginning by 
all world airlines operating them.-^ -^^  However, with the retirement 
from Qantas of Captain Turner soon after the strike ended, it was hoped 
that the way was now clear for the future development of a better 
relationship between Qantas management and its pilots. 
In the aftermath of this latest burst of militancy by the pilots, 
the Federal government acted to amend the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act, 1904-1956, in relation to Industrial matters affecting Flight Crew 
Of fleers.-^°^ In future, industrial disputes affecting flight crew were 
to be handled by a special tribunal - the Flight Crew Officers' 
Industrial Tribunal - constituted by a person appointed by the Governor-
General for 5 years, with re-appointment rights. In a departure from 
usual practice in the conciliation and arbitration field, the government, 
after consultation with the Federation, appointed an academic. 
Professor J.E. Isaac, as the Tribunal.-^^^ The Federation took the view 
that this legislation, while being in accordance with the government's 
own inclinations, had been urged upon it by the companies, as "the 
193. Although shortly afterwards, pilots employed by American Airlines 
won a long fight on the three crew issue on the B737, an identical 
aircraft to the 707 (though built by Boeing). 
194. The Conciliation and Arbitration Act, No. 101 of 1967, assented 
to November 10th, 1967. 
195. "Whoever is appointed as the Tribunal must become really 
knowledgeable in the industry background, its technology and 
operational problems. These problems involve many disciplines. 
The right man may be found in Industry, Commerce, the Professions 
or the Academic field. He may not necessarily be a lawyer." 
L. Bury (Wentworth-Minister for Labour and National Service) 
introducing 2nd reading of the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Bill 1967. C.P.D. Australia, Vol. H. of R. 57, 1967, p. 2064. 
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airline operators made no secret at any time of their ultimate intention 
to persuade the government to provide for statutory means of controlling 
the Industrial Relationships together with the ability to enforce, 
through penalties, a decision made at Arbitration."-^^^ 
There are many unique aspects about arbitration in this field.-^ ^^  
Some arise from the nature of the profession itself and the skills 
required; others from the fact that matters of safety and government 
policy are Involved. There are, as yet, few precedents and it was 
apparent in the three years in which he acted as Tribunal that Professor 
Isaac's decisions were being tested at every opportunity by all parties. 
In the same period the pilots' association has not been totally 
quiescent either. The dispute over the crewing of DC9's dragged on, 
superannuation became an issue and stoppages were called or threatened 
though much of this appeared more "sabre-rattling" than serious, in 
view of the substantial gains made by the pilots in 1955-1967. However, 
the mass dismissals of pilots foreshadowed by Qantas management for 
November, 1971, could provoke serious direct industrial action by the 
Federation. 
Recent changes in the composition of the Tribunal, occasioned by 
the resignation of Professor Isaac, could also affect industrial 
196. B.I. Crofts, Executive Vice-President, A.F.A.P.: Comments on the 
Second Reading Speech by the Minister for Labour and National 
Service (Hon. L.H.E. Bury) - October 19th, 1967. 
197. "I don't think anyone would dispute that flight crew and their 
conditions of employment differ appreciably from just about all, 
if not all, other classes of employees ordinarily dealt with by 
the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission." L. Bury: C.P.D. 
op.cit., p. 2064. 
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relations in the airline industry in the long term. On February 18th, 
1971 the government appointed Peter Abernethy Coldham Q.C., a practising 
barrister from Victoria, as the new Flight Crew Officers' Industrial 
Tribunal.-^^^ The Federation was not consulted on this appointment. At 
the same time he was also appointed a Deputy President of the 
Commonwealth Industrial Commission. Coldham's appointment was thus a 
dual one, but in formal terms matters affecting pilots are still to be 
handled outside the regular arbitration machinery. This may become 
more de jure than de facto, and certainly Mr. Justice Coldham's 
approach to the industrial problems of the airline industry will be 
much more legalistic than the somewhat free-wheeling methods of his 
predecessor. This gradual but steady pressure back to the arbitration 
system may provoke some future reaction on the part of the pilots. 
Tiny cracks in the united front of the pilot body have appeared 
over some of the Federation's policies. The national press for March, 
1958 carried numerous reports of dissension within the Federation over 
its stand on three man crewing of DC9's.-^^^ Of greater interest was 
the formation by a group of Sydney based pilots, led by Captain I.A. 
Cameron, Ansett/A.N.A., of a breakaway union - the Air Pilots' Guild 
of Australia - and the acceptance of its application, in February, 1969, 
by the Industrial Registrar, for registration under the Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act. At this stage, the Guild had 
198. The Age. January 6th, 1971. 
199. Cf. The Australian. 7/3/68, "Pilots forced a special meeting of 
the Federation in Melbourne, attended by most pilots who have 
flown DC9's. The meeting called on the A.F.A.P. to withdraw its 
three-man policy." The Australian, 16/3/68. 
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between 100 and 200 members, mostly drawn from the smaller companies 
and from general aviation. While personalities played their part in 
providing a reason for the break with the Federation, there was also a 
genuine belief that some Federation policies and actions had been 
detrimental to the interests of pilots generally .•^'^^ 
The Guild claims that although the A.F.A.P. is not a registered 
organisation, 
"it is liable to all the penalties and strictures of the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, but enjoys 
none of the benefits nor considerable protection which the 
Act bestows on registered organisations and their members. 
Federation members cannot call for Court controlled ballots. 
They cannot demand disclosure of the financial affairs of 
their Union. They cannot appeal against oppressive 
rulings..."201 
There is some measure of truth in this statement, and, as previously 
stated, Mr. Justice Coldham's appointment as Tribunal may well open 
the way to the further development of a situation whereby the Federation 
finds Itself bound more and more by the strictures of the arbitration 
system without legally being a part of it. 
The Guild's major criticisms are reserved for the Introduction of 
the North American bidding system,^^^ a scheme which it feels stands to 
benefit only a small, select group of senior pilots. It goes so far as 
to claim that the system had had a detrimental effect on the future 
200. Much of this assessment of the Guild is based on interviews with 
Captain I.A. Cameron in December, 1970 and with Captain R.T. Holt, 
February, 1971. 
201. Roneod publication of the Air Pilots' Guild of Australia, Sydney, 
March 30th, 1969, p. 2. 
202. See supra, pp. 121-122. 
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security and promotional opportunities of pilots. 
"In Ansett Transport Industries alone, many pilots have been 
demoted and at least twenty more have been dismissed. This 
happened in spite of the fact that Ansett Airlines has lost 
another sixteen due to death or resignation over the last two 
years. In T.A.A. promotions virtually ceased following 
introduction of the bidding system in November, 1966. Twenty-
three T.A.A. pilots were promoted to Captains in 1965, eleven 
in 1966, but none in 1967 or 1968."^^3 
Finally, the Guild claims, and with some justice, that the Federation, 
until very recently has done little to improve the salaries and 
conditions of its members in general aviation. 
Like many breakaway movements, the Guild and its officers are 
severely hampered by lack of time to organise, of finance and publicity, 
and already they are facing difficulties in maintaining membership at 
recent levels. At this stage it is doubtful whether the Guild has a 
fut^ Ire as a viable organisation. Certainly, were it to flourish, the 
conduct of industrial labour relations in the airline Industry in 
Australia would be drastically altered. 
Several factors stemming directly from the history and development 
of the airline Industry, and of the relationship between management and 
pilots could be influential in the creation of militant attitudes 
within the pilot body. Recruitment of large numbers of wartime pilots 
to the industry in 1945-47 means that over the next ten years (1970-80) 
substantial numbers of senior pilots will leave the companies on 
retirement. As far as can be ascertained, little or no effort has 
203. Air Pilots' Guild of Australia: op.cit., p. 1. 
204. Cf. Appendix K, Licensing of Flight Crew, p. 349. Also Sixth 
Annual Report of the Minister for Civil Aviation, 1965-66, p. 607 
for discussion of pilot shortages. The Bulletin, May 22nd, 1971, 
p. 23. 
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ever been made by the Industry to rationalize the intake of new pilots 
as against expected retirements, so that availability of trained staff 
fluctuates between glut and deficiency. 
Some degree of regulation of pilot intake was achieved by Qantas 
through the introduction of its Cadet Pilot training scheme. Since its 
Inception in 1964, this scheme has provided the company with an average 
annual intake of 50 cadet pilots. The remainder of the Industry has had 
to rely on potential staff achieving commercial licence standard on 
their own initiative and at their own expense, a costly matter even 
with the assistance of a Commonwealth Flying Scholarship.•^^^ 
In the mid-1960's, an acute pilot shortage was felt, in what was 
then a rapidly expanding industry,'^ '^ ^ and it was in this situation that 
the Federation successfully pressed its claims by direct action. By 
1971, a severe recession had overtaken the world aviation industry, and 
it was to offset some of the worst effects of this that Qantas envisaged 
mass pilot dismissals for later in the year, and cancelled its Cadet 
Pilot Training scheme. In this situation of over supply there is already 
205. It is estimated that the cost in 1971 would be between 4,000-4,500 
dollars. For many years the Department of Civil Aviation has 
subsidised Aero Clubs, originally to provide pilots for the defence 
forces, but more recently, for those in the industry. In the early 
1960's, the Commonwealth Flying Scholarship scheme was introduced, 
whereby financial assistance was given to a limited number of 
candidates for flying training. 
206. One of the main reasons for this shortage was the Vietnam War. 
Before the war, the United States Air Force was a constant source 
of pilot supply for the commercial airlines. New pilots were 
remaining in the services and many more young pilot recruits were 
going to the Air Force rather than to commercial aviation. The 
effect was felt throughout the world as American airlines sought 
pilots from other countries. Canadian Pacific Airlines which had 
been losing pilots to the United States, advertised for Australian 
pilots in July, 1966, offering salaries for senior captains of up "to 
$Can. 30,000 a year. 
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evidence that the Federation, while talking strike action, is seeking 
other, more peaceful ways to a solution, such as forming its own 
charter company to employ the dismissed pilots. While the domestic 
airline Industry in Australia has not felt the cold winds as yet, 
there is considerable pilot unemployment, much of it caused by 
continuing drought and a weakening of the mineral boom. It is 
anticipated however, that an upward swing towards acute shortage will 
reach its peak by 1976 with the retirement of many wartime pilots. 
Under these sorts of circumstances, then, the degree of militancy 
exhibited by the pilots can be correlated to the cyclical fluctuations 
in supply and demand of pilots. 
The system of licensing, adopted from the beginning by the 
Department of Civil Aviation, has brought into industrial relations what 
is, for the pilots, the most important of all issues, that of seniority. 
Pilots have to demonstrate twice a year, in the air and in simulators, 
that they have achieved or are maintaining a rigid standard of 
proficiency. At the same time they have to pass rigorous medical 
examinations. Once their licences have been granted or renewed, it 
has to be assumed that they are all of equal ability and competence, 
with the result that, in the present scheme of things, there are no 
means available of recognising merit other than through seniority. 
Hence seniority becomes the over-riding consideration of the Captain 
as he proceeds up the aircraft type ladder, and the basis for "a form 
of civil war which will never be completely controllable."^ '^'' While 
207. President's Report to the 1967 Convention of the Australian 
Federation of Air Pilots, op.cit. , p. 6, 
132, 
this issue poses questions for the Federation itself, of possible 
conflict situations within its own organisation between the senior 
pilots' group and others, it means that in their relations with 
management, the pilots will adopt an inflexible and militant attitude 
to any threat, real or implied, to their seniority arrangements ,'^ ^^  
Other factors such as personalities, conditions of work, 
organisation and the pilot's place in the wider community etc., play 
their part in the formation of militant attitudes within the pilots' 
organisation, and these will be dealt with subsequently. The two-
airline policy, which has created a whole industry supported directly 
or indirectly by government finance, and a situation where true 
competition has been replaced by stability and rigidity, has probably 
given the pilots greater opportunity for militancy than would otherwise 
be the case. 
Finally, it must be said that the development of management-union 
relationships has been based to a large extent on their mutual 
recognition of the unique position held in Industry generally, and in 
the airline Industry in particular, by the pilot group. This is one 
of the most vulnerable of all industries to work stoppages. Pilot 
salaries cover only a small percentage of gross overhead costs, 
so that it becomes Imperative for the companies to keep their aircraft 
208. "If money is the blood of this contract, then seniority is surely 
its heart." The President.'s Address to Extraordinary General 
Meeting on July 11th, 1966. op.cit., p. 7. 
209. "Direct crew costs of pilots is absurdly low at 4.9% of gross 
revenue, although it can be argued that other indirect costs of 
3.2% should be added." R.T. Holt, President, A.F.A.P.: Contract 
Negotiations: A.T.I.-T.A.A. , July 1st, 1966, p. 2. 
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flying and with as high a capacity load as possible, if they are to 
operate profitably. Yet the responsibility for taking the aircraft 
off the ground is the pilot's alone, and he can refuse to do so for a 
variety of reasons of which safety is probably the most Important. Nor 
can he be replaced except by another fully qualified and licensed 
pilot. 
At the same time, the mystique and glamour attached to flying and 
to those who fly is a tangible asset for the pilots. Jet travel has 
accentuated this and it is a factor on which the operators attempt to 
capitalize in their advertising. ^-^'^  These community attitudes have 
tended to support the pilot in his own convictions of his worth. Pilots 
are essential, and, in the short term, irreplaceable, and this very 
uniqueness of their position gives them a greater degree of control 
over the style and content of their relationships with their employers 
than most workers could hope to enjoy. 
In short, it is suggested that militancy is no more than a 
tactical weapon for the pilots; it is not a matter of conviction. 
Consequently direct action within the airline industry may stem from 
causes different from those which inspire such action in other 
Industries. 
210. Note recent advertisements placed by State Railway Departments to 
recruit staff, which bear a similar stamp. 
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CHAPTER 3 
UNION AND MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS AND THEIR 
INTERNAL PROCEDURES FOR DECISION MAKING-^ 
PART I: THE RAILWAY DEPARTMENT AND THE A.R.U. 
One of the first tasks of the Queensland government when it 
authorized the commencement of railway construction in 185 3 was to set 
up an administrative and political organisation to run the railway 
service. Until 1875, political control of and responsibility for 
railway policy were vested in successive Ministers for Works, a dozen 
of whom held the office over this period. A further seven Ministers 
for Lands and Works, or Works and Mines were responsible for railways 
until 1888. At that time, the Implementation of the Railway Act of 
1888 considerably altered the whole concept and application of railway 
administration and control, and as part of this administrative 
reorganisation, a new and separate portfolio. Secretary for Railways, 
was created. This system continued until the present portfolio of 
Minister for Transport was established by the Moore Country-National-
Progressive Ministry on January 28th, 1932.'^  
The enabling legislation-^ created, under the Minister, a Department 
of Transport, comprising the Railway Department, the Department of the 
1. J.T. Dunlop: op.cit., pp. 386-7. 
2. For comparison with another State system, see N. McCusker: 
"Administration of the New South Wales Government Railways", Public 
Administration, Sydney, Vol. XVII, No. 3, Sept., 1958, and A.A. 
Shoebridge: "Administrative Organisation and Functions of the 
Department of Government Transport, New South Wales", ibid. 
3. 22 George V, No. 48. "The State Transport Coordination Act of 1931' 
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Commissioner of Main Roads, and "any other Department or sub-Department 
which may from time to time be transferred to the Department of Transport 
by the Governor-in-Council."'^ 
The continued political importance of the railways was attested 
to by the Cabinet seniority which, for many years, was accorded to its 
Ministerial head.-^  This is not surprising, in view of the developmental 
theme which has been a continuous thread running through the policies 
and public pronouncements of every Queensland government since 1860, 
regardless of party. Assuredly, in a State so dependent on the primary 
producer for its revenue and prosperity, railway policy has been 
important. Even now, when mining and the limited industrialization 
based upon it provide a greater proportion of State revenue than 
formerly, and when alternative means of transport for both passengers 
and freight are available in most parts of the State, the question of 
railway freight rates can be a politically sensitive matter. 
Having provided a political head for the newly created railway 
service, the government of the day also set about supplying it with 
4. ibid., Part II, Sec. 4 (2). Important features of the 1931 Act and 
siibsequent legislation which related to the coordination of 
transport are discussed in Chapter 6. 
5. A.A. Morrison: "The Government of Queensland", ed. S.R. Davis: 
The Government of the Australian States. Longmans, Melbourne, 
1960, p. 315. Colin A. Hughes & B.D. Graham: A Handbook of 
Australian Government and Politics, 1890-1964. A.N.U. Press, 
Canberra, 1968. Cabinet Lists, pp. 166-184. 
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the necessary administrative tools. Abram Fltzgibbon,° whose ardent 
advocacy of the narrow gauge had been instrumental in its acceptance 
for the Queensland system over serious objections and organised 
opposition, was appointed Chief Engineer in both civil and mechanical 
capacities, on September 23rd, 1863.' The appointment was on a contract 
basis, for surveys, specifications and supervision, at a total rate of 
£400 per mile.^ The Railway Act had made provision for the office of 
Commissioner for Railways, and on December 23rd, 185 3, Fltzgibbon 
received this appointment also. The GilbertIan situation was thus 
created of a Chief Engineer responsible to himself, as Commissioner, for 
the proper construction and maintenance of the railways." 
6. For biographical details, cf. J.W. Knowles: "Centenary of the 
Ipswich-Grandchester Railway", The Australian Railway Historical 
Society Bulletin, Vol. XVI (New series), Bulletin No. 333, July, 
1965; George Bond: "The Genesis of the Queensland Railway", 
Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland, Vol. vii. 
No. 3, 1964-65, pp. 521-539; A.E. Cole: "Early History of the 
Queensland Railways", Journal of the Historical Society of 
Queensland, Vol. ill. No. 4, 1945, pp. 284-311; "Queensland 
Railways - First Half-Century, 1864-1914", op.cit.. The Queensland 
Year Book, Government Printer, Brisbane, 1901, pp. 346-366. 
7. Cf. supra, pp. 39-40. 
8. The Ipswich-Toowoomba railway, built to the survey prepared by 
Fltzgibbon, dated December 29th, 1863, was formally opened on 
April 12th, 1867, six months before Fltzgibbon retired as Chief 
Engineer. It was 61 miles long, and, at the contract rate, 
Fltzgibbon should have received the, for those days, princely svim 
of £24,400 over the four-year period in which he was Chief Engineer. 
9. Q.P.D. First Series, Vol. 1, 1864. Legislative Assembly, May 17th, 
1864, p. 69. R. R. Mackenzie (Biirnett) : "Nothing could be more 
absurd than the arrangement made with the Engineer-in-Chief. It 
was absurd for one man to hold at the same time the offices of 
Engineer-in-chief, Commissioner of Railways and Railway Contractor. 
The Commissioner of Railways in the other colonies was an officer 
appointed to look after the railways and the Engineer-in-Chief as 
well. He received a high salary and his duty was to see that the 
lines were properly surveyed." 
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It was almost a year before the government moved to correct this 
absurdity of its own making; however, in September, 1864, it announced 
that, because much of the railway construction work was closely tied 
up with land acquisition, it was logical to adopt the N.S.W. system of 
making the Under-Secretary of Lands and Works, the Commissioner for 
Railways also.-^ *^  Fltzgibbon while remaining within the service as 
Chief Engineer until October 1867, was deprived of one of his two hats, 
which passed to Arth;ir Herbert, the Under-Secretary of the period. 
Except for a few months in 1868 when the office of Commissioner 
was abolished and the appointment vested in the Ministerial head of 
the Department, the practice of placing the conduct of the railway 
system in the hands of the Under-Secretary of Lands and Works, as 
Commissioner, continued until 1889. The Railway Act of 1888,-^ -^  
modelled on similar Acts in Victoria (1883/4), South Australia (1887) 
and New South Wales (early 1888), placed the management of the service 
in the hands of three Commissioners of whom one was to be designated 
Chief Commissioner and receive doiible the salary of each of his 
colleagues.-^^ As stated in the Act, it was to be "the duty of the 
10. Q.P.D. , First series. Vol. 1, 1864, p. 348. Legislative Council, 
Railway Act Amendment Bill, September 6th, 1864. The Hon. J. 
Bramston: "It had been found inconvenient that the duties of 
Engineer-in-Chief and Commissioner of Railways should be performed 
by the same person; it was, therefore, sought by the Bill to 
appoint a gentleman to the latter office who would be altogether 
independent of any of the Engineers-in-Chief. The duties were not 
likely to be very onerous, and could be easily performed." 
11. Cf. supra, p. 134. 
12. £3,000 for the Chief Commissioner, £1,500 for each of the other 
Commissioners. The Railways Act of 1888. Part II, sec. 10. 
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Commissioners to maintain the railways and all works in connection 
therein in a state of efficiency, and to work the same in such manner 
as will best conduce to the general public benefit." -^  
The Act had a two-fold purpose. It was expected that, by means of 
this new organisational arrangement "the railways for the future shall 
be managed more for the public interest, and probably more economically 
than they are at the present moment."-^ "^  At this time, there were 1870 
miles of line open for traffic, in three, as yet unconnected systems 
(southern-south western, central and northern); further construction 
was envisaged, and a better system of administrative control than had 
sufficed in the past was deemed necessary.-^^ 
However, like its sister Acts in other States,-^ ^ the primary 
concern of the Queensland legislation was the elimination of political 
13. ibid.. Part II, Sec. 23(1). 
14. Q.P.D. Vol. LV, 1888, p. 127. It sho\ild be noted, however, that in 
the lengthy debates on the Railway Bill, members stressed the 
importance of the railways as a developmental tool and the Minister 
for Railways categorically denied that there would be any attempt 
under the new Commissioners to manage the railways on "commercial 
principles". Cf. The Minister for Railways (Hon. H.M. Nelson): 
idem. 
15. One of the peculiar featiores of railway management in this period 
was the habit of incoming ministries to mistrust the railway 
engineers appointed by the outgoing governments. Invariably 
changes were made, and much work previously finished was redone. 
This applied particularly to railway surveys, e.g., a survey for 
the line from Dalby to Roma was done for the third time in 1874. 
Cf. Queensland Railways - First Half-Century, op.cit,, p. 64. 
16. R.L. Wettenhall: Railway Management and Politics in Victoria, 
1856-1906. Report of a Case Study in the Origins of the Public 
Corporation. Royal institute of Public Administration, A.C.T. 
Group, Canberra, May, 1961. 
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patronage. This problem was not unique to Queensland-^7 nor to the 
7 8 
railway services, though the latter were for obvious reasons, and, 
with the exception of the police forces, the most exploitable of all 
governmental activity at that time. Virtually all speakers in the 
debates on the Railway Bill attested to the continual pressure brought 
to bear upon them by candidates for employment in the railways; pressure 
which they, in their turn, applied to the Minister.-^^ 
The government's purpose, then, was to place the Commissioners in 
as independent a position as was possible. As stated by the Minister 
for Railways, "we want to have three commissioners who will manage our 
railways, and who will be altogether outside and independent of party 
and political Influences - to be entirely beyond and have no interest 
whatever in party manoeuvres or party politics of any kind whatsoever."^'^ 
Accordingly the Commissioners were given authority over employment and 
dismissal. In anticipation of subsequent public service reforms, and 
to exclude any possibility that patronage would merely shift from the 
Minister to the Commissioners,^-^ the Act laid down certain criteria for 
17. K.W. Knight: The Development of the Public Service of New South 
Wales from Responsible Government (1856) to the Establishment of 
the Public Service Board (1895). Unpiib. M.Econ.thesis, Univ. of 
Sydney, 1955, pp. 64-67. 
18. K.W. Knight: "Patronage and the New South Wales Pioblic Service: 
The 1894 Royal Commission", The Australian Journal of Politics 
and History,,Vol. VII, No. 2, November, 1961, pp. 166-185. 
19. Q.P.D., Vol. tlV,/ 1888. Legislative Coiincil, pp. 84-91, 97-101, 
105-109. Q.P.D., Vol. LV, 1888. Legislative Assembly, pp. 126-
147, 221-237, 249-253, 568-590, 610-618, 677-716, 731, 983, 
1014-1019. 
20. Hon. H.M. Nelson: Q.P.D. , Vol. LV, ibid. p. 127. 
21. Though section 53 of the Act did provide a legal loophole. 
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appointment including entry into the service through the lowest grade 
in each branch, and consequent upon the satisfactory completion of a 
qualifying examination. 
It is clear from debate and public discussion at the time that it 
was not the intention of the government to abdicate the realm of 
railway policy making in favour of the Commissioners. This was to remain 
firmly under ministerial control. It was also fairly obvious however 
that the legislators on both sides of the House were themselves unsure 
as to where to draw the line between management and policy making. 
In the event, neither they nor the Act Itself pointed a distinction 
between political and managerial control, nor attempted a definition of 
policy matters as against administrative ones. Whilst, on the one 
hand, the Act designated the three Commissioners as a corporation sole, 
it also placed them under the Railways Department headed by a new 
ministerial creation, the Secretary for Railways, complete with under 
secretary and staff.^^ 
In commenting on the Victorian legislation which was taken as a 
model by Queensland, Wettenhall states that 
"the continued existence of a political office concerned 
especially with railway affairs, despite the drastic reduction 
in its statutory powers, brought about a situation hardly 
reconcilable with the constitutional concept of ministerial 
responsibility, and resulted inevitably in some overlapping 
of authority and some encroachment on the Commissioner's 
powers. This position no doubt also . . . encouraged other 
members of Parliament to continue to regard the railways as 
22. Q.P.D. op.cit., p. 225. Note that "The Civil Service Act of 1889" 
excluded the Railway Department from the Public Service and this 
exclusion has been continued by subsequent Acts. 
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a legitimate field for playing the game of politics."^^ 
These criticisms are equally valid for Queensland. Certainly the 
appointment of one, three or a round dozen Railway Commissioners was 
not likely to completely insulate railway management from political 
pressures.•^^ Indeed, one would be naive to assume, as is so often done, 
that any aspect of governmental activity can be Insulated from politics 
simply by the creation of a statutory body. Ministerial intrusion 
into matters of employment and dismissal was not unknown after 1889. 
The failure to clearly define areas of authority in policy making, or 
perhaps, the impossibility of so doing, has also meant the encroachment, 
at different periods, of either Commissioner or Minister on each other's 
preserves. 
While one might expect in State politics the stereotype "weak 
Minister - strong permanent head" relationship, this is too facile a 
description of the situation, at least for railway administration from 
1889 to 1950. Personalities and ability in any given administration 
cannot be discounted, while the long periods in office of some 
Commissioners^^ would add weight to their side of the Ministerial-
public servant balance. On the other hand Morrison has pointed 
23. R.L. Wettenhall: op.cit., p. 27. Cf. E.P. Rogan: "Government 
Department or Statutory Authority?", Public Administration, Sydney, 
Vol. XVII, No. 4, December 1968, pp. 328-341. 
24. The continued and heavy use of Select Committees and Royal 
Commissions on Railway matters after 1889 supports the contention 
that the Railways Act of 1888 was unsuccessful in divorcing 
politics from the railways. Cf. Appendixes C and D. 
25. E.g.:- J.F. Thallon (1/11/1902-11/4/11), C.B. Evans (1/6/11-13/10/18), 
J.W. Davidson (1/11/18-28/2/38), P.R.T. Wills (1/3/41-28/2/48), 
G.V. Moriarty (1/9/52-31/8/62), A.G. Lee (1/9/62-
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out^^ that under Labor rule in Queensland, heavy emphasis was placed 
upon the administrative responsibilities of Ministers, and that each 
was expected to be closely attentive to every aspect of his department's 
activities. Support for this statement comes from trade union leaders 
who gained the understanding over years of negotiating with railway 
department management, that industrial relations matters and policy 
came under ministerial direction rather than Commissioner control.^'' 
In addition, the majority of Queensland Premiers since 1915 have been 
men of strong personality and leadership and on those occasions when 
union-management relations within the railway service deteriorated to 
the point of strike action, it was the character of the Premier and the 
role he chose to play in the situation, rather than that of the Minister 
for Railways, which was vital to the outcome.•^^ 
It is understandable that these future difficulties were not 
clearly foreseen in 1889, though sentient queries were raised at the 
time, in particular those of Sir Samuel Griffith, leader of the 
26. A.A. Morrison: "The Government of Queensland", op.cit., pp. 313-
14. In Morrison's opinion "Labour's successor in office, the 
Country-Liberal Coalition Government, has shown itself no less 
sensitive to the heavy administrative demands of ministerial 
responsibility." 
27. Interviews with Messrs. Sampson, Morrow, Rymer and Nolan, all 
past Executive officers of the A.R.U. with experience on 
ministerial deputations and in negotiating with the Railway 
Department which would cover a period from the turn of last 
century to present date. 
28. The success of the railway unions in the 1925 dispute could be 
attributed in no small measure to the conciliatory attitude of 
Premier Gillies, whereas in the 1927 railway strike. Premier 
McCormack went so far as to take personal control of the Railway 
Department and "lock out" the striking railwaymen. Similarly, 
government initiatives in the 1948 railway strike would seem to 
have stemmed from Hanlon, rather than from his Minister for 
Transport, J.E. Duggan. 
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opposition. •^^ "The Victorian Railways legislators did not realise 
the full extent of the administrative revolution they were pioneering"^^ 
and there is no evidence to indicate that their Queensland colleagues 
were any more perceptive. 
The first appointments under the new system were those of J. 
Mathieson (Chief Commissioner), A. Johnston and R.J. Gray. Both 
Mathieson and Johnston had had railway experience in the United 
Kingdom,•'•^  while Gray, at the time he received his commission, was 
Principal Under Secretary in the Queensland Civil Service.-^ ^ 
Before their initial seven year terms had been completed, 
relations between Commissioner Johnston and his senior colleagues 
became so stramed"^ -^  that a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament 
was appointed to investigate the matter. Its report, presented on 
29. Q.P.D., Vol. LV, 1888, pp. 131-137. 
30. R.L. Wettenhall: op.cit., p. 27. 
31. "John Mathieson was born at Cummock, Glasgow, in 1846. When a lad, 
he entered the service of the Glasgow and South Western Railway, 
working his way up through the various grades to the position of 
Superintendent of the line, an appointment he resigned in 1889 to 
take the post of Chief Commissioner of the Queensland Railways. 
He is credited with possessing a special knowledge of the procedure 
for the promotion of new lines." Philip Mennell, F.R.G.S.: 
The Dictionary of Australasian Biography (1865-1892). Hutchinson, 
London, 1892. Andrew Johnston's experience in the United Kingdom 
had been as a well qualified railway engineer. He was a Member of 
the Institute of Civil Engineers. 
32. In 1894, Gray had served 30 years in the Queensland Public Service. 
Prior to appointment as Railway Commissioner he had served for 
10 years as Under Colonial Secretary, 10 years as Immigration Agent 
and in subordinate positions in the Colonial Secretary's and other 
Departments. 
33. The initial and continuing cause of the trouble was the friction 
between Commissioner Johnston, himself a well-qualified engineer, 
and the Chief Engineer of the Railway Department, H.C. Stanley. 
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November 20th, 1894, recommended Johnston's immediate retirement from 
the Railway Commission and further stated that 
"the Committee are of the opinion that divided responsibility 
in the administration of the Railway Department is a mistake; 
and that the interests of the community will be best served 
by placing this large and important Department of the Public 
Service under the control of not more than one Commissioner." ^'^ 
Johnston did retire, as recommended, but Mathieson and Gray continued 
as Commissioners until 1895, when Mathieson accepted the position of 
Chief Commissioner of the Victorian Railways. At that point the 
government implemented the earlier suggestion of the Joint Committee 
and Gray was confirmed as sole Commissioner, a practice which continues 
to this day. 
The Q.R.E.A. shed no tears at Mathieson's departure. They 
considered him a tyrannical Commissioner-^^ and held him responsible, 
not only for the victimisation of the early union organisers but also 
for many of the difficulties they were facing in keeping the union 
alive.-^ ^ His antipathy towards trade unionism was, in all probability, 
the product of his experience gained in the management side of privately 
owned railway companies in the United Kingdom, where a stress on the 
master-servant relationship was characteristic of industrial negotiations. 
The "lad porter to Commissioner" era in railway administration 
opened with the appointment of J.F. Thallon to succeed Gray on his 
34. Report of the Joint Committee on Relations between the Railway 
Commissioners, Votes and Proceedings , Vol. ill, 1894, pp. 1275-6. 
35. The Daily Standard, September 9th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in The 
Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 1, 1966, p. 1. 
36. Cf. supra, p. 70. 
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retirement in 1902. Thereafter, with rare exceptions,-^ '' all subsequent 
Commissioners reached that office by way of the Traffic Branch and 
from the position of General Manager. While service in Traffic and as 
General Managers meant that they have brought to their final office 
long experience in "running the railways"-^^ it is suggested that this 
is not necessarily the best background for the effective control and 
management of one of the State's largest enterprises. The Railway 
Department itself sees the Commissioner's role as one of interpretation 
and implementation of government policy as it is conveyed to him through 
the Minister. The performance of individual Commissioners and their 
staff in these fields has been criticised on occasion but never as 
roundly nor as trenchantly as by Ford, Bacon and Davis, Inc. ,-^^ the 
American engineering consultants retained by the Nicklln government in 
1960 to fully investigate the operation of the Queensland railway 
37. The major exceptions were P.R.T. Wills (1941-1948) who came from 
the Accounts section, and the present Commissioner, A.G. Lee 
(1/9/1962) who was a clerk (administrative section) before being 
brought to Brisbane as private secretary to the Commissioner. He 
remained in the Secretary's office as Assistant-Secretary until 
his appointment as Commissioner. 
38. For the fatuous observations of an outside "expert", commissioned 
by the Ryan Government to make a thorough investigation of the 
railway service but who, in the event, was able to spend only a 
few days in a ciirsory examination, see Robert McC. Anderson: "Some 
Notes on the Queensland Railways", Qld. Pari. Papers, Vol. Ill, 
1915-16, p. 1317. "Probably owing to the fact that your 
Commissioner and his officers have been right through the mill 
from the lowest rungs to the top of the ladder, there is evidence 
more of a family feeling between the various classes and ranks 
(numbering in all 12,000 individuals) than is usually the case 
in a service like this. I came across no evidence of dissatisfaction, 
excepting in matters of minor degree." 
39. Cf. supra, p. 64. 
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system. "^^ Yet their condemnation was not so much of the ability of the 
Commissioner and his officers, as of their operating arrangements. As 
the Report stated, 
"Government expects its Commissioner for Railways to function 
primarily as a Chief Traffic officer. Other duties tend to 
be assigned to the Secretary who is primarily the Administrative 
officer. These two officers "run" the Department. Both are 
so fully occupied with routine responsibilities that neither 
can devote the attention necessary for effective planning and 
control."^^ 
The administrative structure of the Department is partly to blame 
for this situation. There are two distinct bases for organisation, 
with a functional allocation of duties, i.e. a branch organisation, 
superimposed upon a geographical division by area, i.e. a divisional 
and district organisation. The latter was the outcome of the 
decentralization of the railway system itself, which in turn, resulted 
from the physical configuration of the State and from railway construction 
policy, '^^ 
Representations from the central and northern areas for a 
decentralized administration to match the physical layout of the railway 
system were constant in the first forty years of railway history, and 
40. Cf. "The loan funds assigned to the Railways have been relatively 
small; -therefore it would be logical to expect the Commissioner 
and his staff to critically appraise proposed projects to assure 
maximijm operating savings from those selected. Judging from Works 
undertaken, this criterion does not appear to have been applied... 
Also, the fact that present operating statistics fail to provide 
for comprehensive evaluation of savings versus investment 
indicates a lack of understanding of the principles involved." 
Siommairy of Recommendations and Conclusions contained in the Report 
of Ford, Bacon and Davis, Inc.: op.cit., p.2. 
41. ibid. , p.3. 
42. Cf. supra. Chapter 2, Part I. 
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the change to the three Commissioner set-up in 1889 appeared to provide 
such an opportunity. Suggestions that a Commissioner be permanently 
stationed in the northern, central and southern divisions were strongly 
canvassed,'^ •^  but the necessity for them to sit together as a Board 
precluded this. During Commissioner Evans' term of office (1/5/11-
31/10/18) the basis of the present system of Divisions, Northern 
(Townsville), Central (Rockhampton), Southern (Brisbane), and South-
western (Toowoomba) was laid down,^^ though not in final form until the 
re-organisation of the administrative system which took place in 1920.^5 
In 1929 the South-western Division was abolished for reasons of economy 
and not re-established until 1939.^^ Each Division is headed by a 
General Manager, and some Important areas, such as Mackay are designated 
as Districts, under a District Manager. 
Superimposed on the divisional system and cutting across it at 
various levels is the Branch organisation. Control of all sections of 
the system is exercised by the Commissioner through the Secretary and 
his staff, below which are to be found the heads of the Branches: 
Chief of Operations (Traffic), Locomotive (Chief Mechanical Engineer), 
Maintenance (Chief Engineer-Civil), Stores, Finance (Chief Accountant) 
and the commercial branch which includes the refreshment rooms. The 
two systems overlap, so that a bridge carpenter at Roma would come 
43. Q.P.D., Vol. LV, 1888, pp. 228-30. 
44. Queensland Railways - First Half Century: op.cit., p. 89. 
45. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for Year ended June 30th, 
1920, pp. 25-26. 
46. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for Year ended June 30th, 
1939, p. 28. 
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under the General Manager, South-western Division, at Toowoomba, but 
would also be part of the chain of command coming down from the head 
of the Maintenance Branch, i.e. the Chief Engineer (Civil). Likewise 
a station master at Charters Towers would be responsible to the General 
Manager, Northern Division (Townsville) but also to the Chief of 
Operations (Traffic) in Brisbane. 
This would suggest a division in responsibility and, presumably, 
in decision making also, and would partially account for the tendency, 
over many years of railway administration, for matters of routine 
Importance to be pushed across the Commissioner's desk instead of being 
dealt with at the level of the section heads. This appears to reflect 
a traditional ingrained distrust of delegation of authority which has 
grown up over generations of railway administrators, unrelieved by any 
form of managerial or administrative training either Inside or outside 
the Department at any level.^ '^  
A combination of all the factors discussed above long ago produced 
the situation of a Railway Department lamentably short on planning and 
long range policy formation, and these criticisms are as applicable to 
the field of industrial relations as they are to other areas of 
departmental activity. 
No evidence has been found to support the existence, at any time, 
of a general departmental policy on industrial relations. Problems 
47. The creation of the position of Chief of Operations in 1962-63, 
following the report of Ford, Bacon and Davis Inc., was for the 
purpose of transferring to this officer the duties of a Chief 
Traffic officer formerly undertaken by the Commissioner, thus 
freeing the Commissioner to act as Chief Administrative officer. 
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arising from day to day operations have been settled at the General 
Manager - Union District officer level, where the General Manager has 
the power to fine, reprimand and suspend, with anything out of the 
ordinary going up the line to the Commissioner. General policies on 
industrial relations have been lacking and no positive approaches made 
to the unions for joint management - union consultation on matters of 
mutual importance, such as the apprenticeship system which has been a 
perpetual source of friction. No Initiatives came from the Department 
for consultation with the unions concerned before dieselization of the 
railway service commenced, and such discussions as did occur were 
virtually forced on the Department by trade union activity. In recent 
years, passenger traffic has fallen sharply, in line with overseas 
trends, but the Queensland railways have been carrying a record freight 
tonnage, and suburban passenger traffic has risen with the extension 
of dieselization. This situation, together with the introduction of 
container service, and a growing degree of automation in operations has 
made redundancy a crucial problem for the unions, and there appears to 
be a good deal of justification for the railway unions' claim that 
neither cooperation nor forward planning to meet this contingency have 
been forthcoming from the Department. 
Also as previously demonstrated, many Industrial Issues have been 
seen as political rather than as administrative matters, and therefore 
meriting the attentions of the Minister rather than the Commissioner. 
The location of the Minister's office within the Railways Building and 
adjacent to that of the Commissioner assisted in keeping the Minister 
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in close touch with his administration. 
The organisation of railway administration and its operating 
patterns, together with the attitudes of Commissioners and their staff 
have been, accordingly, a factor in the development of militancy within 
the major railway union, the A.R.U. An uncooperative approach to 
mutual problems, together with the failure of the Commissioner to act 
as an impartial arbiter, have contributed on many occasions towards a 
hardening of union attitudes. This is the more unfortunate since 
Walker, in his study of industrial relations in the metal mining 
industry of Broken Hill,'^^ has shown that the attainment of a cooperative 
approach by the Barrier Industrial Council and the Mining Managers' 
Association to the question of Industrial disease "removed one of the 
most bitterly contested issues underlying past industrial conflicts ,"'^ ^ 
and was a contributing factor in the general decline in militancy. 
This combination of decentralization with a high degree of 
centralized decision making which characterises the administration of 
the Railway Department was repeated, to a large extent, in the 
organisation of the A.R.U. This was not the result of chance but of a 
conscious union decision, taken in its earliest days, to match its own 
organisation to that of the Department, so that when Workers' Control 
had been achieved the union could take over the running of the 
Depar-tment with the least amount of disruption.-^^ 
48. Kenneth F. Walker: "Industrial Relations in Australia", op.cit., 
pp. 77-135. 
49. ibid. , pp. 130-131. 
50. Interview with Mr. Frank Nolan, General State Secretary, A.R.U. 
Q'ld. Branch, June 28th, 1967. 
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Consequently, the A.R.U. changed its own organisation to meet 
structural alterations made from time to time by the Department, and by 
1920^ -^  a basic framework similar to that of the railway administration 
had evolved. The A.R.U, was divided into six Districts, each under the 
control of a District Committee, which in four of them (Townsville, 
Rockhampton, Maryborough and Toowoomba) consisted of a representative 
of each branch of the Union within the District, while for the Ipswich 
and Brisbane Districts, where only one branch operated, the District 
Committee consisted of grade and job representatives. The State Council 
of the A.R.U. Incorporated, in similar fashion, representatives from 
the District Committees, chosen by ballot of the whole membership of a 
particular Division of the service, together with job (or branch) 
representatives.^^ 
By these means, a combined industrial and territorial 
representation was achieved vis-a-vis the divisional-cum-branch 
organisation of the Department, with the union's District organisations 
ready to replace the Department's Divisions, and the union State office 
that of the Commissioner and Secretary, once Workers' Control was 
achieved. It was, according to the A.R.U., representation "such as 
the Parliament of the Socialist State will consist of ... and it's 
doubtful if there was another union in the world covering a particular 
51. Cf. The Daily Standard, January 8th, 1920, p. 3, and January 24th, 
1920, p. 3. The new Brisbane branch incorporated what were 
formerly the South Brisbane, Clerical, North Brisbane and Signalmen's 
branches. 
52. One representative from each of the following branches: loco, work-
shops, traffic, permanent way, stores, clerical, interlocking and 
refreshment rooms. 
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industry upon whose management body the two Interests are so definitely 
recognised.^ -5 Yet it was not true Industrial unionism, the territorial 
representation being a concession to the peculiar requirements of the 
Queensland railway system.-54 
Over the years, still following the pattern of the Railway 
Department, union organisation was modified to that of four Districts, 
centred upon Brisbane, Rockhampton, Townsville and Toowoomba, contracting 
further however in the 1950's to the present three Districts structure 
based upon Brisbane, Rockhampton and Townsville. 
Constitutionally, the most Important bodies within the A.R.U. 
organisation are the District Committees, the State Conference, the 
State Council and the State Executive. Democracy within the union is 
most clearly evidenced at the District level, where delegates from the 
branches and sub-branches, and grade and job representatives, all 
chosen by ballot, make up the Committees. The District officers who 
are the union organisers for the area, as well as secretaries to the 
Committees, have a great deal of scope for independent action. They 
take up day to day problems with the Divisional General Managers of the 
Department, and only if the matter has to go beyond them to the higher 
levels of the Department in Brisbane, does the State office of the 
53. The Daily Standard, September 30th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in The 
Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 9, 1966, p. 2. 
54. Note that when the National Union of Railwaymen was formed in 
England in 1913 - the first serious attempt there at organising 
an industrial union - the country was divided into six electoral 
districts for the purpose of choosing representatives on executive 
bodies. However, within these districts, elections were held on 
the basis of grades or callings and not on area. Cf. Philip S. 
Bagwell: op.cit., p. 336. 
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union come into the picture. Yet, as has been pointed out previously,^^ 
within the Railway Department more is referred to the Commissioner than 
would be expected in a fully decentralized system and, as a corollary 
to this, the A.R.U. State office also deals with some questions which 
it would prefer to leave to the District secretary. 
Nevertheless, comparatively speaking, there is a high level of 
local autonomy in the union, with regard to bread and butter Issues, a 
reflection not only of the decentralization of the service, but also of 
the fact that for many years the northern and central divisions were 
physically unconnected with each other and with the southern part of 
the system, and the union within each area developed as an organic 
whole. The difficulty in forming one all-grades union from these 
elements has already been recorded,56 and with the continuing tendency 
of the northern and central divisions to take action independently of 
the Brisbane office if they saw fit, a light rein on the conduct of 
their local affairs became a practical necessity. 
The State Conference and, between sessions, the State Council of 
the union are, constitutionally, the policy making bodies, yet the 
Infrequency of their meeting (the Conference only trlennlally, and the 
Council once or twice a year) militates against their effectiveness as 
policy making bodies, and has resulted in the concentration of policy 
control and decision making in the hands of the permanent officers of 
the union. In 1920, both President and Secretary were full-time, paid 
55. Cf. supra, pp.146-148. 
56. Cf. supra, PP- 73-75. 
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officials, but as the union's membership has contracted, so have its 
finances, and for some years the only permanent officer of the State 
Executive has been the Secretary.-57 This position should be contested 
every six years, while the remainder of the Executive who are volvmtary 
officers come up for re-election every two years. However, Frank 
Nolan's Incumbency was imchallenged from the time he won the secretaryship 
in 1944 until his retirement in 1970. His immediate predecessor, Tim 
Moroney, had had a 27-year unbroken term of office from 1917 until his 
death.55 
For those 53 years, the control of the A.R.U. in Queensland 
virtually rested with the two secretaries, partly because of the sort 
of men they were, and the kind of leadership they offered, but also 
because the union was organised in such a way as to place a great deal 
of power in their hands, if they should seek to use it. This is not to 
suggest that Moroney and Nolan were complete autocrats, manipulating 
the rank and file to their own ends even when this meant commitment to 
strike action, but it would seem that the secretary was placed in the 
position where he could make himself responsible for much of the 
57. For an account of the organisation of the A.R.U. (New South Wales 
Branch) see Lloyd Ross: "Problems of Communication within a Trade 
Union", The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
October, 1959; also State Conference Reports of A.R.U. (N.S.W. 
Branch). 
58. For a comprehensive, comparative study of British trade union 
officers, including a break-down of their major duties, their 
origins, selection, education levels, attitudes etc., see H.A. 
Clegg, A.J. Killick and Rex Adams: Trade Union Officers. A Study 
of Full-Time Officers, Branch Secretaries and Shop Stewards in 
British Trade Unions. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1961. Note that 
the full-time officers of the National Union of Railwaymen are 
elected for life. 
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determination of policy on industrial and other matters. 
At the same time his connection with the rank and file was not 
lost^^ through decentralization because of the need for him to take up 
individual cases with the Commissioner and his office. Contact with the 
grass roots of the organisation was further maintained by means of the 
A.R.U.'s paper, the Railway Advocate, over whose editorial policy the 
secretary has had control. The long terms in office of Moroney and 
Nolan produced a continuity of ideals and purpose which has been 
reflected in the pages of The Advocate. Such use of the union's newspaper 
accords with Truman's observations on the techniques of internal political 
leadership. "It is a major means, sometimes the only ones that group 
leaders use, to develop those consistent responses of members to 
leaders' actions, responses that are the basis of leadership."^-^ 
Financially, the Queensland branch has never been wealthy, at least 
59. For a discussion of the problems of communication within a trade 
;anion, see Lloyd Ross: ibid.; V.L. Allen: Power in Trade Unions. 
Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1954. 
60. While George Rymer was President of the A.R.U. he was also editor 
of The Advocate. On most matters to do with the union, his views 
and those of Moroney were in accord. During his term as secretary, 
Frank Nolan edited and wrote most of the contents of the Railway 
Advocate. 
61. David B. Triman: The Governmental Process. Alfred A. Knopf, New 
York, 1962, p. 195. Also of relevance to A.R.U. organisation is 
Truman's further statement that "these effects of leadership 
control of the channels of communication within the group may be 
accentuated where the membership is large and sufficiently 
dispersed, so that individuals seldom have direct communication 
with one another except through rigidly formal means." ibid. , 
pp. 195-6. 
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in comparison with some of the southern branches.^^ Membership fees 
have always been low°-^  and, consequently, even had they been so inclined 
the union's leaders have never been in the economic position to sponsor 
the kind of research study undertaken by the N.S.W. branch.^ "^  
Organisationally, then, the permanent officers of the A.R.U. and, 
in particular, the General Secretary, were placed in a position where 
they could be highly influential and command the respect and support 
of the rank and file. In the words of George Rymer, 
"it was this active, intelligent minority whom the crowd 
accepted, rightly or wrongly, and it was this hard core 
of thinkers and workers who were the pioneers, and 
62. N.S.W. and Victoria had the advantage of much higher membership 
figures. In N.S.W., for example, where the A.R.U. covers not 
only railwaymen but also public transport workers, e.g. bus drivers, 
its total membership in 1965 was 20,152 of whom 16,609 were financial 
income for the same year was $176,340. Membership in the 
Queensland branch in 1967 was 7,554. Cf. State Conference Report, 
N.S.W. Branch, A.R.U. 1965. 
63. For many years annual dues were $4. They are now (1971) $16. 
64. Cf. State Conference Report, N.S.W. Branch, A.R.U. 1959, p. 40. 
At that date, this branch had sponsored reports on Dermatitis 
among Workshop Employees, Blood Pressure among Guards and Morale 
among Railway Workers. "These have provided us with valuable 
information which may yet prove to be very serviceable. The 
prestige value of the Union has been high; the Department has been 
disturbed at this new and unique interest by a \inion - and the 
results have been worthwhile." 
65. V.L. Allen: Power in Trade. Unions, op.cit., pp. 231-233 writes 
of the difficulty in assessing the ability and efficiency of a 
trade union general secretary. He also believes that "trade 
iinion leaders are able to create a leader/follower relationship 
which is difficult to break down even when the leader becomes 
Incompetent, because it is not based on rational grounds "but 
on elements of 'charisma' found in trade union leadership." These 
elements he sees as "the devotion of the followers and the 
conception of duty possessed by the leaders." 
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exhibited the militancy. As far as the rank and file were 
concerned, we had their confidence and they followed us."^^ 
Though it will be argued subsequently^-^ that rank and file support 
came, in the main, for reasons other than their belief in the leaders' 
views on Industrial action and workers' control, the acceptance of 
industrial unionism and the necessity for its implementation in the 
railway service were, much more deeply rooted in the membership of the 
A.R.U. Therefore, because it has some bearing on this, one further 
organisational change made by the union should be noted. 
In September, 1920, the Q.R.U. became the Queensland branch of the 
Australian Railways Union. The creation of a national organisation of 
railwaymen was first initiated in 1905 with the formation of the 
Federated Associations of State Railway and Tramway Employees, with 
J.H. Catts as its secretary. Federal conferences were held in 1908 and 
1911. An application for registration of the Federation under the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Act was refused, on the grounds that "the 
F.A.S.R. and T.E. was an association of associations and not an 
association of persons who were employees."^^ Subsequent attempts at 
registration foundered on the High Court's decision that the Commonwealth 
Arbitration Court had no power to make an award covering State 
instrumentalities and, as a result, it proved impossible to hold the 
66. Interview with George Rymer. 
67. Cf. Chapter 6. 
68. The Daily Standard, September ,30th , 1922, p . 8, r e p r i n t e d in The 
Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 10, 1966, p , 1. 
158, 
Federation together, let alone make of it an effective organisation.^^ 
Throughout this period the Queensland leadership continued to 
press for amalgamation, arguing the case for a national standard as 
regards conditions of employment and other matters of concern to 
railwaymen, and pointing the necessity for a central authority, vested 
with power to speak on behalf of all States, to exert the utmost 
effort to this end. Amalgamation, not federation, was the hope of the 
A.R.U. for the former would produce a much stronger, more closely knit 
body than a federation and would be an important step towards the 
establishment of a national transport union. Amalgamation of existing 
State organisations would produce One Big Union, which, in time, 
hopefully, could be extended to cover all who earned their living within 
the railway services of Australia and in the wider field of national 
transport.'^ 
A ballot of Q.R.U. members in 1915 overwhelmingly supported 
amalgamation and the leaders continued to work towards this goal, only 
to be ultimately disappointed, for the national organisation which was 
hurriedly put together, ratified and registered under the Commonwealth 
Arbitration Act on February 8th, 1921 was a federation. A High Court 
69. Cf. David B. Truman: op.cit., pp. 119-129 for a discussion of the 
organizational elements affecting cohesion, where he suggests 
that "the problem of cohesion almost invariably arises where the 
constituent units antedate the federal body, as is usually true." 
ibid. , p. 120. 
70. Moroney's belief in the possibility of establishing one union of 
all transport workers, and in the impetus that amalgamation of 
the State all-grades unions would give to this scheme was 
corroborated by Dr. Lloyd Ross, General Secretary, N.S.W. Branch 
of the A.R.U. in an interview with the writer, August, 1969. 
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decision in 19207-^  upheld the right of the Commonwealth Arbitration 
Court to jurisdiction over disputes in which State employees were 
Involved. This reversed previous trends, and as an organisation known 
as the N.S.W. Railway and Tramway Officers' Association moved 
immediately to apply for registration, the all-grades unions in the 
States were forced to act swiftly to forestall their rival.^2 A 
federation was the most for which support could be generated, at that 
time and under those circumstances, and such was the type of organisation 
set up by the five State bodies, with Western Australia ultimately 
affiliating with the A.R.U. at the federal level. 
Federation was a disappointment to the Queensland branch and its 
leaders, as it proved to be too weak an organisation to effectively 
promote industrial unionism. While on paper, the federal body appeared 
to have strength in that it had the right to go into a State branch, 
take it over and run it, as it did in N.S.W. in 1950, yet federal 
Intervention was unwelcome, and unlikely, at least in the early days, 
when the State organisations were at their most powerful. 
The major weakness lay in the retention of financial control in 
the hands of the branches, each of which pays quarterage to the national 
body of 5% of its dues, together with a le-vy to maintain an Industrial 
71. Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd., 
(July-August, 1920), 28 C.L.R. 129. 
72. Cf. Geoffrey Sawer: Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929. 
Melbourne Univ. Press, Melbourne, 1956. For a full account of the 
attempts to set up a federal all-grades organisation prior to 1920, 
see The Daily Standard, September 30th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in 
The Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 10, 1966, pp. 1-2, and No. 11, 1966, 
pp. 3 & 7. 
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officer. Decentralization of finance and detachment of the federal 
officers from the rank and file membership are reasons for the 
comparative ineffectiveness of the federal organisation. 
Strange as it may seem, even after the federation of the A.R.U. 
the railway Industry in Queensland and Western Australia remained 
entirely within the State arbitration systems, so that these branches 
would seem to have gained little industrially from federation. Yet the 
Queensland branch felt it was achieving the best of both worlds by 
remaining under State awards. As the Commonwealth Arbitration Court 
extended its jurisdiction it came to be accepted that once a federal 
award had been determined, the State Courts automatically adjusted 
their own determinations in line with the federal decision. ^-^  in this 
way, the A.R.U. (Queensland Branch) members vrould gain any spin-off from 
federal awards covering railway workers, while at the same time 
retaining access to the State Industrial Court. ^'^  It was at the local 
level that more parochial matters were decided - district and 
divisional allowances, the number and duration of "smokes" and other 
things of importance to the rank and file - and it was here, at the 
State level and before the State Arbitration Court that the A.R.U. 
fought, and was seen to be fighting, for the rights of its members. 
73. Though one of the industrial causes of the 1948 Railway Strike in 
Queensland was the failure of the Queensland Court to pass on to 
railway workers in this state the increases in hourly rates which 
had been granted, federally, some months previously by the Mooney 
award. 
74. A.R.U. officials in Queensland were also deterred by what they saw 
as the excessive legalism of the Commonwealth Court and the time 
taken to hand down decisions. 
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However pertinent these reasons for remaining within the State 
arbitration system, they were over-ridden in importance by the fact that 
in 1921 a Labor government was in power in Queensland, and it was 
anticipated by all sections of the movement that such a government 
would look after its own. It had come to power in 1915 on a tremendous 
wave of enthusiasm which had even eroded (temporarily) the natural 
scepticism of Moroney and Rymer about parliamentary action as a means of 
achieving their rights for the workers.'^ por the most optimistic. 
Labor on the government benches meant socialism throughout the land.'^ ^ 
Even those who understood the situation better anticipated that the 
Labor government would legislate to circumscribe the power of the 
"bosses" and Improve the conditions and situation of the workers. 
Six years later, while reforms had been implemented, the "first 
fine careless rapture" had, to some extent, passed. The government had 
decided that workers' Industrial demands were to be channelled through 
an independent Arbitration Court, yet the hope still remained that 
railway workers in Queensland stood to gain more for themselves even 
75. As Moroney was later to state "the damnation of the Australian 
Labor Movement lay in the fact that it had always placed the cart 
before the horse. It had spent most of its time, money and energy 
in political efforts because it had taken the advice of its 
opponents in the early days. At that time. Parliament did offer 
the workers a scope for working class activity that was not now 
available to them." The Advocate, April 15th, 1929. 
76. "Well, now, the workers in Townsville, when they heard that a 
Labor government had gone in, thought -that the socialist revolution 
had come and there was quite a lot of talk of declaring it and 
running Townsville. Well, of course it was pointed out to them 
by some of the speakers that the idea of taking control in 
Townsville and calling it a Socialist revolution was just too 
fantastic to be thought about, but that was the feeling and the 
indication at the time." George Rymer, Interview, August, 1967. 
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under these circumstances, than were they to place themselves entirely 
under federal awards. 
Occasionally, the Queensland branch's connection with the national 
A.R.U. was disadvantageous to it. In 1933, the Queensland Railway 
Traffic Employees' Union lodged an application with the Industrial 
Registrar to amend its constitution in such a way as to change the union 
from a sectional one to an all-grades union to which any railway 
employee could belong. While in Moroney's view, the application was 
for no other purpose than to legitimize "body snatching", from the 
77 
A.R.U.^' the applicant union, while conceding that an all-grades union 
(the A.R.U.) was already operating within the railway service, made 
much of the fact that "the A.R.U. was a branch of a federal organisation, 
and its members might possibly be Involved in an inter-state dispute."75 
In rebuttal, Moroney explained that 
so far as the A.R.U. are concerned we are a federal organisation 
and a state organisation both. We have to submit to the 
discipline of the State Court in respect of registration under 
this Act. We are bound by awards made by the Queensland Court 
and as for being embroiled in any interstate disputes, I have 
no recollection of ever having done it."'^ 
The application was unsuccessful in its ultimate object of creating 
another all-grades railway union, though the Queensland Railway Traffic 
Employees Union was granted wide extensions of the number of callings it 
was permitted to cover and represent and consequently was able, 
77. Transcript of Hearing in the Industrial Court of Queensland, 
before the Registrar, Brisbane, 28/7/1933. ...in the matter of an 
application by the Queensland Railway Traffic Employees' Union, 
to amend its callings. Industrial Court File, No. 57, p. 8. 
78. ibid. , p. 4. 
79. ibid. , p. 11. 
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legitimately, to make some Inroads into A.R.U. membership. 
It has been argued that, organisationally, both railway department 
and principal railway union were structured on a basis of decentralization 
but with a high degree of centralized control in policy and decision 
making. It has been further suggested that for this and other reasons 
discussed in this chapter the achievement of a mutually productive 
management-union relationship had been Inhibited, and that this had been 
a factor in the growth of militancy within the A.R.U. 
There was another element which contributed to this situation and 
to the development on both sides of attitudes which were counter 
productive. This was the fact that the railway service was a government 
Instrumentality, the employer was the government of the day, and 
railway workers, even though specifically excluded from the public 
service, were government employees. As a consequence of this, both 
sides assumed that their relationship was not the same as that of 
employers and employees in the private sector.^^ 
On the government side, there was always the expectation that 
railway workers would be model employees, with permanency of employment, 
80. "Government asserts that its relation to those who earn their 
livelihood in its service is different from the relation of 
private employers to their employees. ...It insists that, in 
order to preserve the integrity of public authority, it must 
possess the right of final determination in all its employment 
relations." Sterling D. Spero: Government as Emvployer. Remsen 
Press, New York, 1948, p. 1. 
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certain privileges ,^-^  and, for many years, status among the working 
class compensating railway officers for the lower wages paid to them. 
Management took the view that its employees, in return, should willingly 
provide service of the highest possible standard. Management expectations 
of this kind were reinforced by continuing railway deficits and the 
criticisms which these engendered from outside the service.^^ 
Employee calculations were based on a view of government as an 
enlightened employer, setting a standard of treatment for its workers 
which would provide a prototype for private employers. The right to 
organise, to affiliate with the general labour movement and even to 
strike had been grudgingly conceded by non-Labor governments, and it 
was accepted by the workers as an article of faith that a Labor 
government would take a quite different view of the rights of its 
employees when it came to power. It was something of a shock to them, 
after 1915, to find the Labor government anxious to divest itself of 
responsibility for industrial matters and placing these in the hands 
of an Independent Industrial Court. 
81. In 1908, "the Government proposed taking a referendum of workshop 
employees on the question of foregoing railway privileges and 
concessions in favour of outside rates, but the unions objected, 
and the proposal was not proceeded with. One of the reasons 
lorged against it was the difference in hours between workers in 
the railway service and those of similar employees outside. Most 
of the outside rates were daily rates, and it was urged that the 
privileges, which were estimated as being equal to 4d. per day 
did not compensate the railwaymen for the difference in hours." 
The Daily Standard, September 9th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in The 
Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 3, 1966, p. 2. 
82. Railway management was frequently accused of giving jobs to the 
lazy and indolent, of allowing the railway unions "to featherbed", 
and finding places for political appointees. 
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It was even more surprising for them to find their own parliamentary 
leaders exhorting them to work harder, be more efficient, provide better 
service, and taking what had previously been thought of as a typically 
non-Labor view - that a challenge by railway workers to their employer, 
the government, was, in effect, a challenge to the very nature of the 
state, and a denial of the right of the wider community to an essential 
service, which right must over-rule the rights of a group within that 
community, i.e. the railway workers.°-^ 
Such conflicting viewpoints on matters so basic to the conduct 
of industrial relations were difficult, if not impossible to 
compromise and were, themselves, exacerbated by the differences in 
philosophical and ideological belief held by the leaders of the 
government and the union. Together with other factors stemming from 
the organisational set-up on both sides, they formed an Impediment to 
the creation of mutually productive union-management relationships 
within the railway services. 
83. Theodore, for example, adopted a perpetually hectoring attitude 
to trade unionists, and not only to the militants, but also to 
members of his own union, the A.W.U. See Irwin Young: Theodore 
His Life and Times. Alpha Books, Sydney, 1971, p. 46 for an 
account of a special Conference in May, 1921, convened by the 
Q.C.E. to consider the unemployment problem, where Theodore 
"flayed them verbally, both as a body and as Individuals, until 
the assembly sat in sullen silence." Young sees Theodore's desire 
to play the "strong man" in industrial disputes as deriving from 
some psychological factor which "drove him to accept a challenge 
rather than placate an opponent, and this was a defect in 
leadership." ibid., p. 28. 
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PART I I: THE AIRLINE OPERATORS AND THE FEDERATION 
The pilots have devised for themselves an organisation not unlike 
that of the railwaymen in that it combines apparent grass roots democracy 
and decentralization with a high concentration of control at the centre. 
The Australian Federation of Air Pilots binds together approximately 
2,400^ *^  highly skilled professionals with an Intense dedication to 
flying. It admits domestic airline pilots, including those flying for 
small companies and for freight operators like Brown and Brain; New 
Guinea and overseas pilots; aero club Instructors, agricultural pilots 
and those engaged in general flying. 
The A.F.A.P. is a federation of branches, based on geographical 
and, to some extent, functional location and not on the employer 
company.^5 There are seven branches: Overseas (based in Sydney), New 
Guinea (Lae), Queensland (Brisbane), New South Wales (Sydney), Victoria 
(Melbourne), South Australia (Adelaide) and West Australia (Perth), 
together with a general aviation group. The head office of the A.F.A.P. 
is located in Melbourne and is separate from the Victorian branch office, 
though located in the same building. 
The affairs of each branch are in the hands of a Committee of 
12-20,^^ chosen annually by postal ballot, the results of which are 
84. The cxirrent breakdown of membership (approximate figures) is: Qantas -
640; Ansett Transport Industries (including subsidiaries of Ansett/ 
A.N.A.) - 670; T.A.A. - 450; general aviation - 360. 
85. Unlike the railway union, the branches did not antedate the formation 
of the national body and this has assisted cohesion within the 
Federation. Cf. David B. Truman: op.cit., pp. 119-129. 
86. With a minimiim requirement of 10 members. Cf. Rule 4(f) Branches. 
Constitution and By-Laws of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots, 
p. 24. 
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declared at the Annual General Meeting of the branch. Each branch 
operates independently in day to day affairs but all matters of 
importance are dealt with at the federal office level. Centralization 
of finance undermines the significance of the branches. Unlike the 
A.R.U., annual membership dues of the pilots which are levied at the 
rate of 1% of gross salary, are paid to the federal organisation,57 
which returns a small annual sum to the branches. 
The importance of the branch committees lies in their right to 
choose delegates to the annual convention. Each can select not less 
than two or more than five members,"" according to branch size, to 
represent it at this meeting, and, in practice, approximately thirty 
people constitute the Convention. 
This body decides all questions of policy and rules, controls 
affiliation with the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' 
Associations and selects the Australian delegates to this organisation's 
annual meetings. The President, three Vice-Presidents (one of whom 
has to come from the overseas branch), a Vice-President (Technical), 
a Trustee, and a Secretary/Treasurer are elected by the Convention. 
The Executive Vice-President, who is a permanent officer of the 
organisation, is appointed by the President if and when the necessity 
arises, from among candidates selected by the Convention, as are the 
87. This may in itself be an influence on militancy. With annual fees 
up to $300 or more, there is likely to be pressure on the \inion to 
be "seen to be doing something". The wealth of the union enables 
it to employ staff of a high calibre, almost unlimited legal 
assistance, and, if necessary, to push disputes to limits beyond 
the capabilities of most other unions. 
88. Rule 5 (7 a Iv) of Constitution and By-Laws, A.F.A.P. 
168, 
Director of Air Safety, Director I.F.A.L.P.A., and the Director of 
Accident Investigation. 
The Executive Committee, which consists of all the above-mentioned 
Office Bearers of the Federation together with the Chairman and Vlce-
Chairman of each Branch Committee,^ acts as day to day governing body 
of the Federation and has, amongst its powers and duties, the right 
to "make recommendations of policy to the Convention of the Federation."^^ 
On the face of it, it would seem that the pilots have created an 
organisation which is capable of being worked in such a way as to give 
each individual member a reasonably direct say in determining the 
policies of his association. Evidence in support of this includes the 
yearly meetings of Convention (as against triennial conferences in the 
A.R.U.), and the choice of Executive by the delegates of the branches 
meeting in Convention; the relatively small size of the membership, 
compared with most other trade unions; and the scheme devised and used 
by the Federation, by means of which all pilots in Australia, at any 
given time, can be polled for their opinions by the Executive.^-^ 
89. ibid., Rule 6 (1) 
90. ibid. , Rule 6 (2d). 
91. The scheme involves key members in each branch who telephone five 
members, each of whom in turn contact another five, and so on. The 
telephone system has become necessary owing to the impossibility of 
gathering together a majority of the pilots, because of the nature 
of their work, unless a stop-work meeting is called which 
temporarily grounds all aircraft. This system, like the use of the 
referendiim by some organisations, could be described as another 
technique of internal political leadership. As Truman points out, 
"Policy determination, if it is not to reveal disunity, must be 
guarded by the active minority. The referendum in interest groups 
is an instrimient of guidance rather than the reverse." op.cit., 
p. 199. 
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Yet, in practice, policy initiatives are taken by the leadership, 
whether by the pilot Executive, the Federation's bureaucracy or a 
combination of both, taken as a result of their own appreciation of 
situations and evaluation of conditions rather than as a consequence of 
direct demands coming up to them from the pilots. In most instances, 
the Executive has been able to rely on the support of a majority of the 
pilots,^^ when a case has been put to them, clearly, forcefully and 
frequently. ^-^  
To some extent this support is uncritical. Pilots are dispersed 
occupatlonally, and although a close professional bond links men from 
all airline companies inside and outside Australia, they do not work 
in close contact with each other as do workers in many other Industries. 
If the pilots are, in general, uninterested in taking the initiative 
within their own organisation,^'^ this may be, in part, because they do 
not think of themselves as trade unionists, or see themselves as members 
92. Except in the case of three men crewing of the DC9's when growing 
pilot resistance to the Federation's position on this question 
caused it to agree to arbitration by Professor Isaac on specific 
points not in conflict with the D.C.A. view. Professor Isaac foiond 
against the pilots. 
93. This is done mainly through hard hitting Presidential addresses at 
conventions and the circulation of lengthy presidential memos, 
research results and case studies, e.g. "The Superannuation Story", 
8/11/67 and "A Summation of the Case for Three Crew on the DC9-30 
in Australia", 24/11/67. 
94. "There have been many occasions when both your Federation officers 
and the Airline operator concerned could have done with a little 
more "senior" interest. It would be gratifying indeed to see the 
next Branch election nomination list indicate a willingness by the 
group to which I refer to seek office. It would show a willingness 
from those who take most out to give something back and would have 
short and long-term results of the highest order." President's 
Report, Australian Federation of Air Pilots, 1967 Convention, p. 9. 
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of an exploited class, in conflict with the "bosses". They view 
management from a level equal to if not above its own, and although 
they should not be seen as a passive mass,^^ their inclinations are to 
look to their leaders for guidance and to leave policy initiation to 
their Executive. 
In this kind of situation, the role of the leaders, and in particular, 
that of the President, is crucial for the Federation. This position, 
along with the three Vice-Presidents, is subject to annual election and 
yet it is noteworthy that the leaders have come from a small, stable, 
active minority within the organisation. Captain R.T. Holt, for 
example, has been Federal President on five occasions, 1959-61, 1965-65 
and variously Queensland Branch committee chairman and delegate to 
Convention and Executive from 1954 to 1967. He is but one, though the 
outstanding example, of a handful of men who are prepared to make 
considerable sacrifices of money and time to lead the Federation. 
Their motivations will be examined subsequently,^7 ^^ -j- -t-^e possible 
extent of their sacrifices needs to be noted here. 
It has been said that, in normal circumstances, "the President 
98 
needs the third week in each month to cover his routine duties". 
This should mean that, provided he is a senior pilot, under the new 
95. Interview with N. Powell, Queensland Manager, Qantas, 16/7/71 who 
reminded the writer that with the exception of the very highest 
level positions, the majority of Qantas management received 
considerably less than the pilots in salary terms. 
96. Cf. David B. Truman: op.cit., pp. 153-5 where he argues against 
Michels' assertion that the rank and file are an "indifferent 
and apathetic mass" that has a felt need for leadership. 
97. Cf. Chapter 6. 
98. P re s iden t ' s Report, 1967 Convention: op.oit. p . 10. 
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bidding system, he should be able to bid for a block which will allow 
him to devote that one week a month to Federation business, without 
dropping his gross salary level too much, though his opportunity for 
leisure and home life will be greatly circumscribed. When the Federation 
is going through stirring times, industrially, as in 1965-57, the 
organisation's activities may require the undivided attention of the 
President, because of the full-time negotiations required by the 
Industrial Relations Procedures Agreement; in these circumstances, he 
is unable to engage in flying duties, beyond those required to keep 
his licence operative. His company pays his salary and recovers it 
from the A.F.A.P., but he may lose some opportunities to build this up 
to his normal gross salary level by bidding for additional flying. 
He loses economically as well as in recreation, and would need to be 
highly motivated to continue in this situation for any length of time. 
The growing power of the Federation's permanent officers may see 
to it that future Presidents are not called upon to make these sorts of 
sacrifices. The Executive Vice-President "^  is titular administrative 
head of the organisation, on a permanent basis. He works out of the 
Melbourne office where he is supported by a research officer, an 
99. "You cannot expect from my successor the kind of activity in which 
I have indulged. I took office for the specific piirpose of attempting 
to do what has been largely done, and to some degree I did this with 
my eyes open. I have in a sense abused my wife, my children, my 
friends, my interest in any form of civic activity, and I have, on 
your behalf, at times driven your staff at all levels almost to a 
point of desperation." ibid. 
100. The present incumbent is B.I. Crofts, an ex-wartime pilot, who was, 
for a short time. Industrial officer for the Queensland Coal Owners' 
Association before being appointed to the Federation. The Industrial 
Officer in charge of the Sydney office is F.D.C. Caterson. 
172. 
accountant and an expanding secretarial staff. The Sydney office is 
in charge of an Industrial officer, with a similar, though smaller, 
supportive staff. As the Federation has grown in membership and 
wealth, '^  so, too, has its bureaucracy, and were the Executive Vice-
President so inclined, he is in a position to "bend" his instructions, 
particularly if the President's flying duties take him out of the 
country.-^ ^^  As Michels '^-^  and Truman-^ '^ '^  have pointed out, the 
emergence of paid, professional leadership, based in part on the 
acquisition of managerial skills, is one of the signs within an 
organisation of developing minority control, and, in the case of the 
Federation, may indicate a potential political struggle within the 
internal leadership at some future time.-^ '^ ^ 
101. "We are well aware that we are spending our all in the current 
effort - yes, a large amount of money $40,000 plus or thereabouts." 
Contract Negotiations, A.T.I.-T.A.A. Australian Federation of Air 
Pilots, 1/7/66, p. 1. 
102. The immediate Past-President, A.J. Smithwell, was a senior Qantas 
pilot and it was noticeable that during 1971 a majority of the 
official statements issued by the Federation were over the names of 
Crofts or Caterson, rather than the President. The present incumbent 
is Captain John Guggenheimer of T.A.A. 
103. Robert Michels: Political Parties. The Free Press, Glencoe, 
Illinois, reprint 1958, pp. 40-45. 
104. David B. Truman: op.cit., p. 148. 
105. Was there an inkling of this behind some of the remarks made by the 
President in his Address to Extra-Ordinary General Meeting, on July 
11th, 1966? e.g. "For our permanent staff there is something I 
must say: Membership must become a little more adult in its 
appreciation of the place among us these people hold... They wo\ild, 
I think, appreciate my requiring of you, and it is a requirement, 
that in the future we refrain from any personal criticism whatsoever 
of permanent staff... While you elect -the right type of Executive 
Officer to senior positions in the Federation you should have no 
difficulty in ensuring that the permanent staff are working for 
the Federation in the manner, you, the members as a whole, desire." 
p. 9. 
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Other problems, at present minor, which the Federation may have to 
face are ones arising out of the formation of the Air Pilots' Guild of 
Australia, though now that the senior organisation is at last concerning 
itself with general aviation ^' and the achievement of agreements with 
operators for the benefit of pilots in this field, it is anticipated that 
the Guild will have difficulty in maintaining its initial membership 
figures. Incipient divisions within the Federation on the basis of 
geographical parochialism may also become cause for concern. 
The Federation cooperates with other organisations within the 
industry and has derived great benefit from its association with the 
International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations.-^^^ It has 
Informal llason with the Australasian Airline Flight Engineers' 
Association, the Australian Airline Navigators' Association, the Flight 
Stewards' Association of Australia and the Airline Hostesses Association 
and is represented, together with these bodies on a Flight Crew Ground 
Crew Safety Committee.-^ -^ ^ 
106. Cf. supra, pp. 127-129. 
107. Cf. President's Report. Australian Federation of Air Pilots, 1967, 
p. 7 for account of agreement reached with East West Airlines on 
general aviation. 
108. "On -this and on other matters we say that partisanship on a 
geographical basis has no place within this Federation. The 
"Melbourne versus the rest" game must cease on this as on all 
other issues." President's Address to Extra-ordinary General 
Meetings, July 11th, 1966, p. 6. 
109. The International Federation represents pilots' associations in 
49 countries. Its resolutions are not binding on member 
associations until ratified by them. For the Australian Federation 
the I.E.A.L.P.A. is a valuable source of research material data and 
general information on matters of concern to pilots. 
110. Cf. President's Report, 1967, op.cit., p. 5. 
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Safety-^ -^ -^  is, of course, a major issue in the airline industry and one 
in which everyone, manufacturers, operators, flight crew. Department of 
Civil Aviation and passengers alike, have a vested interest.-^ -^ ^ 
"Pilots are of the opinion that they are in a position to make 
more knowledgeable judgments on operational matters than are 
Airline Operators, Manufacturers or Government Agencies, and 
the making of such judgments has historically been their role 
in air safety. They are in fact and in effect highly trained 
24 hours-a-day monitors of what is happening and what is safe 
in the operational environment of air transport."•^•^•^ 
Certain standards and procedures for operational safety are laid 
down and enforced by the Department of Civil Aviation, and are adhered 
to by operators and pilots. It is within the grey area outside the 
black and white of D.C.A. rules and regulations, or in the on-the-spot 
operational interpretation of those rules that pilot-operator attitudes 
to safety can become abrasive. The pilot is sensitive to any attack, 
real or implied, upon his complete authority within the aircraft ,-^-^'^  
even if done in the name of safety, though the Federation itself is not 
111. "Air safety is the primary responsibility of each and every airline 
pilot and as night follows day it follows that air safety is of 
principal concern to the Australian Federation of Air Pilots." 
A Summation of the Case for Three Crew on DC9-30 in Australia. 
Australian Federation of Air Pilots, November 24th, 1967, p. 1. 
112. "In struggling for greater safety in the air, the pilot is 
literally engaged in a fight for his own survival. It follows, 
too, that if the pilot survives, then most probably so will his 
passengers. In this respect, the pilot is the air safety 
spokesman for the air-travelling public." ibid., p. 5. 
113. ibid., pp. 3-4. 
114. "Pilots hold and always will hold a position to be looked up to in 
all matters of operational responsibility and by Air Navigation 
Regulations and Air Navigation Orders they hold certain unchallenged 
authority. The Captain of an aircraft is meant to have the last 
word. For 100% of his working life as a Captain he makes his own 
decisions - no one looks over his shoulder and he is at all times 
a symbol of confidence and assurance to his passengers and -the 
world at large." ibid., pp. 21-22. 
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above using safety to camouflage the real Issues in dispute with the 
operators. ^ For their part, the operators weigh the costs of extra 
safety measures against the need for them,-^ -^ ^ but in the long run, safety 
and profitability, which to some extent stems from it, force cooperation 
on pilots and operators alike. 
Except in very general terms little can be said about management 
organisation in the airline Industry, because of its diversity. It 
ranges from a statutory corporation (Australian National Airlines 
Commission) through a fully government owned company (Qantas) to a 
number of privately owned or public companies of which Ansett Transport 
Industries is by far the largest and the most important. 
A formalized procedure for handling pilot grievances has been 
evolved, beginning with the appointment by each operator of a Senior 
Regional Captain in every port as management representative with whom 
the Branch chairman of the Federation takes up the complaint. Should 
it not be resolved at this level, it is processed up the union chain of 
command to the Executive Vice President, who consults with the relevant 
company staff manager.-^ -^ 7 staff relations in the various companies are 
115. E.g. the three man crewing of DC9's. 
116. "What is the cost of "unsafety"? The shocking results of a jet 
accident in Australia - the appalling hue and cry which must 
ensue in this small country, population-wise I" ibid. p. 6. 
117. One is given to understand that, in practice, a pilot with a 
grievance on arrival at a port is more likely to telephone 
directly to the Federation's industrial officers in Melbourne 
or Sydney, with his complaint than to start it through the 
formal grievance machinery lower down. Interview with N. Powell, 
Queensland Manager, Qantas. 
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in the hands of ex-flight crew personnel. While one would assume that 
this would be productive of a sympathetic relationship between 
operators and pilots, such does not seem to be the case. 
Perhaps, indeed, the likelihood of poor union-management relations 
is actually Increased by the practice of drawing senior management 
personnel from the ranks of flight crew. Although in these 
circumstances management will have first hand knowledge of the 
conditions under which pilots operate, there may also be factors which 
are counter-productive as far as harmony within the Industry is 
concerned. Pilots, for Instance, may well feel resentful when former 
colleagues are seen to be exercising managerial authority; and they 
may be suspicious of the use to which management may put their intimate 
knowledge of flying practices - a fear, in effect, that what has been 
done is to "set a thief to catch a thief". 
On the other side, pilots now in managerial posts may also have 
their natural resentments: there is less "glamour" about their new 
role; managerial salaries are lower than those of senior pilots ;-^-^^ 
there may be a tendency to resist demands for improvements simply 
because the manager himself flew under more adverse conditions; or 
118. "The second factor was general feeling among Qantas management staff 
about the high salaries which pilots were getting in relation to 
their own salaries." "The Qantas Pilots' Super Wrangle: Why the 
Dispute must be Settled Soon." The Australian Financial Review, 
April 1st, 1971. "It is understood that senior 747B captains will 
get a guaranteed annual minimiim salary of about $25,250. A few 
top pilots will earn up to $32,000 a year. The General Manager 
of Qantas, Captain R.J. Ritchie, earns "only" $22,750 a year." 
The Australian,,Ray 11th, 1971. This article also compares the 
salaries of Qantas 747 pilots with those of parliamentary leaders, 
top ptablic servants and many chief executives of big companies and 
shows that these pilots will be among the highest paid salary earners 
in Australia. 
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perhaps more Importantly, because the manager's knowledge is of past 
practice which in a highly technological Industry may have changed 
significantly since his flying days. 
With regard to the domestic airlines, there is a high degree of 
stability in industrial relations, caused, in the main, by the regulation 
of the industry by the Department of Civil Aviation and by the 
government, directly.-^ -^ ^ Within this framework subtle differences of 
approach to industrial relations can be detected. The Federation's 
attitude to A.T.I, appears to be coloured to some extent by a sneaking 
admiration for the buccaneering personality of its head. Sir Reginald 
Ansett. The calibre of top level administration in this company is said 
to be mediocre, due to the comparatively low level of salary offered. 
For this reason, the Federation feels it can more than match A.T.I, 
in getting what it wants, though aware of the fact that Sir Reginald 
must be handled carefully, for he will fight, and fight hard if he 
deems it necessary, T,A,A,'s position vis-^-vls the Federation is 
seen to be much stronger, because of its direct government backing, and, 
for the same reason, relations between it and the Federation tend to be 
more rigid and formal. 
It is with the International airline, Qantas, that a mutually 
119. John M. Baitsell: Airline Industrial Relations - Pilots and Flight 
Engineers. Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard 
University, Boston, 1966. Chapter 2. In this work on industrial 
relations in the American airline industry, Baitsell points out 
•that (as in Australia) the government formed the original patterns. 
"The government still provides financial support for and hea-vy 
regulation of this industry. These facts mean that many of the 
decisions made concerning this industrial relations system are 
either directly or indirectly made by the government or are 
tripartite in nature." p. 36. 
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productive relationship has been more difficult to achieve. Qantas, 
unlike the domestic airlines, operates in a highly competitive and 
unstable Industry,^^^ with, at present, uncertain profitability. The 
pilots have found in B.J. Hlnchcllffe, until recently Director of 
Flight Operations, an abrasive personality, and these factors, together 
with the tendency of the Qantas Board to issue edicts through an 
Industrial officer rather than enter into discussions ,-^ 2^ j-j^ve meant that 
relations between the union and this operator are represented, at best, 
by an uneasy peace. Yet taken overall, because the airline industry is 
a high risk one, both in terms of possible loss of life and of 
profitability it will always be to their mutual advantage for both 
operators and flight crew to establish a good indiistrial relationship 
120. Though the Government endeavours to give it what protection it can 
through international agreements and the adoption of restrictive 
policies to foreign charter operators. Note the current (August, 
1971) refusal by the United States Government to grant Qantas 
landing rights on its territory for the airlines new "jiimbo" jets. 
121. Re Qantas pilots, note that on April 22nd, 1971, the company 
announced "that it was giving 6 months notice of dismissal to 96 
second officer pilots, 42 cadet pilots and 17 flight engineers. 
It also said it was stopping the recruitment of 800 ground staff 
and 156 cabin staff this year, to enable the airline to enter 
next year with 1100 less staff than originally planned. At the 
time of the retrenchments, Qantas had 623 pilots, 209 flight 
engineers, 82 navigators, 48 graduate cadet pilots, 746 stewards 
and 246 air hostesses." The Australian, April 30th, 1971. 
122. The present Qantas board consists of six directors, only one of 
which, the general manager. Captain B. Ritchie has a background of 
executive airline administration. Chairman of the Board is Sir 
Roland Wilson, ex-permanent head of the Treasury and also Chairman 
of the Commonwealth Banking Corporation. It is widely held that 
under his chairmanship there has been constant pressure to force 
Qantas into the Public Service mould. Cf. The Australian Financial 
Review, April 1st, 1971; series of articles by Gavin Souter in 
Sydney Morning Herald, July 26th, 27th and 28th, 1971. 
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based on maximum cooperation between the two. 
Union and management organisation and their internal procedures for 
decision making have been shown, in the case of the A.R.U, and the 
Australian Federation of Air Pilots to be a possible causal factor of 
militancy. In each union an organisational situation has been created 
whereby an active minority of the total membership - the leaders - can, 
to a large extent, decide policies and guide the membership to support 
them. In this respect it has been of interest to see the extent to 
which both unions conform to many of the criteria for elitism in 
organisations as enunciated by Michels and modified by Truman. The 
organisation has provided a functional relationship of a particular 
kind between leaders and members, but whether this is used to direct 
the union towards militant action or not, will depend upon the other 
elements which are being Investigated in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL CONDITIONS 
OF THE WORK COMMUNITY-^ 
Kerr and Siegel, in their attempts to explain "the apparently great 
impact of certain industrial environments on the propensity to strike,"'^  
have hypothesised two factors, the location of the worker in society and 
the character of the job, as being the most Important of a number of 
environmental elements in determining industrial behaviour. They argue 
that workers who are in close proximity to each other in their job and 
yet are isolated from the rest of the community and from management, 
such as seamen, miners and loggers, are more strike prone than those 
whose work integrates them more fully into the community as a whole. 
Further, they suggest that jobs that are "physically difficult and 
unpleasant, unskilled or semi-skilled, and casual or seasonal and foster 
an independent spirit (as in the logger in the woods) will draw tough, 
inconstant, combative and virile workers and they will be Inclined to 
strike."^ Together with other factors, they have used these two 
1. J.T. Dunlop: op.cit., pp. 386-7. 
2. Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel: "The Inter-industry Propensity to 
Strike - an International Comparison", op.cit., p. 191J ed Robert 
E.L. Faris: Handbook of Modem Sociology. Rand McNally & Co., 
Chicago, 2nd printing, 1966. Chapter 17, "Industrial Relations", 
pp. 619-679; K.G.J.C. Knowles: "'Strike-Proneness' and its 
Determinants", The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LX, No. 3, 
November, 1954, p. 218. 
3. ibid. , p. 195. Evidence to support this hypo-thesis may be found in 
the meat slaughtering industry, where Walker (Kenneth F. Walker: 
"Industrial Relations in Australia", op.cit.. Chapter 5) finds the 
seasonal nature of the work a factor causing militancy. Note also 
the extent to which waterside workers fit Kerr's and Siegel's 
description and the attempts of the Stevedoring Industry Board, by 
the introduction of attendance pay and long service leave, to 
counteract these effects, introduce continuity to the industry, and, 
hopefully, damp down militancy. 
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propositions as a basis for a general explanation of militant tendencies 
in one Industry as compared with another. They could also be applied to 
unions within the one Industry, to compare, say, the A.R.U. with the 
Queensland Railway Salaried Officers' Union. Yet these hypotheses, 
and, in particular, the second, should not be overemphasised as causal 
factors of militancy. It is too sweeping to suggest, for example, that 
jobs that are "physically easy and performed in pleasant surroundings, 
skilled and responsible, steady, and subject to set rules and close 
supervision, will attract women or the more submissive type of man who 
will abhor strikes.'"^ 
However, there is already considerable evidence to support the thesis 
that isolation, danger and hard, unpleasant physical conditions play a 
part in moulding workers' attitudes to their jobs and to management. 
Implicit in Gollan's writings on the coal industry^ and in Ross's 
history of the Miners' Federation of Australia^ is the proposition that 
the isolation of work at the coalface and the appalling physical 
conditions under which the coal was won were very real factors in the 
early demands for better working conditions and wages, and in the 
increasing militancy of the miners when these were not conceded by 
management. Walker, in his comparative study of industrial relations 
in some Australian industries7 produces similar evidence for the metal-
4. ibid. 
5. Robin Gollan: The Coalminers of New South Wales - a History of the 
Union 1860-1960, Melbourne Univ. Press, Melbourne, 1963. 
6. Edgar Ross: A History of the Miners' Federation of Australia. The 
Australasian Coal and Shale Employers' Federation, Sydney, 1970. 
7. Kenneth F. Walker: op.cit. 
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mining industry at Broken Hill and cites the technical and physical 
conditions of production as one of the elements causing militancy in 
the meat slaughtering Industry in Queensland.^ 
Research in the British coalmining industry, too, has shown that 
"bad conditions", i.e. unfavourable natural conditions, tend to 
instigate "bad work", which is the result of human shortcomings. When 
both are present there is "a tendency for circular causal processes of 
a disruptive character to be touched off,"9 which threaten to stop the 
production cycle. In its turn, the strain of controlling the cycle 
"tends to produce a group 'culture' of angry and suspicious bargaining 
over which both management and men are in collusion", and "there is 
displacement both upwards and downwards of the tensions generated."-^^ 
The transport Industry has many of the same work attributes as 
mining. Its purpose is to carry passengers and freight over long 
distances and under all kinds of climatic conditions. This must go on 
at all hours of the day and night, so that many employees in this 
industry are permanently engaged in shift work, or, as in the case of 
airline pilots, are rostered to fly outside of what are considered to 
be normal working hours. For some groups such as the pilots and the 
running staff of the railway services, to difficult working conditions 
are added the responsibility for the safe arrival of passengers and 
8. ibid. , pp. 195-6. 
9. E.R. Trist & K.W. Bamforth: "Some Social and Psychological 
Consequences of the Longwall Method of Coal-Getting", Human 
Relations, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1951, pp. 20-21. 
10. ibid. , p. 23. Cf. E.R. Trist, G.W. Higgin, H. Murray, A.B. Pollock; 
Organisational Choice. Tavistock Publications, London, 1963. 
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freight at their destinations and the danger Inherent in flying or in 
driving a locomotive at high speed. Both groups work in isolation from 
the wider community, pilots in the aircraft cockpit, the footplate men 
in the even closer and less pleasant confines of the locomotive cabin. 
In sum, many transport workers fulfil roles which are similar to those 
of miners, in the high degree of stress which they promote.-^ -^  For 
these reasons, a closer examination of the physical and technical 
conditions under which railwaymen and flight crew have performed their 
duties is warranted. 
There have been two distinct groupings of workers in the railway 
service, those engaged in railway construction on behalf of private 
contractors, and the "regular" employees engaged in the tasks of 
operation and maintenance. The conditions of the construction workers 
cannot be omitted from this study, not only because these men are a part 
of railway history, but because many of them ultimately joined the 
permanent service, as gangers and fettlers in the maintenance section, 
some even rising to the more highly skilled positions on the footplate 
and in the traffic branch. It must be assumed that their experiences 
as navvies and labourers on construction work conditioned, to some extent, 
at least, the attitudes to industrial relations, which they were to 
exhibit as railway employees. 
11. "All roles at the coalface are stressful, but the pattern varies 
with the different roles. The physical effort required, the 
liability of interference from factors beyond the control of the 
facework group, the cruciality of the tasks for cycle progress, the 
monotony or variety of tasks, the permanency of the roles and the 
shifts on which these are carried out, are all factors which 
contribute to the "stress pattern"." E.E. Trist, G.W. Higgin, 
H. Murray, A.B. Pollock: ibid. p. 23. 
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Railway construction in Queensland never reached the magnitude of 
7 2 
that in England, though it did provide employment, in numbers that 
were siibstantial by colonial standards, and for long periods of time. 
Section 4 of the North Coast Railway from Cooran to Yandlna, for 
example, a very heavy piece of work. Involving many cuttings deep in the 
Blackall Range, required the shipping of all the necessary material by 
sea from Brisbane to Maryborough and thence by rail to Cooran, and the 
establishment of the main camp for the offices and "staff" residences 
at Mount Eerwah for a period of "twelve months.-^-^ Work for the New South 
Wales Railway Department on the No. 2 Section - Mullumblmby to 
Murwillumbah - of the Lismore to the Tweed railway, undertaken by the 
same contractor, took 30 months and employed a daily average of 2,000 
men.-^ "^  
"Much of the glory [of railway construction] went to the engineers-^^ 
12. "In 1845 there were 200,000 men working on about 3,000 miles of new 
line. In the eighty years from 1822 onwards, millions of na-wies 
made 20,000 miles of railways in Britain, and thousands of miles 
more in Europe and the rest of the world." Terry Coleman: The 
Railway Navvies. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, revised 
edition, 1968, p. 20. 
13. George Henderson: Reminiscences of Railway Construction and Public 
Works, carried out in South Africa and Australia from 1882 to 1916 -
George Charles Willcocks - his Contracts and Work in Queensland, 1885-
1916. Brisbane, Xeroxed manuscript, 1920. (In possession of the 
Historical Society of Queensland) pp. 27-28. Henderson appears to 
have been Willcocks' personal assistant and managed many of his 
construction contracts for his employer. 
14. "Na-wies arrived at Murwillumbah from all parts - North, South, 
East and West. What a conglomeration of men, horses and bullocks -
I never saw before anywhere." ibid. , p. 31. 
15. Cf. Jacqueline Bell: "Robert Ballard, an Early Queensland Railway 
Engineer", Queensland Heritage, Vol. 1, No. 10, May, 1969, pp. 3-9. 
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and much of the profit to the enterpreneurs."-^^ One such person was 
George Charles Willcocks ,-^ 7 ^ ^o was finishing a railway construction 
job in South Africa, for Messrs. Peto and Brassey, the English 
contractors, when he learned that the Queensland Government had applied 
to London for a £10 million loan to build railways and other public 
works. Sensing that this could provide the right opportunities for a 
man of his experience, he took his family to Queensland, arriving on 
November 5th, 1885. Almost Immediately he won his first railway 
contract, Gympie to Cooran, on which 1,000 men were employed, and from 
that time until his death in 1916, Willcocks won and completed contracts 
to a total value of £2,623,000, the majority of which were for railway 
construction.-^^ 
Yet, while the railway era brought reputation and wealth to 
contractors and engineers, it was based, in fact, upon the nav-vy.-^ ^ 
Without him there would have been no railway age. "Never to be 
confused with the rabble of steady, common labourers, whom they out-
worked, out-drank, out-rioted and despised,"^ '^  the navvies were the 
16. Terry Coleman: op.cit., p. 20. 
17. George Henderson: op.cit. 
18. Willcocks also invested heavily, and, it would seem, profitably in 
Queensland mining. In addition to part ownership in the O.K. Copper 
Mine in North Queensland, he was "interested, more or less, in 15 
Tin mines, 40 Gold mines, 25 Copper mines, 2 Coal mines, 1 Silver 
mine, 4 gold dredging properties, 1 gold mining concession and 16 
investments, comprising Banks, Breweries, Sawmills and other 
properties, all requiring attention in a more or less degree, at 
least quite sufficient to keep our eyes skinned all the time." 
George Henderson: ibid., p. 40. 
19. "The word na-wy itself comes from navigator. This was the name given 
to the canal builders of the eighteenth centiory and was inherited by 
the railway men." Terry Coleman: op.cit. p. 26. Cf. Michael 
Robbins: op.cit., pp. 68-71. 
20. Terry Coleman: op.cit., p. 25. 
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specialists in excavating and tunnelling, in blasting and in bridge 
building, distinguished by their distinctive and colourful dress and 
their gargantuan appetites for food and drink. •^•^  
Considerable numbers of these men were brought from the United 
Kingdom in the early days of railway building in Australia, to be joined 
by indigenous labour. Much of the pattern of their lives in England 
was reproduced in Queensland; the drunkenness, rioting, the working and 
living together in emcampments by the line, and the movement from one 
length of construction to the next. A good deal of this life style was 
caused, as in England, by the harsh and terrible conditions under which 
they lived and worked. 
Although by comparison with that of the Northern hemisphere the 
Queensland climate may have appeared mild, the sub-tropical and tropical 
zones produced their own particular hazards and difficulties. The 
regular summer "wet seasons" brought constant hea-vy rain. Often the 
camps were cut off by flooding for several weeks, and the men with no 
fresh rations available, lived on salt pork and damper. George 
Henderson described such a period in these words: 
"About this time the wet season was at hand. For fully a week 
it rained incessantly. Floods everywhere, which means a rotten 
time in the bush. No work being done. Just then we got news 
of a great washaway having taken place on Smith and Timms' 
section, just beyond Gloucester. The whole side of a mountain 
slipped into the river carrying everything with i t , including 
bridges, culverts, rails etc."^^ 
21. Possibly because they were fewer in number and their camps and work 
were frequently far from centres of population, the social customs 
of the navvies in Queensland did not impinge on the community at 
large to the extent that they did in England. 
22. George Henderson: op.oit., p. 61. 
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Having tunnelled their way through the Great Dividing Range, the 
wide, flat, treeless western plains, while making for easier construction 
gave no relief to the navvies from the climate. The gidgee flies crept 
into their eyes, mouths and nostrils in thousands, and the bitterly cold 
winds of winter gave way, all too soon, to the dust and heat of a 
Queensland summer, when shade temperatures of 120° were not unknown on 
these plains. 
"Sandy blight and bung eyes were the order of the day... all 
the time, too, the water was bad, also scarce and brackish. 
It was obtained by sinking into the bed of the creek ... So 
great was the heat the men platelayers with hard hands like 
horns, they could not (from eleven in the forenoon until three 
in the afternoon) handle the steel rails which felt just red 
hot. It became so bad, the works had to be stopped for three 
months, until the cooler weather came around."^-^ 
Two men went mad from heat and over-drinking while this sixty mile 
section from Charleville to Wyandra was being constructed. 
It must be remembered that these railways were built with nothing 
except picks, shovels, barrows and gelignite, and the sweat and strained 
muscles of thousands of men.24 Accidents were common, serious Injury 
and death frequent.25 Yet the worst problem of all was that of excessive 
23. ibid. , pp. 37-38. "I often said none of us were ever nearer to 
purgatory." 
24. As an example of what was accomplished with picks and shovels, on 
the 53 mile stretch from Dungog to Gloucester, 1,250,000 ciibic 
yards of earth work had to be shifted, fully 10,000 casks of cement 
were required and 24,000 feet of piling of all sizes. To construct 
a large tunnel, 64,200 cubic yards of rock had to be removed, 18,000 
casks of cement required, 600 tons of blasting powder, 200 tons of 
gelignite and some 50,000 detonators." ibid., p. 58. 
25. "D\iring the building of the various tunnels there were many 
accidents, several deaths. The contractors had a hospital - really 
three four-room cottages - in charge of Dr. Hector MacDonald and 
two wardsmen. The hospital was more or less always full of patients 
from result of accident or sickness." ibid., p. 36. 
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drinking and of the "sly grog" shops or "sheebeens" which sprang up 
wherever a permanent camp was sited. While loneliness, and the 
isolation of the railway camps, together with the monotony and 
harshness of their life and work were, no do\±it, sufficient cause for 
drunkenness, a bad situation was made worse by those who sold the 
liquor to the men, preying on them until every shilling of their wages 
had been spent. Then, 
"the day following pay day - Sunday morning - the usual thing 
was to see the men lying about all over the place suffering a 
recovery from the night before. During Sunday, which was 
always a wild day, the men continued to fight amongst 
themselves - all day and right away until dark. In fact, I 
have seen them, many a time, fighting by candlelight. It was 
no use trying to stop them, even the policeman could do nothing. 
There was nothing else for it but to let them fight until they 
could fight no more. This occurred every pay day each month. 
Truly it was awful."^^ 
The wages which drained away so quickly down the throats on Saturday 
nights were, in some cases, substantial for those days, although the 
amount varied considerably. Much of the work was done as piece work 
and "some men made good money, some making as much as £25 per month, 
while others handling the same stuff under the same conditions could 
not make £10 and many not even £8 per month,"27 The general wage rate. 
26. ibid., p. 28. Henderson also mentions that sometimes the beer had 
too much arsenic in it. Before the days of refrigeration, it was 
a commonly held belief in northern and western Queensland that the 
brewers placed arsenic in the beer, in summer, as a preservative 
and that this produced "fighting" beer. The writer has never been 
able to prove whether this was myth or reality. 
27. ibid. , p. 48. 
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however, was from 6/- to II- per day^^ which meant that the majority 
of construction workers, particularly the labourers were not well paid. 
It would seem appropriate to record a final word about the railway 
construction worker, his life and working conditions from William 
Morrow,29 who was one of the early and outstanding leaders of the A.R.U. 
in North Queensland. Although the quotation is lengthy, it seems 
desirable to allow Morrow's words to stand unaltered for they provide 
a vivid picture of the conditions under which men were forced to work 
in constructing the railway system of the State. 
28. W. Morrow confirms the heavy drinking of the construction workers 
and says, "The sly grog shops were terrible things because they used 
to dilute the whiskey and rum, putting tobacco in the rum and arsenic 
in the whiskey. Well, -the men would drink this stuff and it would 
send them mental. Now most of the engineers, though not all, 
encouraged the men to drink because if they didn't have them always 
broke they couldn't keep them there, because they were only 
getting 6/- a day for all -this hard work." Interview with W. 
Morrow. 
29. W. Morrow worked on the construction of the Chlllagoe railway, the 
Mareeba to Atherton line and the Herberton line; then became a 
guard-shunter on the Chlllagoe railway, a fireman, and finally an 
engine driver in charge of the locomotive used on railway 
construction. About 1908 in Chlllagoe, with several others he 
started "a little union of oiir own for the railway men." This 
eventually became part of the Amalgamated Workers' Association 
(A.W.A.) and in turn, the A.W.A. amalgamated with the A.W.U. 
Leaving the A.W.U. Morrow, in time, became Secretary of the Charters 
Towers branch of the Queensland Railways Union (Q.R.U.), then 
Chairman of the Northern District Committee of the A.R.U. at the 
time George Rymer was its Secretary. When Rymer was transferred to 
Brisbane as Assistant State Secretary (shortly thereafter to become 
State President) Morrow became Secretary of the Northern Division. 
He later moved to Tasmania where he was State Secretary of the 
A.R.U. for ten years, ultimately representing that State in the 
Senate from 1/7/47 to 19/3/51 and from 28/4/51 to 30/6/53. Though 
he had previously won top position in -the A.L.P. team, he lost the 
party endorsement in 1953, stood as an independent and was narrowly 
defeated. 
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"J came from an old railway family. My father held up the 
first sleeper in Queensland. That was on the Ipswich to 
Grandchester line. He then continued his career in the railways 
and we all followed him. There were six brothers and five of us 
were engine drivers. I went to work when I was very young, 
about ten years of age, as a nipper in the lifting gang, i.e. 
lifting the rails. I carried water for the men to drink and 
boiled their billies. At 16 I was a man, because I'd been 
mixing with them all the time, and I was in charge then of 
straightening the rails, after the lifting gang had finished 
with i t , to make it straight for the train. 
Well, the conditions we lived under were very primitive. 
They used to build half a mile of railway a day, lay it down -
what they call plate-laying - and the lifting gang would come 
along behind. Every fortnight we'd shift our camps. They 
consisted of tents, no boarding houses. We had to cook all 
our own meals and I, at ten, used to cook mine. Our main diet 
was corned beef, bread and golden syrup, potatoes, tea and 
sugar. We'd hang our food up in a bag under the tent. You'd 
come home some nights and find your tent flattened by a "willie-
willie" - and millions of ants. You couldn't have butter 
because it was too hot, it used to melt. 
The men had to walk from the first morning they shifted 
their camp at the head of the road (i.e. the head of the line 
where it was built to). They'd build half a mile. Then they'd 
walk half a mile home, and next morning they'd walk half a mile 
to work and that night they'd walk a mile home. They'd repeat 
that operation walking an extra half a mile home at night until 
they got up to six miles. As a result, we had to get up very 
early in the morning - we worked 48 hours a week then - and 
every fortnight you'd shift and when you'd shift your camp 
you'd build your camp on the Saturday afternoon, and Sunday 
you'd clean things up. 
The navvy was the man who was most looked down upon and yet, 
I think he was the most important man who ever came to Queensland. 
He was the most loyal of men, but he had no association with 
women, no association with the outside world, and the monotony 
of the job was such and conditions were so very very bad, that 
he drank a lot."^^ 
U n t i l the advent of a Labor government, a l l r a i lway c o n s t r u c t i o n 
was done by p r i v a t e c o n t r a c t , and in the e a r l y days the c o n t r a c t o r s had 
30. W. Morrow, In t e rv iew with the w r i t e r . 
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little difficulty in keeping "labour agitators" at bay.^ -^  By 1909 
when Henderson was describing the situation in New South Wales on the 
Dungog-Gloucester section for which Willcocks had the contract, he had 
a different story to report, of labour scarcity pushing up the daily 
rate to 8/- per day, and of the men becoming very Independent. "The 
Trades Hall representatives were never off the works, all the time 
stirring up strife and dissatisfaction. With N.S.W. now under a Labour 
Parliament, the men seemed to get it into their heads they could work 
just as they liked, and were more or less fractions (sic) all the 
time. "-^ 2 
It was men like Morrow -^  who were doing the sort of organising 
among the workers which upset George Henderson so much, and the 
organisations they helped to create, like the A.W.A. and the northern 
division of the Q.R.U. were militant organisations because "the people 
were in revolt against these conditions which had lasted so 
31. Cf. George Henderson: op.cit., p. 49, for an account of how 
Willcocks dealt with an incipient strike. 
32. George Henderson: op.cit., p. 60. Ultimately, the N.S.W. 
government bought out the contractors working on this line, 
including Willcocks, and finished the work itself with day labour. 
33. There were some recorded by Henderson who were to become the 
leaders of the A.L.P., both federally and in Queensland, e.g. 
"When I first met Andrew Fisher (later Queensland M.L.A. for Gympie 
and M.H.R. for Wide Bay and s\ibsequently Commonwealth Prime Minister) 
he came from Gympie to work as a na-wy, from the No. 4 North 
Phoenix Gold Mine and was camped nearby the Main Camp at Six Mile 
Creek." ibid., p. 26. Also "while overseeing Mr. Willcocks' 
contract for the Mt. Garnet railway in North Queensland, I met 
Mr. Edward G. Theodore, also Mr. Wm. McCormack. ... They in time 
became members of Parliament, and later on one after the other 
became Premier of the State of Queensland." ibid., p. 44. 
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long."-^ ^ This militancy among the rank and file led them to support 
leaders who believed in direct action, not only as a means of alleviating 
present conditions, but as a political philosophy in itself. Consequently, 
these hard and difficult working conditions provided the situational 
setting within which a functional, cohesive relationship was able to 
develop between what Rymer called "the intelligent minority" and the 
mass of the workers. 
When one looks at the permanent railway employees, those engaged 
in operation and maintenance, one finds, in some Instances, that their 
conditions were little better than those of the navvies. This applied, 
in particular, to the gangers and fettlers of the "permanent way" 
branch. 
For many of them, their jobs, too, were of an unskilled or semi-
skilled nature. They worked in isolated areas, far from the comforts 
and companionship of the settlements and towns, and lived in canvas 
or bag tents or galvanised iron huts. If they were married, their 
wives and families had to live under the same conditions, and schooling 
for their children was an ever present problem.-^ ^ 
34. W. Morrow in interview with the writer. Cf. G.C. Bolton: op.cit., 
p. 292, where he suggests "that hours and conditions, rather than 
wages, were the cause of most discontent". Cf. David B. Truman: 
op.cit.. Chapter 7. 
35. It needs to be remembered that the three major railway systems 
of Queensland, the northern, central and south western, once they 
had crossed the Dividing Range, traversed hundreds of miles of 
sparsely settled country. 
36. "The fettlers and gangers were compelled to eke out a black 
fellow's existence on the isolated railway tracks of this great 
State, without even a semblance of the human habitation and 
educational facilities boasted of in this land of democracy." The 
Advocate, October 10th, 1921, p. 27. 
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At the turn of the century, men in the traffic and maintenance 
sections were working a 54 hour week, while tradesmen worked 48 hours.-^ 7 
At that time, a maintenance Inspector on the line earned £250 per annum, 
a sub-inspector 10/- per day, a ganger 8/- per day and a labourer 6/5 
per day.-^ ^ When, later, the Railway Department began periodic economy 
drives, it was the maintenance section which appeared to be singled out 
first for attack, by reducing the strength of gangs and increasing the 
mileage of lengths.-^ ^ At the same time, because of great fluctuations 
in traffic, over a year, particularly on the Northern line, the men 
worked periods of excessive overtime, followed by long intervals of 
short time, or even "laying off" . "^"^  
In July, 1919, the Q.R.U. circularised all A.L.P. members on this 
question of "the abominable and disgusting conditions of habitation 
imposed upon and tolerated by the hardest worked railway employees and 
their families."'*-^  The Department responded grudgingly, stating that, 
as far as possible, it was the practice to place single men at all the 
37. Ernie Sampson in interview with the writer. He remembers this as 
a time when men were still expected to touch their caps to their 
"superiors" on the job. 
38. George Phillips: "Pioneer Railways for Queensland", op.cit., p. 51. 
39. The Daily Standard, September 16th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in The 
Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 6, 1966, p.2. 
40. Appendix 2. Annual Report of the Northern Division, Report of the 
Commissioner for Railways, year ended 30th June, 1921. 
41. The Advocate, October 10th, 1921, p. 27. "The squatters and other 
employers of labour are rightly compelled by the provisions of 
the Workers' Accommodation Act to provide suitable barracks and 
quarters for their employees, but repeated requests for the 
Government's own employees to be extended the benefit of that Act 
have been received with that "which availeth nothing". 
IS 
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elated points,"^ ^ though it slowly'^ -^  began to erect cottages in 
unsettled districts for maintenance men. "The cottages were cut out 
in the maintenance workshops at Townsville, ready for erection, and 
fettlers charged 7% on capital cost by way of rental.""^^ 
In the course of discussions between the A.R.U. and the 
Department in connection with accommodation problems of the fettlers 
and other railway workers in isolated districts, the matter of 
educational facilities for their children was also raised. Union 
representatives also met the Minister for Education and suggested the 
appointment of itinerant teachers to cater for lengthsmen's 
children, but a shortage of teachers at the time was said to make 
this impossible. "^5 The Department continued to be tardy in 
Improving living conditions for maintenance men, and thirty years 
later (1949), was still housing those of its employees who were 
living away from home, in tents (though these now had floorboards 
provided) and in bondwood huts, 12' by 10', to accommodate two men. 
In its generosity, it was issuing meat safes to flying gangs in the 
proportion of one safe for each twelve men.^^ 
42. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for year ended June 30th, 
1920. 
43. For example, it erected five such cottages in the 1920-21 period. 
As the Department itself admitted, "the existence of such 
cottages enables transfers to be more readily effected." ibid.. 
Appendix 2. Northern Division Report. 
44. ibid. 
45. The Daily Standard, September 23rd, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in 
The Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 8, 1966, p. 2. 
46. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for year ended June 30th, 
1949. 
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Though the engine driver was considered by all in the service to be 
the aristocrat of the industry - he was better paid and had a higher 
status - both he and his fireman also worked under the most trying and 
arduous of conditions. Most of the work of the traffic section is done 
47 
by shift"*' and the footplate men and train crews had the added 
disadvantage of spending much of their working life away from their 
homes and families.'^^ 
"In the days of steam, almost every railway job was physically 
exhausting. Firing a main-line locomotive was generally accepted to be 
the most laborious of all railway jobs. On a long trip or in high 
winds, as much as six tons of coal would be shovelled into the locomotive 
firebox. ""^ ^ What is more it was a highly dangerous job, working in the 
confined space of the cab, and keeping one's feet on a moving platform 
which might be travelling at anything up to sixty miles per hour. 
47. "Shift work makes the domestic life totally chaotic. A man has to 
try to sleep two or three hours in the afternoon, he wonders when 
he goes to bed at seven o'clock at night if he can possibly get up 
again at three o'clock in the morning." The Life of a Railwayman, 
Frank McKenna talks to Michael Dean. The Listener, December 3rd, 
1970, p. 777. 
48. "In the old days the railwayman had no fixed shifts at all. He 
went out with his train, at whatever hoiir he was called, and came 
back home when -the train returned to its depot. Men do not work 
such long hours today though I have known railwaymen having to 
work sixty, seventy or eighty hours a week during bad weather, 
especially on freight trains." Frank McKenna: A Glossary of 
Railwaymen's Talk. History Workshop Booklet No. 1., Ruskin 
College, Oxford, 1970, p. 6. 
49. ibid. , p. 9. "Firing a steam engine demanded peak physical fitness 
and perfect eyesight. The moment a fireman stepped into the cab 
of the train he began a day of muscle-racking arduous labour." 
McKenna also tells of some exceptionally hea-vy engines of between 
130-150 tons which were called "The Birth Control Locomotives" 
because the effort of firing them was so great that men were made 
impotent for weeks at a time. The Listener, op.oit., p. 778. 
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Except for the clerical and supervisory staff, all jobs in the 
railway service were hard, tiring and dirty, whether in the workshops, 
on the tracks, in the cab or, worst of all, cleaning the engines.-^ "^  
For many it was also monotonous, and though, in theory, it was possible 
to rise through the ranks to the top, in practice this was unlikely to 
happen, particularly if one worked in the locomotive, permanent way or 
maintenance sections. Lad porters, trainee enginemen and all unskilled 
or semi-skilled grades were recruited from the top grades of primary 
school. Specific in-service training allowed them to qualify for 
advancement, though promotion was slow, due to the large number of 
classified positions, each with a narrow salary band, and consequently, 
of appeals. 
The question of morale, therefore, has to be taken into account 
along with the physical conditions of work, as creating a total climate 
within which industrial relations develop.^ -^  Nor, in the case of the 
railways, is morale improved by technological change, unless there is 
close cooperation between Department and unions and a concerted effort 
made to explain the extent of likely redundancy to the men, and plans 
devised to mitigate its worst effects. 
50. Dieselization has considerably improved the situation. 
51. Cf. R.T. Martin & T.C. Murray: "Morale Among Railway Workers", 
Personnel Practice Bulletin, Vol. XIV, No. 3, September, 1958. in 
this study it was found that while approximately half the 
respondent railwaymen were satisfied with the intrinsic nature of 
the work they performed, only 22.3% were satisfied with the physical 
conditions of their work. On the question of morale and the 
meaning of work, see also ed. Ronald Eraser: Work. Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1968 and ed. Ronald Eraser: Work 2, 
Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1969. 
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While to the layman, the dangers which appear to be Inherent in 
flying and the stress and tension which these may generate52 would seem 
to be the crucial factors in an assessment of the working conditions of 
pilots, it must be assumed that the pilots themselves would not agree.-5-^  
Because they enjoy flying pilots do not consider their profession a 
more dangerous one than most. This does not mean however that they are 
not safety conscious, and. Indeed, there is a high degree of industry 
cooperation on this question. The Department of Civil Aviation, by 
laying down and policing strict safety standards has assisted in 
minimizing the dangers of flying, as have technological advances in 
aircraft construction and in methods of air and groimd control. 
Pilots would probably rate danger secondary to the discomforts and 
hardship of shift work and unstable rosterlng. Like the railway engine 
52. "A pilot is a control-system operator, albeit sophisticated, who is 
special because of his constant exposure to danger and because of 
his high responsibility for the safety of expensive equipment and 
the lives of others. The pilot is occasionally reminded of this 
profound responsibility by accidents to either himself or others, 
though how often he is aware of this when flying is unknown. He 
knows that an accident can be caused at any time by failure on his 
part to carry out his task appropriately as well as by factors 
beyond his control." R.C.B. Aitken: "Prevalence of Worry in Normal 
Aircrew", The British Journal of Medical Psychology, Vol. 42, 1969, 
p. 285. For their own assessment of themselves, Cf. "The desirable 
features of a pilot as noted by the A.F.A.P. in its s\ibmission in 
1958 - 'character, courage, self-discipline, responsibility, physical 
and mental fitness, unremitting care in watching instruments, 
quickness, calm and ability to control emotions and capacity to 
handle a crisis. On the pilot's possession and exercise of these 
qualities and on his overall integrity, depend not merely the 
efficient functioning of the airline services but the safe return 
to earth of extraordinarily costly modern planes and their priceless 
cargo of human lives.'" Isaac Report, op.oit., p. 26. 
53. "Pilots have selected the occupation of flying with some idea of 
its attendant risks, and no doubt their choice of career is 
determined by certain personality traits. They experience a 
particular enjoyment in the thrills of flying and their tolerance 
of physical discomfort and frustration has often to be high." 
R.C.B. Aitken: ibid. 
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crews, they spend much of their working life in shift work, and away 
from their home port and their families. "Rosters rule both the working 
and private lives of the crew, and instability in rosters has far-
reaching effects on themselves, their wives and their families. The 
effect on the family was noted as a serious source of stress."^"^ 
While pilots still fly outside normal working hours, much of the 
instability of the rosterlng system and, consequently, its social and 
psychological by-products have been removed by the introduction of the 
North American bidding system in 1967.-55 of greatest benefit to the 
senior pilots, it has meant however, that the majority, by bidding for 
their "block" a month in advance, can now plan their private and social 
lives with a degree of certainty which was absent in the past. 
As Corklndale has pointed out,56 all flight crew are likely, at 
some time, to be subjected to one or more of the following types of 
stress situation which may lead to a reduction in their efficiency: 
dangerous duty stress, where there is a constant threat of exposure to 
a dangerous situation and the possible danger due to equipment failure 
54. Human Engineering Technical Memorandum 8. Air-Crew Fatigue in 
International Jet Transport Operations. A Report to the Director-
General of Civil Aviation, April, 1965. Melbourne Aeronautical 
Research Laboratories, Australian Defence Scientific Service, 
Department of Supply, p. 62. "As a factor inducing pilot fatigue, 
the effect of roster instability, though indirect, appears important 
as it undoubtedly contributes substantially to the general stresses 
and strains of a pilot's occupation and may be expected to reduce 
his tolerance of the factors which have a more direct effect on 
fatigue." ibid., p. 26. 
55. Cf. supra, pp.121-124. 
56. K.G. Corklndale: "The Effect of Environmental Stress on Performance" 
ed. J.A. Gillies: A Textbook of Aviation Physiology. Pergamon 
Press, London, 1965. 
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or human error; confinement or isolation stress, arising from physical 
confinement in a small cockpit, and involving sensory deprivation, among 
other things; biological stress, resulting from the long-term effects of 
sleeplessness, etc.57 pilots themselves testify to the tenseness which 
arises from delays caused by bad weather or mechanical break-downs which 
frequently force them to spend frustrating hours waiting at airports 
for take-off. 
Overseas pilots continue to face difficulties arising from their 
working conditions which do not apply within the domestic airline 
Industry. Fatigue amongst Qantas pilots has remained high and even 
Increased with the introduction of pure jet aircraft on international 
routes.5^ A research study commissioned by the Director-General of Civil 
Aviation in 1955 found that the major cause of excessive fatigue in 
Qantas pilots was circadian dysrhythmia, i.e. disturbance of the 
clrcadlan rhythm,59 arising from rapid change of environment and 
alteration in their normal time schedule. In the case of the Qantas 
pilots the condition was intensified by the high percentage of late 
afternoon and evening departures (50% after 18.00 hours), night flying, 
57. ibid. pp. 1061-62. 
58. Air Crew Fatigue in International Jet Transport Operations, op.cit., 
p. 4. "Revised schedules, shorter trips, high altitudes, altered 
cabin environment, rapid traversing of time zones, and high 
utilisation of aircraft, together with a substantial and continuing 
rise in passenger traffic, have combined to bring about a very 
great change in the working conditions of aircrew." 
59. Circadian rhythm is the term in current use to describe 
physiological functions having a cyclic variation with a periodicity 
of about 24 hours. For the effects of circadian dysrhythmia on 
international jet passengers also, see the National Times, March 
1st to 6th, 1971, p. 15. 
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particularly in the early hours of the morning (59% of hours were at 
night), and morning arrivals after night work, requiring day sleep and 
a temporary reversal of the light-dark cycles. ^"^  
"The almost universal practice of "unwinding" after a trip and the 
frequency with which difficulty in sleeping when tired was reported, 
suggest that the degree of tension and anxiety among crew members is 
higher than would be expected among other occupational groups."^-^ Other 
physical factors conducive to fatigue were found to be frequent exposure 
in the cabin to low humidity and low barometric pressure which induced 
tiredness and Irritability. At the same time the tension among flight 
crew on take-off and landing was thought to contribute to stress. 
Finally, the fatigue study suggested that the stress situation 
caused by the abovementloned factors was heightened by management/pilot 
tension, some of which arose from the difference in "image" of the 
pilots as seen by management and as seen by the pilots themselves. "The 
pilots see flying as a profession for which they are paid professional 
salaries, while management inclines to the view that flying is a skilled 
technical job, with a high pay loading sufficient to compensate for any 
disagreeable working conditions - a loading similar perhaps to "penalty 
rates" in other occupations. 
Many of these conditions can be and have been ameliorated by stable 
rosterlng, staging of crews at places and under conditions which vjill 
60. Air Crew Fatigue in International Jet Transport Operations, 
op.cit., p. 52. 
61. ibid., p. 59. 
62. ibid., p. 63. 
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lessen the "time lag" effects, and the time-tabling of overseas flights 
to minimize night flying, though, here, passenger convenience will take 
precedence over that of the pilots, because of the highly competitive 
nature of the International airline industry. 
Sufficient evidence has been presented to support the contention 
that pilots and railwaymen in general, share the common ground of 
"stress patterns" in their work, the result of pursuing their occupations 
under conditions of danger, discomfort, fatigue and tension. 
It cannot be said that these sorts of conditions, in themselves, 
are a cause of militancy in the workers who must submit to them. What 
is of Importance is that they create an environmental climate in which 
other causal factors, under study in this thesis, can be brought to 
bear and operate more freely towards militancy; while at the same time 
they provide a basis for the development of a leader/rank and file 
relationship which is also essential if direct action is to have any 
hope of success. 
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I 
THE IDEAS, BELIEFS AND VALUE JUDGMENTS OF THE DECISION 
MAKERS IN UNION AND IN MANAGEMENT, AND IN THE COMI^UNITY 
AND IN THE INDUSTRY IN WHICH THE PARTIES OPERATE-? 
Tim Moroney was born at Nundah, Brisbane, on the fifteenth of 
November, 1890. He joined the railway service as a lad porter in June, 
1906 but it was soon apparent that involvement in the trade union 
movement and in the politics of his own union, the Q.R.E.A., was of more 
importance to him than preferment in his job situation. At the age of 
twenty-two, he took an active part in the General Strike, and by 1918 
had been chosen General State Secretary of the Q.R.U., a position he 
was to hold until his death, in office, in September, 1944. He was 
Queensland delegate to the inaugural conference for the establishment 
of the Australian Railways' Union in 1920 and was subsequently Federal 
President of that body (1935-44).2 
Over six feet tall, Moroney was a "big" man in every sense, with 
strong features and an acute mind. A vigorous speaker and writer, 
whether at mass meetings, as industrial advocate, or within the pages 
of The Advocate, he possessed a great deal of personal charm and an 
easy capacity to be "one of the boys".-^  A practising Catholic, he was 
active in the work of his Church and its auxiliary organisations.'^ 
1. J.T. Dunlop: op.cit., pp. 386-7. 
2. Biographical details taken from The Advocate, September 15th, 1944. 
3. The writer's personal impressions gained from photographs, speeches 
and writings and from the views of Moroney's colleagues and friends. 
4. He was buried from St. Stephen's Roman Catholic Cathedral, with a 
Solemn Requiem Mass, presided over by Archbishop Diihig who preached 
the panegyric. 
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The source of his personal philosophies and political commitment 
is not directly traceable at this point of time, but it must be 
remembered that at an early and impressionable age, he joined and 
actively participated in the affairs of a union which had been established 
and carried forward on the principle of industrial unionism. To this 
must be added the results of extensive reading and self education. The 
bookshelves in the A,R,U, office in the Trades Hall, Brisbane, still 
bear witness to this. They are all there - the "classic" authors of 
socialism - Marx and Engels, Kautsky and Kropotkln, Lafarge, Jack 
London, George and Bellamy and many others, all heavily annotated in 
Moroney's distinctive handwriting and with his name on the fly leaves. 
It must also be assumed that Moroney was aware of the situation 
within the railway industry in the United Kingdom where, by 1913, 
industrial unionism had progressed dramatically with the amalgamation 
of three major railway unions into the National Union of Railwaymen; a 
situation finally brought about by the "shining example of united action 
which was given by union leaders and eagerly followed by their rank and 
file in the national railway strike of 1911."^ 
Syndicalist influence was an Important factor in this movement for 
union amalgamation. Tom Mann, through his journal The Industrial 
5. It would have been unusual had the leaders of the laboior movement 
at this time possessed a high level of formal education. What is 
striking is the extent of their reading and self education. Frank 
Nolan, for example, left school at thirteen and yet the breadth and 
depth of his reading would surpass that of many "educated" men. Cf. 
H.V. Evatt: Australian Labour Leader. The Story of W.A. Holman 
and the Labour Movement. Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1954. 
6. Philip S. Bagwell? op.cit., p. 325. 
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Syndicalist, expounded an amalgam of the ideas of the Industrial 
Workers of the World (I.W.W.) and the French syndicalists, which 
combined an emphasis on the necessity for one big union in each industry 
with a demand for direct Industrial action and workers' control. Many 
railwaymen were receptive to these ideas and "whilst it would be a 
mistake to over-emphasize the importance of the spread of syndicalism 
as an Influence in the consolidation of railway trade unionism [in the 
United Kingdom], it would be just as much a mistake not to take it into 
account as a doctrine fervently held by a minority of active and 
Influential members of the A.S.R.S. and N.U.R."7 
In that he was a native-born Australian, Moroney was one of the 
exceptions to the statement that the leading advocates of the One Big 
Union (O.B.U.) in Australia were emigrants from the British Isles.5 
George Rymer, however, came within this category. He had been a railway 
wagon builder in Birmingham, England, and a member of the Vehicle 
Builders' Union before emigrating to Townsville in 1914. Obtaining a 
7. ibid. , p. 327. 
8. Ian Bedford: "The One Big Union, 1918-1923". Ian Bedford & Ross 
Curnow: Initiative and Organisation. Sydney studies in Politics, 
No. 3, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1963, p. 37. 
With reference to the impact of migrants in the early labour 
movement Louis Hartz' work on cultural fragmentation is of interest. 
The Founding of New Societies. Harcourt Brace, New York, 1964. He 
suggests that beliefs transplanted from Europe, no matter of what 
kind, freeze into immobility in the new environment. John Power 
has advocated that this thesis be used as a basis for reappraisal 
of men like William Morris Hughes, viz. "The Egalitarian Tory", 
Quadrant, No. 33, Vol. ix. No. 1, pp. 68-71. 
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job in the railway workshops there, he Immediately plunged into union 
activity^ and was chosen as Secretary of the Northern District Committee 
in 1917. Three years later he transferred to Brisbane as Assistant 
General State Secretary and the following year became the first full-
time paid President of the A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch). 
The other Important personality within the union has been Moroney's 
protege and successor, Frank Nolan. Though born at Wellshot, Central 
Queensland, he grew up in Rockhampton and worked there for many years 
in the railway service. He joined the Department as an apprentice clerk in 
1912 and the Q.R.U. in November, 1914. Active in the affairs of the 
Central District Committee as Treasurer and Chairman, and in the 1925 and 
1927 railway strikes, he was in the latter year, elected to the Council 
of the A.R.U. on a state-wide ballot, as clerical representative, and 
served continuously thereafter on that body, with the exception of one 
year (1935) when ill-health prevented his candidature. 
In 1928, he opposed the sitting M.L.A. for Rockhampton, George 
Pritchard Farrell in a pre-selection plebiscite and lost.-?*^  Although 
9. Rymer was workshop delegate on the Nor-thern District Committee and 
representative of the northern workshops to the "Dirt Money" Royal 
Commission in 1917. 
10. "When the numbers went up, Mr. Farrell was declared the victor and 
it is too long ago to make any comment on the manner in which the 
plebiscite was conducted, suffice to say that the seat was lost to 
Labour at the election which followed in 1929." F.G. Nolan: Report 
of the 24th State Conference of the A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch), October 
27th, 1966, p. 32. Farrell lost his seat to an Independent, Thomas 
Alberto Dunlop in 1929. The 1932 elections which returned Labour 
to office brought Rockhampton back to the A.L.P. in the person of 
James Larcombe, later to become Assistant Minister for Transport, 
Feb.-Aug., 1939 and Minister for Transport, August 1939 - April 1944. 
Colin A. Hughes & B.D. Graham: op.cit. 
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other opportunities subsequently presented themselves, he never again 
sought to enter parliament. He made his first overseas trip in 19 30-31, 
to Russia,-^ -^  and moved to Brisbane in 19 35. There he had to begin again 
to obtain an official position in the A.R.U. Nolan was elected Chairman 
of the North Brisbane Branch and went on to become District Treasurer 
and then State Treasurer. On Moroney's death he succeeded him as General 
State Secretary, Editor of The Advocate and arbitration advocate for the 
A.R.U.-^ 2 
Even within the scope of these brief biographies a common 
denominator can be observed; the fact that all looked upon service within 
the union as a career, and spent the major part of their working lives 
as full-time trade union officials. Nolan has said that after being 
classified as chief goods clerk at Mount Morgan in 1922, he sought no 
further promotion in the Railway Department, being more concerned with 
union and Labor politics ,-^-^  while it is also clear that, as young men, 
Moroney and Rymer abandoned possible advancement in the service for 
careers within the union. 
11. As well as his trip to Moscow in 1930 for an R.I.L.U. Conference, 
Nolan's association with the international labour and peace 
movements took him to I.L.O. Conference, Geneva, 1958, A.S.R.S. 
Conference, New Zealand, 1961; Transport Group of the W.F.T.U., 
Budapest, 1961; I.L.O. Asian Conference, Melbourne, 1964; Peace 
and Disarmament Conference, Sydney, 1965 and the Conference re 
French Nuclear Tests in 1966. See Report of the 24th State 
Conference of the A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch), op.oit. 
12. At the time of his retirement in 1970, Nolan held the offices of 
Vice-President, A.R.U. Federal Council; Vice-President Q'ld. Trades 
and Labor Council; Chairman, Combined Railways Unions' Committee; 
Delegate to the Q'ld. Central Executive of the A.L.P. He had 
previously been, on occasion, Q'ld. delegate to the A.C.T.U. and 
to both Federal Executive and Federal Conference of the A.L.P. 
13. Report of the 24th State Conference of the A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch). 
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This "professlonalizatlon" of trade union officials may be 
beneficial to their organisations and membership as, over time, they 
acquire expertise and experience. On the other hand, it can lead to 
bureaucratic Inertia and a tendency to lose touch with the real wishes 
of the members, and with the conditions under which they work, 
particularly if the practical experience of the officials within the 
Industry has Itself been limited and of short duration. 
The most important common factor in the careers of the A.R.U. 
leadership, however, has been their belief in industrial unionism, 
direct industrial action and workers' control of industry. As 
epitomized in the personal philosophy and ideas of Tim Moroney, the 
political, social and industrial were Integrated into and encompassed 
within a whole social philosophy ,-^'^  not unlike the teachings of the 
I.W.W. and of its Chicago "school", which rejected political action 
as a means of changing the condition of the working class.-^ -^  
14. Revolutionary Industrial Unionism, Tactics and Plan of The Workers' 
International Industrial Union. The Literature and Education 
Bureau of the Workers' International Industrial Union, Melbourne, 
1918, p. 4. "Industrial Unionism is not a name for any kind of 
economic organisation of workers; on -the contrary, it is the 
collective designation of a specific kind of workers' organisation, 
with a different philosophy, goal, structure, and tactics than 
any previous union of labor. 'It is other than others'.". 
15. Morrow, Sampson & Rymer see the I.W.W. as merely reinforcing an 
ideal and not as an originator. This is substantially true, as 
evidenced by the history of industrial unionism in the Queensland 
railway service. It is interesting to note that neither Sampson 
nor Rymer believe the teachings of -the I.W.W. to have been 
influential beyond the encouragement for their own efforts from 
the O.B.U. movement in the South. Morrow feels the I.W.W. had a 
great influence, through its songs and good speakers in moving 
the rank and file away from what was purely an anti-boss attitude 
towards a more thoughtful one about the possibilities of industrial 
unionism, socialism etc. 
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Like the I.W.W., Moroney believed that between the working class 
and the employing class "a struggle must go on until the workers of 
the world organise as a class, take possession of the earth and the 
machineiry of production and abolish the wage system."-?^ The foundation 
of his philosophy was recognition of this class struggle, and it was 
his sanguine expectation that this contest was coming to a crisis in 
Queensland in the late 1920's, where "the war upon trade unionism was 
being made by political action and by direct action. The State, as 
such, and its instrumentalities, like arbitration and the machinery 
of employerdom, were all in the fray, for the retention, exercise and 
development of monopolistic privilege and profit."-^ 7 
The successful conclusion of the class struggle in favour of the 
workers would be reached only if "old unionism"-?^ ^ ere to be replaced 
by the new form of Industrial unionism, uniting all workers within each 
industry, regardless of occupation, skill or craft alignment. "Industrial 
unionism regards industry as one comprehensive whole and organises 
16. The Preamble to the Constitution of the Industrial Workers of the 
World, Proceedings of the 1908 I.W.W. Convention, I.W.W. Industrial 
Union Bulletin, November 7th, 1908. Quoted in ed. Joyce L. Kornbluh: 
Rebel Voices, an I.W.W. Anthology. The University of Michigan Press, 
Ann Arbor, 1964, p. 13. 
17. Tim Moroney; "The Crisis in Trade Unionism", The Advocate, September 
21st, 1927, p. 2. 
18. "Old unionism is that kind of organisation by which some workers 
are brought together as a particular craft or trade, for the sole 
purpose of immediate benefit to those workers, and those workers 
alone. They disregard the interests of all others, even of those 
engaged in the same industry, who are likewise organised as crafts 
in separate trade unions, with separate wage contracts with their 
employers, each expiring at a different time making it impossible 
for the various crafts to cooperate in -their struggle against the 
employer for more wages and better working conditions." 
Revolutionary Industrial Unionism, op.cit., p. 8. 
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accordingly, with a view to taking them over and conducting them for 
the use and benefit of all useful producers."-^^ 
Consequently, the A.R.U. leaders actively supported the concept 
of One Big Union (the O.B.U.) as the basis on which would be built the 
socialisation of industry and workers' control, 
"Out of the crisis of the time surely the One Big Union will 
appear. The task at hand is linking up the unions into 
departments under cemented control . . . if, profiting by 
today's lessons we re-kindle the determination to get together 
for workers' control of industry, the actions of the Queensland 
branch of the A.R.U. will be splendidly justified."^0 
Writing in The Militant, the fore-runner of The Advocate, Morrow 
saw workers' control of industry as comprising "the determination of 
the kind and quality of goods produced; determination of the processes 
by which things are made; determination of the workers' pay and, 
finally, of the disposal of the product."2-? Moroney himself argued for 
the establishment of a Supreme Economic Council, along Russian lines,22 
19. ibid. , p. 9. 
20. Tim Moroney: op.cit., p. 3. The attempted establishment of an 
O.B.U. in Australia has already been discussed in Chapter 2, pp. 
87-89. Cf. Ian Turner: op,oit.} Ian Bedford: op.oit.} Irwin Young. 
The N.S.W. One Big Union, 1918-1919. The Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 6, No. 3, November, 1964, pp. 226-237.; ed. E.G. 
Fry. Tom Barker and the I.W.W. The Australian Society for the 
Study of Labour History, Canberra, 1965; Ian Turner: Sydney's 
Burning. Heineman, Melbourne, 1967. 
21. The Militant, October 7th, 1919, p. 6. Cf. Revolutionary Industrial 
Unionism, op.cit., p.16. "The Industrial Unions in the different 
industries are foundations upon which Industrial Democracy is 
building. Through their union the workers are to control and direct 
production in any given shop, industry, industrial department and 
central industrial administration." 
22. Such a scheme was proposed at the Labour-in-Politics Convention, 
Townsville, 1928, but the motion proposing same was lost on the 
'voices'. Brisbane Courier, May 16th, 1928. 
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to control the economic and Industrial sectors, using the industrial 
unions as a foundation. 
It was realised however that the achievement of Industrial Democracy 
in this fashion would not, of itself, produce a completely new social 
order, unless applied "logically and consecutively upward through all 
the grades of Industrial organisation until it reached the culminating 
point of national executive power and direction."2-^ 
It was at this point that the A.R.U. leaders parted company with 
those supporters of I.W.W. principles who conceived of at least a 
partial achievement of their goals, through political action. Moroney 
and his colleagues would have none of this. They agreed that "the 
Labor Party aims, not at a Repiibllc of Labor, but only to reform the 
worst evils of capitalism. This means a bolstering up of capitalism 
for there is no real programme, no solution offered for the ills of 
capitalism by these loud talkers about Democracy.^^^^ It was not 
necessary for trade unionism to have an organised political expression, 
as all that was required for the achievement of workers' control of 
industry was the solidarity of the workers (as represented in the slogan 
"an Injury to one is an injury to all"), their organisation into 
industrial unions and their tactical use of direct industrial action. 
In this way, "a strike conducted by the Industrial Union would no longer 
be an aimless blow, struck in the dark by men who knew not the real 
object of their attack, but an act of intelligent revolt, undertaken by 
23. Revolutionary Industrial Unionism, op.cit., p. 31, 
24. ibid. , p. 15. 
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men who were clearly conscious of the nature and aim of the strife in 
which they were involved, and of the means whereby it is to be brought 
to a successful issue."25 
Thus Moroney rejected the notion that any government in its present 
form was capable, let alone desirous, of changing the capitalist system 
to one which gave control of its own destiny to the working class.26 
As the 1920's progressed, and it became clear that the political tide 
had turned and was running against the A.R.U. Moroney and his colleagues 
directed their fiercest criticism at the A.L.P.27 They saw it as a 
party, not of the workers but of "publicans and the bourgeoisie",25 
whose representatives in Parliament "had settled down to a comfortable 
policy of class collaboration with Labour's enemies, with a view to 
keeping the Party in power, and themselves in place and power above all 
25. ibid., p. 19. 
26. Addressing the State Council of the A.R.U., Moroney said that "he 
was not one of those who believed that it was necessary that they 
should have an Organised Political expression. They had got on 
fairly well wi-thout one during the last four years. However he was 
forced to recognise that his members desired some form of Political 
expression but he thought that it was not in their interests that 
it should take the form of support of the Labour Government ... 
Recent events had demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that 
Parliament as an institution was not necessary either for the 
maintenance of Capitalism or for the attainment of the Socialist 
Objective." The Advocate, April 15th, 1929. 
27. As George Rymer expressed it, "The recent events in the South 
Johnstone and railway trouble must have convinced all workers who 
took the trouble to think for themselves that the time had arrived 
when the Labour Movement should be cleaned up. It was evident that 
Labor politicians were Tories in disguise. They had grown inept 
and were out of touch with the ideals of the movement." Brisbane 
Courier, September 12th, 1927. 
28. George Rymer; Brisbane Courier, May 16th, 1928. Cf. V.G. Childe: 
How Labour Governs, Melbourne Univ. Press, Melbourne, 1964. 
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else."29 By 1929 they were openly working against the return of the 
Labor government at the approaching elections.^^ 
Working class dissatisfaction with the McCormack Labor Government, 
and in particular, with his action of "locking-out" the railwaymen in 
the 1927 South Johnstone dispute, found two possible outlets at this 
time. The most effective was to vote out the Labor ' government at the 
election on May 11th, 1929 and it would seem that a sufficient number 
took this option to bring in a Country-Nationalist government under 
A.E. Moore.-^ -^  A minority. Including Moroney, took the other course -
support for the "Left Wing of the Labor Movement", set up on Communist 
Party initiative, which established local electoral committees in 
support of two communist and three Left Wing candidates which the 
Movement nominated for seats in Brisbane and Townsville.-^2 
29. State Secretary's Report, 18th State Conference, A.R.U. (Q'ld. 
Branch), 1948. As can be seen, Frank Nolan, for virtually the same 
reasons, also fulfilled the role of the A.L.P.'s sternest public 
critic. 
30. "The defeat of McCormack would give the working class in this State 
a chance of re-organising their movement on a better basis than it 
had in the past. As a matter of fact, the defeat of McCormack was 
necessary for that purpose." The Advocate, April 15th, 1929. 
31. Cf. A.A. Morrison: "'Militant' Labour in Queensland, 1912-27", 
Proceedings of the Royal Historical Society (1952-53)i E.M. 
Higgins: Queensland Labor Governments, 1915-29, M.A. Thesis, 
University of Melbourne, 1954; D. Volker: The Australian Labor 
Party in Queensland, 1927-35, B.A. Hons. Thesis, University of 
Queensland, 1962; M. Bridson Cribb: op.cit. Part of A.L.P. dogma 
was that a worker, however dissatisfied he might be with his own 
party, would never "scab" and vote Tory. It would seem however, 
that a sufficiently large number broke with tradition in 1929. 
While the informal vote rose by only 0.33% from that of the 1926 
elections, support for the Country-National Party rose by 5.02%, 
A.L.P. percentage of the total valid vote fell by 7.80% and 
independents polled 3.27% better than in the earlier election. 
Colin A. Hughes & B.D. Graham: op.oit., pp. 520-21. 
32. The five Left (Wing) Labor candidates together attracted 3,194 
votes, 0.74% of the total valid vote. ibid. 
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The "Left Wing of the Labor Movement" was the end product of a change 
in Communist Party tactics, expressed as the Queensland Resolution and 
published by the Party on August 24th, 1928, in collaboration with the 
Executive Committee of the Communist International. The resolution 
laid down new political tactics for the Queensland State elections in 
1929,-^ -^  the essence of which was the branding of McCormack and his 
colleagues as "social fascists", abandoning their previous policy of 
support for Labor and capitalizing on the increasing radicalisatlon 
of the masses by the creation of a new industrial labour party.-J"^  
The A.R.U. did not officially support the movement, though a number 
of A.R.U. sub-branches requested their Executive to throw its influence 
and assistance behind the "Left Wing Minority Movement." These requests 
were dealt with by the A.R.U. State Council where in spite of the 
impassioned advocacy of Frank Nolan and some others, no firm resolution 
in favour of the movement and its candidates was taken. 
Moroney had opposed the motion for support in the A.R.U. Council, 
though he continued in an individual capacity to be one of the leaders 
of the Movement together with Charles Collins, Labour M.L.A. for Bowen, 
33. "In 1926, the Communists, in their election manifesto, had said 
that any worker who did not vote for Labour was a scab - that Labour 
must be returned to office and the rottenness of its policies exposed 
from within. They had greeted with alarm any talk of forming a new 
party, as this would have weakened their own position as they saw 
it, of being the only alternative means of expression for the workers. 
Now they were in the process of executing a remarkable volte face." 
M. Bridson Cribb: op.oit., pp. 129-30. 
34. For a much more detailed account Cf. E.M. Higgins: op.cit.; M. 
Bridson Cribb: ibid. , Part V. 
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J.M. Durkln (ex-A.W.U. organiser), A Brown, Secretary of the Waterside 
Workers' Federation and E. Ellis of the Carpenters' Union. There were 
real and practical reasons why, at this time, Moroney did not wish to 
see the A.R.U. officially aligned with the Left Wing Movement.-^^ Nor 
had he changed his view that there was no necessity for the formation 
of another political party, while the unions existed as a basis for all 
political activity by the workers. Furthermore through its members of 
whom there were many in the northern district of the A.R,U,, particularly 
in the Townsville Branch, the Communist Party was exerting pressure 
within the union, to such an extent that both the State Executive and 
Council had to take firm measures to pull some of their rank and file 
back into line.-^ ^ 
While these factors add up to a strong case for abstention on the 
part of the A.R.U. and Moroney from the activities of the new industrial 
labour party sponsored by the Communists it must be balanced against 
the fact that, as already pointed out, Moroney regarded the defeat of 
the McCormack government as crucial for the survival of Industrial 
unionism and the concept of workers' control,-^ 7 ^ j-^j ^^s prepared to go 
a long way towards bringing this about. 
It also needs to be stated that between the "syndicalist" philosophy 
35. Cf. Chapter 6. 
36. "Rank and file members of the A.R,U. who are members of the 
Communist Party will need to choose between the policy of their 
union, as definitely laid down by successive State Councils for 
years past, or the policy of the Communist Party, if they desire 
their loyalty to the A.R.U. to remain linchallenged." The 
Advocate, September 15th, 1928. 
37. See p. 212 and Footnote 30, this chapter. 
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of the A.R.U. leaders and Communist Party Ideology lay much common 
ground. The class struggle, industrial unionism, the use of direct 
action for political and social as well as industrial ends, workers' 
control of industry and ultimately of the State - there was little to 
divide them here. However, they disagreed on the vital question of the 
need to provide a vanguard for the proletariat in the shape of the 
Communist Party. By this time it was already clear that the Communist 
Party "saw only a limited usefulness for trade unions in the pre-
revolutionary struggle ,"-^ 5 a belief which could be sensed as early as 
1920, behind the apologia for the Party's role in Russia contained in 
the Special Message addressed to the I.W.W. from the Communist 
International.-^^ The Communist Party's political role had no place in 
Moroney's vision of "a brave, new world". It is understandable, however, 
that the A.R.U. and the Communist Party could make common cause on 
industrial matters, and indeed the Communists often provided the 
stiffening in the A.R.U. ranks when the union was engaged in direct 
action, particularly in the Railway Strike of 1948 when much of the 
initiative came from Party members and the highly organised picketing 
which was a feature of this strike was under the control of the Party 
and its auxiliary, the Eureka Youth League. 
Believing as they did that no government or its instrumentalities 
could usefully serve the purpose of the workers, it may also seem strange 
38. Ian Bedford: op.cit., p. 31. 
39. To the I.W.W.: A Special Message from the Communist International 
(Moscow). Proletarian Publishing Association, Melbourne, 1920. 
Many of the early members of the I.W.W. in Australia did swing over 
to the Communist Party, including Jock Garden and Tom Glynn. 
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that the A.R.U. leaders could continue to use the arbitration system. 
There were, of course, practical reasons for this which have already 
been discussed.^^ However, the explanation goes further than that. 
Seeing the Arbitration Court as an instrument of the capitalist class, 
coercing the workers into accepting conditions against which otherwise 
they would fight, they took the attitude that "there can be no 
agreement with the employers of labour which the workers have to 
consider sacred and Inviolable.""^ -^  Thus the arbitration system was to 
be worked for what could be got from it, but "the workers were warranted 
in protecting themselves along other lines if arbitration etc. fail 
them. Even when arbitration etc. will suit them, the workers will find 
they suit them better if backed by economic might. If they do not suit 
them, economic might can possibly make up what they have lost."'^ 2 
Throughout the whole of his life as a trade union official, 
Moroney bent his considerable talents and energies towards the 
achievement of industrial unionism, and fought against the craft union 
concept, and every extension of sectionalism within the railway service. 
Though a less forceful personality, Nolan continued the struggle when 
his turn came to lead the union. His colleagues speak of Moroney as 
one of the few leaders within the trade union movement with a truly 
40. Cf. supra, PP- 82-87. 
41. Revolutionary Industrial Unionism, op.cit., p. 25. 
42. The Advocate, September 21st, 1927. "The fundamental principle of 
the A.R.U. was industrial action, and we had demonstrated 
effectively the fruits of industrial action in the 1914, 1917 and 
1925 strikes." Interview with George Rymer. 
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International socialist view,^ -^  and a much wider vision than his job 
as secretary of the A.R.U., and his successful advocacy before the 
Arbitration Court required. He saw beyond the railway ser-«-ices to the 
transport system of Australia as a whole, and in the early days of 
flying in Queensland, spent many hours at Archerfield Aerodrome, talking 
to airmen, and attempting to interest them in his scheme for the 
unionization of all engaged in transport into the one organisation. 
Though unsuccessful in this and in the achievement of the 
amalgamation of the railway service unions, he did bring off a lesser 
coup. He was able to persuade the majority of unions with membership 
employed in the railways of the need to combine to discuss the many 
problems of each which were common to all. As a result, the Railway 
Transport Council was set up for the purpose of unity of action of all 
railway unions, and Moroney was elected President of that Council. This 
was expanded, in 1936, into the Combined Railway Unions Central 
Committee (C.R.U.) with Moroney still at the helm.'^ '^  Branches of the 
C.R.U. were ultimately established in all the larger railway centres. 
There is no doiibt that some degree of cooperation has been achieved 
through the C.R.U. though it has not been able to speak with one unanimous 
voice on all matters concerning railwaymen. Though Nolan, in his turn, 
served as its Chairman, he was openly critical of its effectiveness. In 
43. As against the narrow "nationalism" of the average Australian 
working man of the time, (Cf. Humphrey McQueen: op.cit.) Moroney 
stands out as an internationalist; one piece of evidence for this 
was the strenuous effort he made to have the teaching of Esperanto 
adopted in -the labour movement. 
44. For further details, see The Advocate, September 15th, 1944, p.4. 
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more recent times it does appear to have more cohesion, resulting, in 
part, from new leadership in some of the craft unions, in particular, 
that of F.E. Doyle of the A.F.U.L.E. whose views seem more in line with 
those of the A.R.U. 
Reviewing the past history of the A.R.U., it must be admitted that 
its leadership failed to implement their basic philosophy, and to create 
a new Industrial and social system for the working man. There are many 
reasons for this but the major stumbling block was always the A.L,P, 
and its organisation. By 1918, when I,W,W, influence and the impetus 
for One Big Union were at their height, the A,L,P, was firmly 
entrenched as an Integral part of the social and political systems of 
Australia, Though at that point of time there were men of ability in 
the trade union movemenf^^ who supported industrial unionism and the 
0,B.U,, even those, the majority, who accepted the continuing need for 
political action (of whom Moroney was not one), had not come to grips 
with the essential problem of how the A,L.P, was to be fitted into the 
new scheme of things. 
Whether the 0,B,U, meant the end of the A,L,P, was never made clear, 
even though some of the 0,B,U,'s staunchest supporters, men like A,C, 
Willis and Jock Garden, were high in the party hierarchy in N.S,W.'^ ^ 
The A.W.U.'s support for the O.B.U. had been less one of principle 
than of expediency, as it saw in the Industrial union movement a rare 
opportimity to extend its hegemony, and when, in the end, in alliance 
45. Irwin Young: op.oit., p. 234. 
46. ibid. 
220. 
with the "moderates" in the A.L.P. it broke the O.B.U., many of the 
nearest thing to true "socialists" that the labour movement in Australia 
ever produced left the party. Had the impulse for industrial unionism 
quickened much earlier in its history the results might well have been 
different, a fact which Moroney recognised quite clearly. 
For men like Moroney and Nolan, who denied the effectiveness of 
political action in assisting the workers in the class struggle, coming 
to terms with a Labor government became less likely as the years 
passed. From the time the Theodore government took office in October, 
1919, to be followed, up to 1950, by the McCormack, Forgan-Smlth, Cooper 
and Hanlon Labor Ministries (with a short inter-regnum for the Country-
Nationalist Moore government), the alliance between the A.W.U. and the 
A.L.P. in both its parliamentary and organisational wings was forged 
and cemented."^ ^ There were practical reasons why this association 
was detrimental to the Interests of the A.R.U. ,^'^ and was seen to be 
so by its leaders, but the very real gulf which opened and widened 
between them was one of ideas and basic philosophy. 
To state it bluntly and in very general terms. Labour, in Queensland, 
as elsewhere in Australia, decided early in its history to work within 
47. Omitted is the Gillies Ministry of 8 months - February 26th, 1925 
to October 22nd, 1925. Gillies, though popular, was considered a 
weak leader, and for having allowed the A.R.U. to win the 1925 
Railway Strike was "kicked upstairs", as a member of the Board of 
Trade and Arbitration by the A.L.P. caucus, on October 21st, 1925. 
Caucus immediately replaced him with W. McCormack. 
48. So much so that in many of the electoral districts of Queensland, 
the A.W.U. organisation was the A.L.P. machine. 
49. Discussed in Chapter 6, following. 
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the framework of the capitalist system.-^ ^ Evidence for this is provided 
by the decision to select parliamentary candidates and contest 
elections, and reinforced by the performances of successive Labor 
governments. This is not to suggest that Labor did not have those 
among it with radical aspirations, but that the party was not "socialist"^-^ 
in the sense of wishing to replace an existing order with a new social 
and political system based entirely on the working class.-^ 2 "The absence 
of a coherent theory [of socialism] meant that "measures of a socialist 
character" which were effected by Labor governments were in no sense 
an assault on the citadels of capitalism."^-^ As many observers have 
noted, even the State socialism of the T.J. Ryan government was meant 
to be competitive with private enterprise and not to exclude it.^ *^  
50. The subject of this thesis precludes an analysis of the extent of 
"socialism" in the early labour movement. Reference should be 
made to the standard works on the A.L.P. and the trade union 
movement cited in the bibliography: Childe, Fitzpatrick, Crisp, 
Gollan, Turner, Rawson et al., and McQueen's recent interpretative 
study. In the Queensland context, reference should be made to 
books and theses under the authorship of Murphy, Higgins, Bray, 
Thompson, Dalton, Cribb et al. 
51. In answer to the writer's question: "What do you mean by socialism?", 
George Rymer replied, "The ownership and the control of industry 
for the people in the interests of the people. The generally 
accepted term of socialist control of the State." 
52. "Theodore never failed to remind us when we brought these matters 
of socialisation of industry, distribution of wealth to his attention, 
that after all a Labor government was administering the capitalist 
State and it had to continue to do so imtil such time as the people 
determined otherwise; and any effective socialist State could only 
come about, not by the existing type of political institutions but 
by revolution, and he was not prepared to render any assistance in 
that direction." Interview with George Rymer. 
53. Humphrey McQueen: op.oit., p. 198. 
54. Cf. D.J. Murphy: The Establishment of State Enterprises in 
Queensland, 1915-1918. Unpub. B.A. thesis. University of Queensland, 
1965. 
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The A.L.P. was prepared to tinker with the system but not to 
eradicate it, to reform it gradually, not to remove it.55 xhe 
Socialisation Objective^^ passed at the Federal A.L.P. Conference at 
Brisbane in 1921, which appeared with hindsight, to be less of an 
expression of genuine belief and urgent requirement than a sop to 
union opinion and general dissatisfaction with the A.L.P., did, however, 
give temporary heart to the genuine socialists within the labour 
movement, who believed that Labor, in office, would move to Implement 
the Objective.57 As Rymer tells it, dissillusionment, for him, set in 
at the Labour-in-Polltlcs Convention at Emu Park in 1923: 
"The A.R.U. was responsible for placing on the agenda paper a 
resolution that the Government be instructed to restore the 
basic wage to Z4.5.0. Theodore took the view that the 
Conference had no authority to instruct the government on 
such matters. We pointed out that it was a matter of Labor 
policy and industrial policy, and we had every right. Finally, 
we did get the resolution discussed. A lot of ill feeling 
was shown in the debate. Theodore and McCormack and one or 
two others spoke, and their strong point was that one of the 
government's functions was to assist in the development of 
the State, they must get money from the loan market, they had 
to trim their sails accordingly, the economy of the State 
couldn't stand i t , and so forth. Finally, Theodore said that 
he was about to go to London to float a loan and that he 
55. j'l think the political advantage in the A.L.P. to the working man 
is merely in the field of palliatives, such as social welfare." 
George Rymer. 
56. The socialisation of industry, production, distribution and 
exchange. 
57. As early as 1917 at the Toowoomba Conference of the A.R.U., it was 
generally expected that the Ryan Labor government would do this. 
"The Conference opened with the singing of "The Red Flag" - every 
candidate carried a red flag medallion on his lapel, and the 
general talk then was socialism, how to introduce it, what part the 
Labor government would play; and it was generally expected at that 
stage that the Labor government would embark on steps towards 
implementing socialisation of industry and re-distribution of 
wealth." George Rymer. 
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would not go with that millstone around his neck, that 
instruction to restore the basic wage cut."58 
To this intrinsic cleavage over capitalism and the class struggle, 
and all its ramifications, was added divisions between particular Labor 
governments and their supporters on the one hand, and the "Industrialists" 
or "militants" on the other, over the lack of government regulatory 
and legislative action to assist the working man. Labor leaders were 
accused of working the capitalist system so as to benefit, not the 
workers, but the middle and upper classes. Under the guise of governing 
in the Interests of all. Labor was said to be governing in the interests 
of a few - the employing class. Though in their criticisms of the 
performance of A.L.P. governments, or more precisely, of their lack of 
same for the workers' benefit, Moroney, Rymer and Nolan Indulged in a 
form of verbal overkill, there was much in the public statements of 
leaders like Theodore and McCormack, and, later, Forgan-Smlth and 
Hanlon, to provide ammunition for the A.R.U.'s heavy artillery. This 
was all the more surprising in view of the radical union backgrounds of 
some of these men. 
To take as examples those at the beginning and the end of the 
period 1920-50, Theodore and McCormack were working men who knew what 
58. Interview with George Rymer. In reply, Rymer said "that if ever 
there was a clear statement from a Minister of the Crown as to who 
was the real government of the State, we have had it from the words 
of Theodore when he admits that he has to go to the Jews in 
Lombard Street to raise a loan, and that he won't go with this 
millstone around his neck." Rymer and his colleagues must have 
been supreme optimists to have expected anything else from Theodore, 
in view of his bitter and vigorous opposition to the socialisation 
resolution at the Brisbane Conference. Cf. Ian Turner: Industrial 
Labour and Politics, pp. 222-25. 
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harsh working conditions were like, having been employed in the mining 
industry and on railway construction in North Queensland. Henderson 
remembers them as "working mates on Jerry Tuites' platelaylng gang, 
"spiking" on the Mount Garnet railway construction, and two real good 
workers, they were most creditable to both."59 Both were actively 
engaged in founding and organising the Amalgamated Workers' Association 
(A.W.A.), which was reputationally militant, and took it into 
amalgamation with the A.W.U. which in turn they came to control. Yet 
Theodore, as Premier, could say, "Are we not a government representing 
the whole of the people of the State? Are we here merely to provide 
higher wages and Improved conditions to a privileged class of 
employees?...Every time I have addressed a union at the Trades Hall, I 
have taken up the attitude that they have no right to assume the 
Government is in office to tax people to reap in revenue to create 
privileged positions for them.''^ *^  
Theodore and McCormack were the first of a series of tough, 
autocratic leaders of the A.L.P.^ -^  in Queensland, of whom V.C. Galr was 
the last, all excepting Hanlon and Galr, with a background of close 
personal association with the A.W.U. Gradual reformism was their policy 
59. George Henderson: op.cit., p. 44. 
60. Daily Standard, August 6th, 1924. 
61. Cf. P. Bray: E.G. Theodore and the Queensland Labor Movement (1909-
1925). Unpub. B.A. thesis. University of Queensland, 1958; Irwin 
Young: Theodore: His Life and Times. Alpha Books, 1971; M.J. 
Thompson: The Political Career of William Forgan-Smith as it 
influenced economic and political developments in Queensland. 
Unpub. B.A. thesis. University of Queensland, 1965. 
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and their belief,^^ even though, in Hanlon's case, in a relatively 
short career in the railway service, he had been President of the 
Railway Strike Committee in the 1912 General Strike, and prominent in 
the Q.R.U. until he left the railways to become a grocer. Indeed, at 
the time of the lock-out of the railwaymen by McCormack in 1927, Hanlon 
entered the debate in the Assembly in support of his former work-mates, 
yet, in 1948, as Premier, in another strike situation, he Introduced 
legislation which had a much more repressive effect on trade unionism 
than any action of McCormack's. 
While it is clear that the A.R.U., representing a minority 
viewpoint in the trade union movement, expected far too much from any 
Labor government, there is evidence to suggest that Labor leaders, 
particularly in the period 1920-29, in attempting to govern in the 
interests of all, paid too little heed to the genuine desires of their 
original clientele, the workers. Possible reasons for this have been 
canvassed elsewhere ,6-^  but it would seem that leadership and the power 
that went with it had led these men far from their working backgrounds, 
and from a sympathetic understanding of the aspirations of their 
62. McCormack: "We believe that the policy of gradual economic change 
and gradual betterment of the great mass of the people is the 
right line for Australia to move on," Brisbane Courier, February 
24th, 1927. 
63. Cf. E.M. Higgins: op.cit.; M. Bridson Cribb: op.cit., p. 41; 
Irwin Young: ibid. 
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former work-mates. 
In their ideological conflict with the A.R.U. the leaders of the 
A.L.P. could confidently rely on the support of the A.W.U. and of the 
majority of the railway unions, in particular that of the A.F.U.L.E. 
and of the sectional unions. While the relationship between the A,R,U, 
and these unions will be explored in the following chapter it needs to 
be emphasised here that the cleavage between the A,R,U, and Labor 
governments over ideas and beliefs extended also to the above-mentioned 
unions, 
The close working alliance between the A.W.U. and government 
leaders has already been noted. While there were sufficient practical 
political reasons on both sides for the continuation of this partnership, 
it was firmly based on a mutual belief in the principle of moderate 
and gradual reformism and unswerving support for the arbitration system 
as the only proper instrument for resolving Industrial conflict and 
64. Bernays, a not unbiased observer, says of McCormack: "McCormack, 
once in government, and associated with big things, became a 
devotee of golf - the recreation mostly of the idle rich - and this 
brought him where he wanted most to be, amongst "the people who 
count" as he expressed it himself," C.A. Bernays: Our Seventh 
Political Decade, 1920-30, p. 292. McCormack's political enemy 
W. Morrow, shows more understanding: "When you're outside fighting 
along wi-th the workers, naturally to get the support of the workers 
you become like he [McCormack] did; he was one of them and he 
worked honestly for -them. That's one class of society. But when 
they put you into Parliament, you serve another class of society. 
It is the exploiter and the exploited. When he's there he's got to 
administer capitalism in accordance with what's laid down. He's 
going to be loyal to the Governor and the Governor represents the 
Queen and he's going to be loyal to Imperialism and he gets into a 
different category altogether. And finally he has to consider the 
financial position, he has to depend on the banks or the financial 
institutions to continue in government." Interview with W. Morrow. 
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achieving better conditions for the worker. The A.F.U.L.E., at this 
time, was the most staunch supporter of the government among the 
railway unions, with its leaders opposed to industrial unionism and the 
use of direct action to determine the outcome of Industrial Issues. 
McCormack's lock-out of the railwaymen in 1927 brought these opposing 
forces into alliance but it was only a temporary one, and the antagonism 
between the A.R.U. and the A.W.U./A.F.U.L.E., based at least in part on 
uncompromising Ideological beliefs, continued to affect relationships 
within both the political and Industrial wings of the A.L.P. 
Community attitudes to this clash of ideological viewpoints within 
the labour movement have become difficult to assess accurately with the 
passage of time but some general statements can be made. Though their 
share of the total vote fluctuated65 -^Q -^ he extent that electoral 
redistribution, weighted in the government's favour, became necessary 
to protect their position,^^ Labor governments remained in power, and 
only once in this period were their traditional supporters sufficiently 
aroused against them to vote them out of office. At the same time much 
was gradually done for the working man, particularly in piiblic health 
and housing, though in the Industrial field as early as 1915, a Labor 
government had set the pattern for the future by refusing to legislate 
directly on wages, hours and working conditions, directing unions' 
claims on these matters to an independent Arbitration Court. 
65. 1920 - 47.77^ 
1932 - 49.89% 
1944 - 44.67% 
1923 - 48.13% 1926 - 47.96%; 1929 - 40.16% (lost); 
1938 - 47.17%; 1941 - 51.41%; 
1950 - 46.87%. Hughes & Graham: 
1935 - 53.43% 
1947 - 43.58% 
op.cit., pp. 517-28. 
66. Cf. The Electoral Districts Act 1949, ibid. , p. 502. 
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One must assume, then, that a majority of workers were satisfied 
with the performance of these governments and that support outside the 
working class was forthcoming once it became clear that no radical 
changes were contemplated by Labor-in-office. As Rymer has emphasised 
also, many workers were prepared to continue to sustain Labor governments 
for fear that they might be replaced by non-Labor ones. At the time 
when the A.R.U. was leading the campaign for the restoration of the 
basic wage cut made by Theodore, Rymer claims he received hundreds of 
letters from railwaymen pleading with him not to force the issue on 
that matter for the sake of the Labor government.^7 Others were 
concerned that leaders like Moroney and Nolan were trying to take them 
too fast and too far along a road which could only lead to their 
ultimate isolation from both the trade union and labour movements.^^ 
As has already been Indicated, militancy among railwaymen sprang, 
to some extent at least, from the harsh working conditions of earlier 
days. As dnlon organisations, mainly through the arbitration system, 
won reforms from employers, and placed the workers in the position where 
they were much better off than previously, most of the rank and file 
lost their militancy because they no longer had to endure the very real 
hardships of the past.69 On the whole it is fair to say that the ideas, 
beliefs and values of the leaders on both sides of the union-management 
67. They were prepared to sacrifice the basic wage rather than -the 
government. Interview with George Rymer. 
68. Cf. Chapter 6. 
69. "We had no holidays, no sick pay, no compensation, nothing like 
that at all. In fact, sometimes you'd work on Sunday for nothing 
in the early days; but the "thinking few", the leaders, won a lot 
of reforms from the employers." Interview with W. Morrow. 
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relationship were, as Rymer states it, only those of "the intelligent 
and thinking minority" within the Labor movement, for the majority of 
the workers had very little knowledge of or interest in doctrinaire 
socialism.'^ 
To this point discussion has been oriented towards the railway 
service and evidence has been produced to indicate that conflicting 
beliefs and attitudes between the A.R.U. on the one hand, and Labor 
governments, the majority of railway unions and the A.W.U. on the other 
have been a divisive element in industrial relations within the Industry 
and a major cause of militancy in the A.R.U. As this is a comparative 
study of two reputationally militant transport unions, it now becomes 
necessary to evaluate the extent to which clashs in ideology between 
operators and pilots may have affected their industrial relations 
relationship. 
An answer to this can be given quickly and in the negative -
ideological beliefs have played little or no part in industrial relations 
in the airline Industry. The Federation has no acknowledged political 
philosophy or alliances. Nor is there evidence to suggest that members' 
attitudes to Federation policies or those of the operators are 
70. "They were all honest to God good workers with very little 
knowledge or understanding of the social system as such. A terrible 
lot were anti-boss. They felt the boss was their natioral enemy, but 
they didn't discriminate between the man who was forced into the 
position and the one who was really exploiting. In my opinion, the 
mass of -the people don't think." Interview with Ernie Sampson. 
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conditioned in any way by their personal political beliefs.7^ The 
pilots, as an organised body, have no social philosophy, in the sense 
of wishing to see changes brought about in present society; furthermore 
they take no official stand on social issues of the day. The nearest 
they approach a philosophy in terms of their attitude to industrial 
relations is in their determination to maintain their relative salary/ 
status position near the top of the Australian work force, and in this 
their views harmonise with an increasing number of white collar and 
professional unions. For this purpose they are prepared to use the 
tactics identified with manual unions, e.g. compulsory unionism and 
direct Industrial action.72 
As Encel has pointed out, "one of the major features of social 
history in the past 150 years has been a growth in the number of 
occupations which can claim professional status, and the emergence of 
successive professional groups,"7-3 one of which, in their own estimation, 
being the Australian Federation of Air Pilots. Professional status 
Implies legal recognition of belonging to a select group, social 
prestige, the opportunity to press for higher salaries because of this 
special status, and the ability to influence or determine standards of 
71. It has not been possible to poll -the pilot membership to ascertain 
their political beliefs. Conversations with a cross section of 
pilots using Brisbane as their home port give the impression that as 
a group they are not politically conscious though virtually all of 
those with whom the writer had discussions were Liberal voters. 
72. The Federation claims that so tough are the operators that without 
the implied threat of direct action to be used as a club in their 
hands, the pilots would not be able to get the operators to talk to 
them on industrial matters. Interview with Captain R.T. Holt. 
73. S. Encel: "Social Implications of the Engineer's Case." Journal 
of Industrial Relations, Vol. 6, No. 1, March, 1964, p. 61. 
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professional education. In the case of the pilots, standards of 
physical fitness and of technical skill and competence are laid down 
and regularly tested by the Department of Civil Aviation, which alone 
has the power to issue, withhold or cancel a pilot's licence, and the 
degree to which the Federation has been able to influence these standards 
has been limited. 
Unlike those in most other professional occupations the pilots 
have not found an unqualified acceptance of their status as such by 
their employers, who consider commercial flying as a highly skilled 
occupation and no more.75 The high loadings on pilot salaries are seen 
by the operators as margins for skill and advanced technical competence 
rather than as an acknowledgement of professional status. A desire for 
recognition on this latter basis may be a factor, however subconscious, 
in the pilots' use of Industrial action to achieve what are by the 
average standards of the Australian work force, very high salaries. 
Since the Association of Professional Engineers of Australia, in 
a series of cases in the early 1960's, succeeded in having the 
Arbitration Commission recognise "the right of professional groups, as 
such, to a special economic and social status,"76 similar groups, 
including the pilots, have been able to base their salary claims on the 
concept of "work value" and to do so with considerable success. The 
pilots' continuing concern, however, is to maintain their position 
74. ibid. Cf. Everett C. Hughes: Men and their Work. The Free Press, 
Glencoe, Illinois, 1958. 
75. Cf. supra, p. 200. 
76. S. Encel: op.cit., p. 65. 
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relative to that of other levels of the work force77 and to hold open 
the salary gap between professionals and non-professionals.'''^  
The major motivation behind the militancy of some white collar 
unions in recent years has been their realisation that the skilled 
manual workers have drawn level with and in some instances out-paced 
them in such matters as annual and long service leave, superannuation 
and security of employinent ,79 and that the advantages of white collar 
occupations have been largely eroded as the result of the national 
wage cases and margins for skill. The pilots' awareness of this 
phenomenon has been in respect of their position vis-a-vis other 
professions, and their leaders have fought with skill and determination 
to hold the line of their economic break-through in 1966-67.^*^ 
That they have been able to use direct action or its threat with 
such success has been due, in part, to the Federation's tactical 
position within the airline industry. It has also been due to the acute 
perception of just such tactical advantages on the part of men like 
R.T. Holt, past President of the Federation and its leader at the time 
when it was making its substantial gains in the mid-1950's. 
Captain Holt's background is typical of commercial pilots of his 
age in that he is an ex-service flier who entered the domestic airline 
Industry post-war and has been flying ever since - in his case, with 
77. Cf. supra, p. 7. 
78. "The Commission's judgment [in the Engineer's Case] made it clear 
that disputes could be created under the relevant section of the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act by "professional, semi-professional 
or craft organisations"." S. Encel: op.cit. 
79. Cf. R.M. Martin: "White Collar Unions in Australia", op.cit. 
80. Cf. supra, p. 123. 
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Ansett/A.N.A. The initial impression is one of supreme physical 
fitness, reinforced at later meetings by a realization that toughness 
of body is matched by toughness of mind. Extremely able and personally 
highly organised, it is obvious that Captain Holt has all the 
complicated functioning of the industry at his fingertips. In keeping 
with the Federation's attitude to industrial relations, he impresses 
one as a supreme pragmatist who has had considerable Influence on the 
approach and tactics of the Federation in their Industrial dealings. 
It could almost be said that in recent years the Federation has become 
what it has in response to his ideas of what it should be, and of the 
pilots' place in the wider community. 
The vulnerability of the operators to strike action has strengthened 
the hands of the Federation. This is particularly so in the case of 
Australia's International airline, Qantas, where it has been found 
that many passengers lost through strike action transfer their 
allegiance permanently to competitors. The pilots' strategic position 
within their industry is no longer matched, however, by the railwaymen 
within theirs. 
The increasingly widespread ownership and use of the private motor 
car and of road transport for many kinds of freight haulage have meant 
that in the case of a railway strike the inconvenience suffered by 
potential suburban and long distance passengers, and by those who wish 
to ship or receive mail and freight is by no means as acute as it would 
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have been prior to the last war.°-^  Generally speaking, with regard 
to loss of government revenue, the railway department is now likely 
to suffer more from strikes in other Industries which use the railways 
extensively, such as coal and other mining, or from the effects of 
prolonged drought in the pastoral industry, than it is from strike 
action of its own employees. 
This is not to suggest that there will be no reaction to strikes 
from the general public, but community response will vary according to 
the reasons for the use of direct action, the degree to which these 
can be clearly explained through the mass media,^2 ^YIQ extent and 
duration of the strike and a host of other more Intangible factors.^-^ 
81. The 1948 railway strike would be an exception to this statement as, 
although the war was over, petrol rationing was still enforced and 
new motor vehicles were not yet readily available. Cf. Neil W. 
Chamberlain & J.M. Schilling: The Imrpact of Strikes. Their Social 
and Economic Costs. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1954, Chapters 7 
and 8. Note also Sterling D. Spero: Labour Relations in British 
Nationalised Industry. New York Univ. Press, New York, 1955, p. 45, 
where, in commenting on the national rail strike in England in May, 
1955, he says "that this strike demonstrated that the railway workers 
owing to the development of alternative modes of transportation, no 
longer have the power they once had to tie up the country." 
82. Extensive use of the mass media for publicity purposes and to put 
their case before the public was made by the railwaymen in the 1919 
Railway Strike in Great Britain and this appears to have been 
responsible for a loss of public support by the government. Cf. 
Philip S. Bagwell: op.cit., pp. 392-6. Note also the black-out of 
the mass media with respect to all Disputes Committee and Labour 
Council decisions, speeches etc. imposed by the Hanlon government 
during the 1948 Railway Strike. 
83. V.L. Allen: Trade Unions and the Government. Longmans, London, 1960 
p. 213 makes the point that when the Government is the employer, a 
strike against it is more than a trial of economic strength, and in 
such a case the outcome of -the strike will depend to a large extent 
on the piiblic impression created during the strike. Allen believes 
that, in Britain, -the public react against any-thing likely to damage 
the system of parliamentary democracy and "thus, they protect the 
Government from unconstitutional pressure, such as strike action." 
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It is clear, however, that unions contemplating direct action should 
also Include a possible hostile public reaction in their pre-strlke 
calculations. If "the parties [to a strike] have assessed the likely 
costs of an adverse public sentiment and have decided to incur them 
rather than accept, as the only prospective alternative, the costs of 
conceding to the other's demands then the sanction [of public opinion] 
is ineffective because it has already been anticipated."^^ 
Insufficient work has been done in Australia in Investigating the 
attitudes of the workers themselves to the use of direct action in 
industrial disputes. Dufty in his studies of small groups of skilled 
manual workers and white collar unionlsts^5 has shown that there are 
differences in the views held by each group as to the use of the strike 
weapon^6 ^nd that "the white collar workers were more inclined than the 
blue collar workers to think that strikes were only used as a last 
resort."°7 
Little as these preliminary studies tell us, they appear to be in 
84. Neil W. Chamberlain: Social Responsibility and Strikes. Harper & 
Brothers, New York, 1953, p. 252. "Only in the event that unforseen 
sanctions are encountered, imposing costs of unexpected magnitude, 
will the resolute parties be shaken from their predetermined 
positions." 
85. N.F. Dufty: "The Skilled Worker and his Union", and N.F. Dufty: 
"The White Collar Unionist", op.cit. 
86. Over one third of white collar unionists were of the opinion that 
-the strike weapon should never be used, as against one quarter of 
the skilled workers. Three quarters of each sample gave the 
arbitration system their approval, even though in some cases this 
was qualified, ibid. 
87. Dufty: "The White Collar Unionist", p. 155. "The skilled worker, 
of course, had more personal experience of and involvement in 
strikes than the white collar unionist." 
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line with differences in attitudes and alms between manual and white 
collar workers and unions as considered by Rawson^^ and Martin.^^ The 
difficulties of categorizing organisations of employees have already 
been discussed90 and this study, dealing as it does with only two 
unions, cannot offer sufficient evidence to tip the scales either way. 
Certainly, the A.R.U. fulfils most of Rawson's criteria for a trade 
union; affiliation with Trades and Labor Council and the A.L.P. (though 
not to the latter between 1925 and 1957) ; broader alms than mere 
economic self interest and a strong sense of being part of the working 
class. To the extent that it does not fulfil any of these, the 
Federation would fit Rawson's requirements for a non-trade union - an 
association of independent employees. Beyond this point of agreement, 
neither the manual union nor the white collar Federation match Rawson's 
model precisely, though the A.R.U. does follow it more closely. 
The Federation is confined in its coverage to people working for 
a very few employers, but the number of its full-time officials would 
be comparable with those of the A.R.U. (on a national basis) and their 
membership dues are probably the highest of any organisation of employees 
in Australia, while those of the A.R.U. (Q'ld.) are extremely low. 
The Federation does however follow Rawson's model in that it eschews 
political commitment of any kind and although affiliated with A.C.S.P.A. 
88. D.W. Rawson: "The Frontiers of Trade Unionism", op.oit. 
89. R.M. Martin: "Class Identification and Trade Union Behaviour: The 
Case of Australian White Collar Unions", op.cit. in which Martin 
disputes Rawson's line of argument. 
90. Cf. supra, Chapter 1. 
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it considers this link to be of the most tenuous and prefers to 
operate Independently of other white collar unions,^ -^  
Therefore, while these two unions do not strictly conform to 
Rawson's classifications to the extent of supporting in their entirety 
his claims for a clear demarcation between manual unions and white 
collar organisations, they do not stray far enough from them to give 
unqualified support to Martin's arguments. For the purpose of this 
study and of this chapter, the important distinction between one 
manual union and one white collar organisation within the transport 
industry lies in the fundamental difference be-tween them over long term 
aims. Both the A.R.U, and the Federation have used direct action as a 
tactical weapon and part of their overall strategy of industrial 
relations; but while the Federation's purpose has always been confined 
to furthering the narrow economic interests of its members, the 
militancy of the A,R,U, has been part of a long term campaign, not only 
to alter the composition of the trade union movement to one of 
industry-based unions, but to build on this foundation a new social and 
political order, in which the worker would emerge triumphant. 
91. D.W. Rawson: op.cit., p. 203. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SETTING OF THE PARTIES. WHICH 
INCLUDES THE RELATIONS OF THE UNION TO OTHER UNIONS 
AND TO THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY J; AND THE MANAGEMENT 
TO OTHER MANAGEMENTS, BOTH GENERALLY AND IN ITS LABOUR 
RELATIONS POLICIES.^ 
Within any Industry,relations between unions and management will be 
affected by continuing disharmony among the unions whose members 
constitute its work force. It can also be hypothesized that the greater 
the number of unions represented, the more difficult it will become to 
establish agreement on all points in question, and the number of incidents 
and Issues in dispute requiring resolution will multiply in proportion 
to the number of unions likely to be involved. Moreover, the quality 
of industrial relations depends to some degree on the interpersonal 
relationships between management and unions and on the establishment of 
effective lines of communication between them, and this becomes harder 
to achieve when there are twenty or more unions than when there are 
only two or three.2 Qn the other hand, a multiplicity of unions, 
operating within the one Industry, provides an excellent opportunity for 
a management, so inclined, to employ the classic "divide and rule" 
strategy and offers a greater temptation to do so rather than to take the 
more laborious course of attempting to establish good relations with all. 
When the employing side of the relationship is vested in agents of 
1. J.T. Dunlop: op.cit., pp. 386-7. 
2, Writing in The Daily Standard, September 16th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted 
in The Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, 1966, p. 2, Moroney cited 43 
unions represented within the Queensland railway service. 
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the government of the day, as it is in the Railway Departments in each 
State and the Commonwealth, and when, in turn, the A.L.P. forms that 
government, then the relative position of the union within the wider 
context of the political labour movement will have a direct bearing on 
industrial relations within its own industry. These propositions 
emerge from a study of the A.R.U.'s association with its fellow railway 
unions, with the A.W.U. and with the A.L.P. 
There was a time, early in its history, when the A.R.U. (then known 
as the Q.R.E.A.) actively sought a place within the political labour 
movement, and when railwaymen, individually, and collectively through 
their union, gave vigorous and strong support to the Infant A.L.P. and 
to the task of getting the working man into Parliament. The early 
secretary of the Q.R.E.A., Jimmy Wilkinson, who resigned from the 
railway service to place the union's chief office beyond the vengeance of 
the Railway Commissioner,-3 became, in 1893, the first railwayman elected 
to the Queensland Parliament. 
When Premier Phllp expressed his Intention, in 1903, of giving 
railwaymen direct representation in the State Parliament as had been 
effected in Victoria by the Constitution Act 1903, repealed in 1905, 
the union met this proposal head on,with protest meetings in Ipswich 
and other centres,'^  and was Instrumental in having it dropped. "While 
direct representation would have been very helpful to railwaymen in 
those days, Phllp's offer was seen through as an attempt to curtail 
3. Cf. supra, p. 70. 
4. At the protest meetings, the Q.R.E.A. demanded instead the extension 
of the franchise and all other political rights. 
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Labor representation in Parliament by cutting the railway vote out of 
the different electorates."5 
The Q.R.E.A. itself planned to run candidates on the Labor ticket 
in many electorates, "thus securing representation not only of railway 
Interests but of general Labor Interests as well,"^ but found a stumbling 
block in Rule 18 of the Regulations governing the conditions of 
employment in the railway service and of the conduct of railway employees. 
Rule 18 prevented railwaymen from participating in politics, and while 
they could resign, as J.S. Hardy did, to contest unsuccessfully the seat 
of Bundamba for Labor in 1904,7 they were liable to dismissal if they 
openly engaged in party politics while in the service. The union pressed 
the Railway Commissioner for the deletion of Rule 18 from the Regulations, 
and although he denied this request, J.F. Thallon, Commissioner from 
1902 to 1911, promised not to enforce it, provided certain conditions 
were met.^ vniile he kept his word, his successor did not, and "in 
July, 1912, Albert Welsby was dismissed for having participated in the 
Labor candidate's campaign at Ipswich."9 
5. The Daily Standard, September 9th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in The 
Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 2, 1966, p. 1. 
6. ibid. 
7. ibid. 
8. Thallon is reported to have said, "So long as a man does not appear 
on a public platform in uniform, or use his citizen rights so far 
as to be disloyal, I will not interfere with him irrespective of 
what party is in power." The Daily Standard, September 16th, 1922, 
p. 8, reprinted in The Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, 1966, p. 1. 
9. ibid. The union was convinced "that others equally as active in -the 
opposing camp had their actions overlooked." 
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The involvement of railwaymen in Labor politics continued-^ '^  and 
was strengthened when, following a recommendation of the Q.R.U, Annual 
Conference in 1914, several branches of the union affiliated with the 
Central Political Executive (C,P,E,), to be followed by the union as a 
whole in 1915,-^ -^  The increasingly close association of the Q.R.U. with 
political Labor was part of a general pattern of growing participation 
by the unions, which culminated in the formation of a Labor government 
in Queensland in 1915, and, after the 1915 Labor Convention, in the 
reorganisation of the party administration so that henceforth 
affiliated unions, in proportion to their membership would be directly 
7 2 
represented at both the Convention and on the C.P.E. In March, 1915, 
Tim Moroney became the Q.R.U.'s delegate to the C.P.E. and at the Labor-
ln-Politics Convention in January, 1918, the union had direct 
representation for the first time. This shift in emphasis in the 
organisation of the party towards the trade unions and away from the 
branches most probably stimulated inter-union rivalry, in that it now 
became Important for unions to maintain and, hopefully, increase 
membership figures as it was on this basis that the number of their 
delegates to the party's policy making bodies was allotted. 
10. Four railwaymen contested the State elections in 1912: M.J. Kirwan 
(railway porter), W.V. Heffernan (machinist), J.H. Sherry (labourer) 
and G. Walden (railway clerk), of whom Kirwan, in winning the seat 
of Brisbane, was the only one successful, ibid, and D. J. Murphy, 
R. Joyce & C.A. Hughes: Prelude to Power, Appendix I, pp. 317-24. 
11. "It was the first railway organisation to affiliate with the C.P.E. 
immediately political rights were granted railwaymen." Moroney: 
The Daily Standard, September 30th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in The 
Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 12, 1966, p. 3. 
12. Cf. D.J. Murphy: "The Changing Structure of the Party", Murphy, 
Joyce & Hughes: ibid., pp. 89-107. 
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With Labor in office, the right to share in the party's policy 
making accorded to it through affiliation, and its ovm membership 
increasing, the Q.R.U. appeared well placed to play an influential role 
in both the industrial and political wings of the A.L.P. Yet its 
position was challenged from the beginning by a stronger rival, for, as 
Murphy has noted,-^ -^  Theodore, through amalgamation, had already forged 
a powerful political instrument in the A.W.U. with a ready-made 
propaganda machine available to it in the Worker newspaper; more 
crucially for the Q.R.U., "by 1914 the largest single group of members 
on the C.P.E. were members of the A.W.U."-^ "^  
It was not until after 1920, however, with Theodore as Premier and 
Moroney established as General State Secretary of the A.R.U., that 
conflict and rivalry became overt so as to threaten the stability of 
the party and the existence of the union. When it did come, the clash 
was not simply one over ideals and aspirations between the government 
7 ^ 
and a radical "industrialist" union, though that provided a solid 
basis for the antagonism. Overlaid upon the mutual distrust of each 
other's intentions and beliefs were the complications of inter-union 
rivalry between the A.R.U. and the government's major source of 
support, the A.W.U., and also between the A.R.U. and other unions in the 
railway service, notably the A.F.U.L.E. 
There were various reasons for this rancourous competition; some 
13. ibid. , p. 105. 
14. ibid. 
15. Cf. supra, Chapter 5. 
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of them have already been canvassed in this study: the clash of 
ideological beliefs, the effects of preferential unionism and bracketing 
which encouraged "body snatching" and demarcation disputes between the 
industrial union and the craft organisations.^ 
Another factor may have been the number of small unions, organised 
on the basis of a certain class of work, like the Guards, Station 
Masters etc., some of which had splintered off from the A.R.U.-^ 7 j-^ IQ 
strange that sectionalism has been endemic in the railway service in 
Queensland, when it is largely absent from those of the other States 
and of the United Kingdom. It has been argued frequently that "the 
Queensland Railways' Union [A.R-U.] is unwilling to grant recognition 
to sections of employees in particular Branches of the Railway Service, 
and as at present constituted, is too large and unwieldly a body to 
care properly for the Interests of employees in such Branches where 
questions arise which affect only the employees in a certain Branch ,"-^ 9 
16. Note somewhat similar factors at work in Great Britain where the 
syndicalist philosophy of the National Union of Railwaymen (an 
industrial union) has led it "to oppose the other unions, 
particularly the Engineers and Firemen (A.S.L.E.F.), not merely as 
competitors for membership but also as disrupters of the lonity of 
railway workers. The rivalry between the N.U.R. and the A.S.L.E.F. 
has at times degenerated into open hostility." Sterling D. Spero: 
"Labour Relations in British Nationalised Industry", op.cit. , 
pp. 36-37. 
17. Cf. supra, pp. 80-82. 
18. It exists in other services but only on a small scale. The N.U.R. 
in New South Wales, while a break-away union from the A.R.U., is 
itself an industrial and not a sectional union. 
19. J.B. Harding, Secretary of the Queensland Railway Traffic Employees 
Union, in a sworn affidavit, dated 17/9/1917 and submitted to the 
Industrial Coiort of Queensland. Industrial Court File No. 37. 
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but even if there was truth in this statement, though the A.R.U. is 
organised on a job basis as well as on area,20 it does not account 
for the relative absence of sectionalism in railway services which 
contain large all-grades unions such as that of the United Kingdom. 
Was the A.R.U. leadership more aggressive in Queensland and therefore 
more frightening; was it more active in the practice of direct industrial 
action than unions elsewhere led by "s3mdicalists" and therefore to be 
shunned? One cannot tell with any certainty. 
A feeling did exist that a union like the A.R.U,, a large part of 
whose membership was drawn from the semi-skilled and unskilled ranks 
had nothing to offer to the more "elite" sections of the service, and 
Indeed, might neglect their Interests in favour of those of the 
majority,21 As Frank McKenna has pointed out with respect to the British 
Railways - and there are no indications that a similar situation did 
not exist in Australia - "Railwaymen are notoriously divided across 
the board of the industry by their different grades. Each man believes 
that without his particular section the industry would grind to a stop. 
Footplate men believe that the "desk men" and the "station men" are not 
really railwaymen at all because they have nothing to do with the real 
20. Cf. supra, p. 151. 
21. It is interesting to note that some members of the administrative 
staff of the Queensland Railways to whom -the writer has spoken, 
acknowledged membership in the A.R.U. in the early part of their 
career but said they had left the union "because it was only 
looking after the interests of the engine-drivers." Discussions 
at the No. 4 Review Course in Railway Administration, The 
Institute of Management, University of N.S.W., November, 1971. 
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job of getting the trains on the track."22 At the other end of the 
scale, a vast gulf yawns between the "aristocracy of labour" and the 
men in the dead-end, unskilled jobs. What is more, "railways are a 
conglomeration of skills and talents, very few of which are inter-
changeable ,"2^ so it can easily be seen that small group exclusiveness 
is a natural by-product of the organisation of tasks and duties in 
railway services and this may well flow on into union organisation. 
There is no doubt, also, that some of the moderate and 
conservative unions, those that were not radical in their beliefs, 
made no secret of their dislike for the philosophical and political 
idealism of Moroney, Nolan and their colleagues ,2"* and their own 
loyal adherence to the arbitration system led them to deplore the use 
of direct action except as a last resort, and to be fearful of what 
they saw as the "spoiling" tactics of the A.R.U. in industrial matters. 
22. Frank McKenna: "A Glossary of Railwaymen's Talk", op.cit., p.vii. 
"These divisions have deep historical roots. The early railways 
were organised on a military basis, with grades replacing ranks. 
The companies relied on the different grades to discipline and keep 
a check on one another." 
23. ibid. , p. viii. 
24. J.B. Harding: op.cit. "The said Union [Queensland Railway Traffic 
Employees] consists of Railway Employees, the great majority of 
whom were formerly members of the Queensland Railways Union, and 
who resigned therefrom because of the decision of a majority of 
the delegates to the Conference of the said Queensland Railways 
Union to vote from the funds of the said union a sum of £10 to the 
Workers Defence Committee in aid of certain members of an organisatio: 
known as the ' International Workers of -the World' , and because of 
the actions of an official o:^ ganiser of the said Queensland Railways 
Union, who was the duly accredited delegate of the 'International 
Workers of the World' to a conference of employees employed by the 
government, in advocating the adoption by such employees of a 'go 
slow' policy, which is believed by me to be recognised as one 
of the principles of the said organisation." 
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Unquestionably, Moroney's leadership was combative and forceful, 
and the probable domination of this man and his views within any proposed 
amalgamation of railway unions threatened to overwhelm not only their 
own desires to support the government, its policies and its 
instrumentalities, but also their own positions of power and influence 
as leaders of independent, though often numerically small, unions. 
Another possible cause of friction may have been that the A.R.U. did 
not go quietly about its business, holding to its "different" ideas but 
abstaining from the missionary role. George Rymer was a good 
proselytlzer through the Advocate, though Moroney was a more fluent 
and rousing speaker in public. Between them they kept up a ceaseless 
educational and propaganda campaign, which was continued by Nolan, and 
although The Advocate could not compare with The Worker in the size of 
its circulation and the extent of its reading public, the message of 
solidarity, industrial unionism and direct action was carried to 
railwaymen in most areas of the State.25 Books and pamphlets, many of 
them part of the literature of the I.W.W., went the same way, "to 
educate the railwaymen to the need for industrial unity, and as to its 
bearing upon working class emancipation."26 
For these sorts of reasons, it is not surprising that inter-union 
solidarity was not easily achieved in the Queensland railway service. 
25. After -the 1927 strike, McCormack cancelled the right of free 
carriage on the trains for The Advocate, an action which the A.R.U. 
viewed as one of pure spite. 
26. The Daily Standard, September 23rd, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in The 
Advocate, Vol. XLVI, No. 7, 1966, p. 2. Cf. Railwaymen and 
Unionism: a Case for Amalgamation, Australian Railways Union (Q'ld. 
Branch), n.d. 
247. 
It was attained in the 1925 railway strike,27 but only because the 
issues were plainly Industrial, and the case for the restoration of the 
basic wage cut was widely supported by rank and file workers. Furthermore 
Premier Gillies acceded to the railwaymen's demands within a week 
which gave the "united front" little opportunity to crumble. When 
Gillies was moved almost Immediately from the Premiership to the Board 
of Trade and Arbitration, a more worthy opponent for the "militant 
minority" was found in the new Premier, W. McCormack. 
Cohesion among the railway unions was more difficult to sustain in 
1927 when they were drawn into the South Johnstone sugar workers 
dispute, even though McCormack outraged large sections of the labour 
movement, and the Labor press, too,2S by his lock-out of the railwaymen. 
Firstly, the strike dragged on for some weeks and the issues, as they 
affected railwaymen, were not clear beyond the need to sustain other 
workers in their attempt at direct action, viz: the northern sugar 
workers, who belonged to the A.W.U. 
Moreover, solidarity was never possible once T. Kisslck of the 
A.F.U.L.E., supported by some of the small, sectional unions, made it 
27. For a more detailed accoiont of the 1925 and 1927 railway strikes, 
see M. Bridson Cribb: op.oit. 
28. "If the Government wanted a single handed scrap with the A.R.U., 
anyone of a dozen issues could have been selected, none of which 
would involve a basic principle, but this issue, which strikes at 
the very root of industrial organisation, strangely enough seems 
to suit a Labor Premier and a Labor Cabinet as well as any other." 
The Worker, August 31st, 1927, p. 6. 
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clear that his union had no quarrel with the Government,29 even after 
it had locked out A.F.U.L.E. members along with those of the other 
railway unions. At Kisslck's request, a South Johnstone and Railways 
Dispute Committee was set up which he and his colleagues came to 
control; at the same time he refused to be publicly associated in any 
way with Moroney and Rymer.-^ '^  Under these circumstances, the strike was 
settled on McCormack's terms, which included the requirement that the 
men sign a pledge to obey the rules and regulations of the Railway 
Department before they could be reinstated in the service. 
In the period under review in this study, the longest and most 
Important exercise in the use of direct industrial action, as applied 
by railway workers, was the 1948 railway strike. This strike was in 
operation from February 2nd to April 5th, and during that period a 
remarkably high and constant level of solidarity was maintained. On 
this particular occasion, the industrial issues centred upon the 
workshop and running shed tradesmen, who had not received "the 
additional marginal Increases of 15/-, 13/- and 11/- already paid under 
29. T. Kisslck: Brisbane Courier, September 8th, 1927. "Up to the 
present his organisation had no quarrel with the Government. As 
the Premier had stated, the issue of the ultimatimi was, in effect, 
to bring the matter to a head quickly and the most important 
reason was to put the members who had already been dismissed in 
exactly the same position as those who were employed... He was 
quite satisfied that the Government and his union sympathetically 
agreed that railwaymen could not be the buffer in every industrial 
dispute." 
30. Brisbane Courier, August 27th, 1927. Kisslck stated that members 
of his union did not want to be addressed at meetings by either 
Rymer or Moroney, and that he himself would not sit on any platform 
with them. For these and other actions, Kissick was expelled as a 
delegate of the A.F.U.L.E. to the Trades and Labor Council. The 
Advocate, November 15th, 1927. 
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the Mooney Award to rail workers in other States, and to thousands of 
metal workers throughout Australia Including employees in private 
industry in Queens land. "-^-^  Thus the original impetus for the withdrawal 
of labour came, not only from members of the A.R.U., but also from the 
powerful Amalgamated Engineering Union (A.E.U.), supported by its 
federal organisation, together with other workshop craft organisations, 
such as the Federated Ironworkers' Association, the Blacksmiths' and 
Boilermakers' Societies, the Electrical Trades Union and the Vehicle 
Builders' Federation. 
The A.F.U.L.E, representative was a member of the Central Disputes 
Committee which unanimously called the strike for midnight, February 2nd, 
1948 and Theo, Kisslck, still leader of the union, is recorded as one 
of a team of trade union speakers who, "working day and night, week 
after week - kept striking railwaymen Informed of each development and 
the tactics necessary to carry the dispute further stages towards 
victory,"-^ 2 yet a perusal of the Railway Dispute Fund, managed by the 
Queensland Trades and Labor Council, shows that out of a total amount 
of £5,236.5.4 raised by unions in Queensland alone ,^-? the A.F.U.L.E. 
contributed only £56 and there is no record of the railway sectional 
unions providing one penny of finance for the strike. On March 15th, 
31. The Queensland Railway Strike: Report and Balance Sheet. Queensland 
Railways Central Disputes Committee, .February, 1949, p, 6. 
32. ibid. , p. 12. 
33. ibid. , pp. 68-71. The total receipts to the strike fund from 
throughout Australia were £35,084.12.7, but this did not include 
svibstantial amoionts paid out by individual unions to their members 
as strike pay. 
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the A.F.U.L.E. Divisional Council ordered its members back to work, 
and this was the only break in the united front until the miners, who 
had come out on a solidarity basis only, returned to work on March 23rd. 
Once again the A.F.U.L.E. and the sectional unions had not stood 
together to the end with other railway workers in a strike action. 
It is true that in 1948 the issue of tradesmen's marginal Increases 
did not directly Impinge on A.F.U.L.E, members, or guards, shunters, 
station-masters etc. , but there was a much more cogent reason why they 
found it difficult, and eventually, impossible to make common cause 
with other workers in this strike. A number of union representatives 
on the Disputes Committee were known Communists, and the A.E.U. 
which was spearheading the action was, federally, a Communist controlled 
union; its Federal Councillor, E.J. Rowe, who provided much of the 
dynamism and tactical leadership of the strike was also a Communist. As 
the strike rolled on, control of it passed to these men together with 
their comrades J. Healy and E. Englart of the Waterside Workers' 
Federation, while the overt activity of the Communist Party itself, 
along with some of its auxiliary and front organisations e.g. Eureka 
Youth League, Militant Women, was stepped up to such a degree that the 
Party, together with its members in the unions, was, to all Intents and 
purposes, in command of the strike. 
The A.R.U.'s long and close association, both personally on the 
part of its leaders, and collectively through its membership, with 
men like F.W. Paterson, Communist-M.L.A. for Bowen, had been an issue 
between itself and the less radical unions at the time of the 1927 
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strike and much had been publicly made of this, then and later,-^ "^  by 
its opponents in the Government and the A.W.U. As has been stated 
previously, while Moroney and Rymer were not Communists, though 
branded as such,-^ 5 their ideological beliefs were of such a kind that 
little separated them on the principles of industrial unionism and the 
use of direct industrial action. The A.R.U. was not bound by the 
dictates of International Communism and could, therefore, be more 
flexible with regard to the timing and tactics of industrial action. In 
1948 the strategy of the Communist Party impelled strike action,-^ 6 
which, for different reasons, was in accord with A.R.U. desires. 
Disregarding the A.F.U.L.E. and the sectional railway unions, there 
are several explanations for the high level of united action achieved 
in 1948. Firstly there is no doubt that once the Communists gained 
control they brought efficiency, expertise and tactical skills to the 
day-to-day management of the action. This applied particularly to the 
well organised picketing which must have intimidated many waverers, and 
to the skilful and continuous use of pamphleteering and panels of 
speakers to keep in close communication with the workers, and for general 
propaganda purposes. Even Hanlon's mass media blackout did not prevent 
them from informing the workers of what was going on. The Government's 
introduction of the State of Emergency and its use or abuse, depending 
34. See Q.P.D. for 1927, 
35. Rymer was invariably spoken of in debate and in the press as "Red" 
Rymer. Moroney did not suffer attack on the same scale, evidently 
because it was well known that he was a staunch and active member 
of his church. 
36. Cf. supra, pp. 95-97. 
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on one's viewpoint, of these powers would also have contributed to the 
closing of ranks among the strikers. Finally, as has also been 
previously argued,-^ 7 harsh and difficult working conditions are a factor 
in creating militancy, and railway workers, throughout the war years, 
had been operating in a work environment of under-staffing, extremely 
long hours, and with depleted and worn rolling stock and locomotives.-^^ 
It should be remembered that from 1941 to 1945, "Queensland's 
geographical position made it the battlefront State,"-^ 9 ^ nd that the 
brunt of the transport within Australia of the war requirements of the 
Australian and Allied armies was borne by the Queensland railway 
service. The misguided"^^ decision taken by "the federal authorities to 
build, for wartime use, a number of locomotives on the Garratt 
principle,'^ "^ -^  brought the first of these into service in late 1943. 
By 1945, pre-war stocks of carriages, wagons and locomotives had been 
operated far beyond their normal capacity and the service was forced 
to rely heavily on the Garratt locomotives. Both the Commlssioner'^2 
and the men who drove them"^ -^  attested to their danger in operation e.g. 
37. Cf. supra. Chapter 4. 
38. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for the years ended June 30th, 
1945-1948, 
39. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for the year ended June 30th, 
1945. 
40. This was the view of the Railway Commissioner, ibid. , pp. 6-7. 
41. ibid. 
42. ibid. 
43. ibid. "For several weeks past all of the Garratt engines have been 
laid up, due to the refusal of enginemen to operate them, following 
a series of derailments." 
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the lifting of one of the driving wheels clear off the road when the 
engines rounded sharp curves. 
The situation was made worse by a series of accidents and 
derailments, culminating in the Camp Mountain rail disaster in May, 
1947, "when 15 persons, including the driver and fireman of the train 
lost their lives and 38 others were Injured.'"^ "^  While the report of 
the subsequent public Inquiry stated that "the accident was caused by 
excessive speed, and was not attributable to any defect in locomotive, 
rolling stock or permanent way,""^ 5 railwaymen were not convinced, and 
it continued to be widely rumoured throughout the service that the 
locomotives and rolling stock operated by train crews were death traps. 
These feelings of disquiet were exacerbated by the fact that the 
Department appeared to be doing nothing to relieve the situation. Long 
range forecasting by the Department of post-war needs had been slow 
and hesitant and the manpower shortage meant that the Ipswich Workshops, 
fully engaged in locomotive repairs, and carriage and wagon construction 
and repair, could not build new locomotives, orders for which had to 
be placed with outside firms. Of 74 new locomotives previously ordered 
up to and Including 1947, only four were received and placed in service 
in that year.^6 Understandably, such dangerous working conditions, 
continuing on much longer than anticipated or promised, produced stress 
and tension and more of a mood to countenance strike action over another 
44. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for the year ended June 
30th, 1947, p. 27. 
45. ibid. 
46. ibid. , p. 23. 
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issue than might have been present in a more normal situation. 
The A,W,U. was not involved in either the 1925 or the 1948 strikes 
and although in 1927 the strike had begun with A,W,U. members, the 
union's role became peripheral once the railwaymen had been locked out. 
The A.W.U.'s rivalry with the A.R.U. took other forms and it was in a 
much better position to initiate conflict and to inflict wounds upon 
its opponent than were the railway sectional unions, because of the 
size of its membership, relative to the A.R.U.,^7 and its position of 
power, arising not only from its place in the labour movement but also 
from its membership, directly and indirectly, in the organisational 
"machine" of the A.L.P., in the parliamentary party, and among the 
leaders. "Body snatching" and encroachments on each others preserves 
were more likely to hurt the A.R.U. with its smaller and exclusively 
railway service membership than any raid in reverse by the A.R.U. upon 
the A.W.U. 
The A.W.U. launched a two-pronged attack on the A.R.U. in 1925. 
In the industrial field, it announced the formation of a Railway 
Section within its own organisation,'^^ and though the oft-trumpeted 
number of 5,000 members did not secede from the A.R.U., Moroney 
admitted that at least 400 had done so. The situation became quite 
critical for a time with the defection to the enemy camp of the South-
47. Cf. Table IX, p. 255. The marked drop in 1927 in A.R.U. membership 
from that in 1925 when it reached a peak never achieved before or 
since should be noted. Though there was a comparable increase in 
membership figures for the A.W.U. there is no way of knowing to what 
extent these were recruited from the A.R.U. 
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eastern Divisional Secretary of the A.R.U., Jack Hayes.-^ 9 This forced 
a reorganisation upon the union and the disciplining of the South-eastern 
Executive; confirmation of Hayes' expulsion was sought and obtained 
from the A.R.U. State Conference of that year. 5*5 
The formation of a railway section within the A.W.U. was most 
likely meant as a provocation to its opponent. Skirmishes of this kind 
cannot have been important to the larger organisation, conscious as they 
were that in the wider field of labour politics they could humiliate the 
A.R.U. and negate its influence because of their increasing control of 
the A.L.P. "machine", where they "had the numbers". Accordingly, the 
A.W.U.-Government alliance moved against the A.R.U. at the Labor-ln-
Politics Convention at Southport in 1925 and in the process wiped out 
their own humiliation at the previous Convention at Emu Park, where the 
parliamentary leaders had come close to defeat by the "industrialists" 
and their allies. 
For the purpose of implementing the 1924 Federal A.L.P. Conference 
resolution on Communists ,5-^  the Q.C.E., in 1925, had demanded that all 
49. State Secretary's Report, State Conference, A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch), 
1926 and General Secretary's Report, Australian Council of A.R.U., 
1926. 
50. A re-organisation of the duties of A.R.U. officers had been under-
taken in 1920 and Hayes, who had been Branch secretary, became 
District Secretary of the South-eastern Division. The Daily 
Standard, September 30th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in The Advocate, 
Vol. XLVI, No. 9, 1966, p. 2. Hayes' defection must have rankled 
for Nolan mentions it in his Report to the 24th State Conference 
of the A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch), October 27th, 1966, p. 32, 
51. This resolution of the 1924 Federal A.L.P. Conference declared 
itself against affiliation with the Communist Party of Australia 
and laid down the ineligibility of Communists for membership in the 
A.L.P. L.F. Crisp: The Australian Federal Labour Party 1901-51, 
Longman Green & Co., London, 1955, pp. 176-7. 
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party members sign a pledge affirming that they were not members of the 
Communist Party. The A.R.U. delegates, Rymer and Moroney, refused to do 
so on the grounds that the Q.C.E. had no right to instruct a member of 
an industrial union to sign such a pledge, and this stand was endorsed 
by every District Council of the union. However, after discussion 
within the A.R.U. State Council it was decided that the pledges would 
be signed and endorsed to the effect that this was done on the 
Instructions of the Council.52 
Some months later, at the Labor Convention, the Premier (McCormack) 
moved the suspension of standing orders to discuss the pledges of the 
A.R.U. delegates, which, in his view, were unacceptable as they were 
not unconditional. 
"As a result, the whole matter came up for discussion and 
there were quite a lot of arguments taking place about i t , 
and we saw the spectacle of Cabinet Ministers going around 
amongst A.L.P. branch representatives and public servants, 
and evidently private discussions were taking place all 
around the hall. We learned afterwards that pressure was 
being put on them that they must vote in the right direction -
and when the numbers went up we were passed out from the 
Southport Convention."^3 
After a lengthy but futile correspondence between the A.R.U. and the 
Q.C.E., the union disaffiliated from the A.L.P. and did not return until 
1957, when, at the time of the split, the Trades Hall group. Including 
the A.R.U., gained the ascendancy, and the A.W.U. Itself subsequently 
left the party. 
52. Cf. Brisbane Courier, November 30th, 1925 and February 9th, 1926. 
Also M. Bridson Cribb: op.cit. 
53. Interview with George Rymer. 
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The isolation of the A.R.U. within the labour movement was thus 
accomplished, and this must Inevitably have affected its industrial 
position and the extent of its following within the railway service. 5^^ 
Though ideologically opposed to parliamentary action and believing 
that unions would gain only what their power and strength enabled them 
to take, Moroney himself conceded that many A.R.U. members wished to be 
part of some political organisation, preferably the A.L.P. 
From the evidence presented above, it would seem that inter-union 
rivalry did affect industrial relations in the Queensland railway service 
and, furthermore, that power struggles within the political labour 
movement had their repercussions Industrially when the A.L.P. was in 
office. It would also appear that sustained militancy, unless used as 
a tactical weapon only, as the pilots use it, can be counter-productive. 
Where militancy forms part of the total corpus of belief of a union's 
leadership and is directed to long-term social changes as well as 
short-term Industrial issues, its continuing use may, in time, be 
destructive of the union Itself, in terms of loss of membership, 
finance, etc., unless these beliefs reflect those of the majority of 
the wider industrial community. In a similar manner, sustained support 
for militant action at the rank and file level to which leaders fail to 
respond may, in turn, lead to the defeat of the leaders themselves. 5 
Finally, from what has been seen of the Queensland railway service, if 
54. Cf. Table IX, p. 255. 
55. Cf. Lloyd Ross: "A Campaign for an Industry Allowance - Some 
Sociological Aspects", The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 3, 
No. 1, April, 1961, pp. 64-67. 
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direct industrial action is to be successful inter-union rivalry has 
to be overcome and solidarity maintained; this suggests that industrial 
Issues must be present of sufficient importance to elicit sustained 
response from the majority of workers. 
The Australian Federation of Air Pilots has been fortunate in that 
it has not had to concern itself in any meaningful way, until recently, 
with countering the claims of rival unions, and, consequently, to be 
able to speak on behalf of all pilots has been one of its strengths in 
industrial bargaining with the operators. While the ground staff in 
the airline industry are covered by many different unions, and cabin 
crew by the Flight Stewards Association and the Airline Hostesses 
Association, the pilots share the flight deck with only one other 
group - the Flight Engineers, organised in the Australasian Airline 
Flight Engineers Association.^ As no one other than a currently 
licenced pilot may take an aircraft off the ground, the Federation need 
not fear that if it calls out its members, the Flight Engineers will 
replace them and keep the aircraft flying.57 
Until 1968, with the occasional and very rare exception, all 
pilots employed by the Australian domestic operators and by Qantas were 
56. There is one other group, all of which are employed by Qantas -
the Australasian Airline Navigators' Association. This body is 
not and never has been registered under the Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbi-tration Act because it has insufficient 
members to qualify for registration. 
57. Overlapping membership in railway tmions does pose a problem, e.g. 
the A.R.U. and the A.F.U.L.E. both represent engine drivers and 
unless solidarity is maintained, a strike by one union may be 
broken by members of the other union continuing to work. 
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members of the Federation. The situation changed, but only marginally, 
with the advent of the Air Pilots' Guild of Australia in that year.55 
Soundings taken early in 1971 had Indicated that Guild membership had 
contracted to a mere handful, and even that assessment may have been 
optimistic.59 There were several pilots who belonged to neither 
organisation at that tlme.^^ 
The Federation had been disturbed by the existence of the Guild 
and although the latter was in its dying throes, moved to hasten its 
demise by blacklisting Guild members and instructing Federation pilots 
not to fly with them.^ -^  It also extended this edict to cover all non-
Federation pilots, which, in effect, meant that it was trying to 
enforce a closed shop within the industry. 
When used by manual unions, the principle of compulsory or 
preferential unionism usually signifies that workers must take out 
trade union membership, otherwise their workmates will refuse to work 
with them. In adopting a characteristic of "trade unions", using 
Rawson's definition, the Federation advanced this a step further, for 
there is more than a semantic difference between enforcing membership 
in an appropriate trade union, and enforcing membership in one 
particular union - the Federation. 
58. Cf. supra, p. 127-128. 
59. Courier Mail, October 6th, 1971, where it is stated that the Guild 
had only two members, both employed by Ansett Airlines. 
60. ibid. There were three pilots who did not belong to either the 




Rank and file pilots with whom this latest development was 
discussed, supported the Federation's contention that because pilots 
pay very large amounts in membership fees to the Federation, it is 
unfair to expect that those who do not have this monetary outlay should 
still reap the benefits obtained for all pilots by the Federation. 
They were disturbed however by other implications of the rigid 
enforcement of membership in the Federation. A pilot not prepared to 
join, or expelled^2 by the organisation would be unemployable within 
the domestic airline industry in Australia and by Qantas, and more than 
likely compelled to leave altogether the profession which used the 
only skills he possessed; or else leave the country, if he wished to 
continue as a commercial pilot and was forced to seek employment overseas. 
The conflict between the Federation and the non-Federation pilots 
came to a head in mid-October last when Captain Ian Cameron, President 
of the Guild, submitted a log of claims on behalf of his members to the 
Flight Crew Officers' Industrial Tribunal, at the same time appealing 
62. Under Rule 2, 7 a to c, pp. 17-19 of the most recent edition of the 
Constitution and By-laws of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots, 
provision is made for the suspension or expulsion from the 
Federation of any member "whose conduct has in the opinion of a 
majority of those present at such a Convention, been a breach of 
the code of ethics or proved detrimental to the interests of the 
Federation." Also under Rule 2, p. 13b, provision is made in the 
membership for what is called an Agency Client - "a pilot with 
conscientious objection to full membership or if he is rejected 
for full membership". An agency client has to pay an annual 
si±iscription equivalent to that of a full member, will be 
represented by the Federation in contract negotiations with his 
employing company, has automatic provident fund cover, and legal 
representation in event of aircraft accident or incident. An agency 
client cannot vote, attend Federation meetings, hold elective office 
or receive Federation publications. He is not bound by rules and 
by-laws of the Federation except in matters of contractual agreement, 
but is subject to any levies or payments required from time to time 
of full members. 
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to Mr. Justice Coldham (the Tribunal) against the decision taken by 
Ansett Airlines to dispense with the services of non-Federation pilots 
after December 8th, 1971.°-' The Federation had been increasing its 
pressure on the operator and also on its own members to enforce the 
union's ban on "crewing" with non-Federation pilots. ^"^  
The Tribunal was unsuccessful in its attempt at mediation,^5 ^j^ j^ 
as a direct consequence of Ansett's "notices of dismissal". Captain 
Cameron and his fellow-Guild member. Captain E.H. Boorman, were left 
with no alternative if they wished to remain in the industry but to 
join the Federation as "agency clients".^^ Captain Cameron was quoted 
as saying that the Guild would continue for it still disagreed with 
many of the Federation's policies and had its own industrial issues to 
fight, including new logs of claims for agricultural and helicopter 
pilots.^7 
The Guild had appealed, initially, to the pilots in general aviation 
because this was a field largely neglected by the Federation and it 
could conceivably continue to represent their interests effectively in 
the future, though the Federation is also stirring itself at last on 
63. Cf. The Age, October 29th, 1971, November 9th, 1971. 
64. The Australian, October 16th, 1971. "Union ban 'caused pilots to 
fly under stress'." 
65. Mr. Justice Coldham was severely critical of Ansett Airlines and 
the Federation for not trying to resolve the dispute arising out 
of A.F.A.P.'s policy of compulsory Federation membership. The 
Australian, ibid. 
66. For an explanation of "agency client", see supra, footnote 62, p.261. 
The -three pilots who were members of neither organisation had joined 
the Federation the previous week. 
67. The Age, ibid. 
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behalf of general pilots. As a force within the Australian domestic 
and overseas airline industry, however, the Guild is dead. The 
Federation's policy of enforcing a "closed shop" has been completely 
successful. Yet, by adopting a rigid and authoritarian attitude on 
this question as it has tended to do on occasions, with the operators, 
the Federation could cause to happen eventually what this particular 
policy was obviously introduced to prevent - the creation of more than 
one union representing commercial pilots and the intrusion of inter-
union rivalry into industrial relations in the airline industry. 
No management which produces, sells or distributes goods or services 
can afford to disregard competitors in the same or contiguous fields, 
but if it is in a monopolistic position, the question of inter-
management relations becomes of much less Importance. The Railway 
Department has such a monopoly of transport by rail in Queensland, but 
the service is open to competition from sea, road and air transport, 
which Introduces an element of conflict into relationships between the 
four. 
Coastal shipping kept alive the first settlements in what is now 
Queensland, and maintained their only link with Sydney. As more of the 
State was opened up, the steamers plied further north and by 1870 
Cleveland Bay (Townsville) "had its regular steam service with Brisbane 
and Sydney; and within the next few years, this had been extended, 
first to Cooktown and then to Cairns."^^ Thereafter, and until the 
68. A.G. Davies: "Pioneer Steamships in Queensland Waters", Journal of 
the Historical Society of Queensland, Vol. ill. No. 1, December, 1937, 
p. 23. 
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linking of Townsville and Cairns by through rail with Brisbane in 1924, 
the main ports and the coastal ships which serviced them occupied a 
position of strategic importance in the development of Queensland.^9 
In the following years, the existence of the coastal railway, with 
its convenience and special rates to get payable traffic and back 
loading, together with more intangible influences like the uncertainties 
of waterside troubles, general changes in shipping conditions and the 
government's policy of assisting industries through low railway rates, 
all contributed to check the growth of traffic through some of the ports. 7'^  
69. Cf. The Bureau of Economics and Statistics: Report upon the Enquiry 
into Railway Competition with Ports. Government Printer, Brisbane, 
1931, p. 12. "They were the only channels through which the 
ordinary trade with the South could flow, and through which overseas 
exports could be despatched directly or indirectly. But the very 
process of extending lines from the ports was bound in time to link 
them all together and to destroy the position of virtual monopoly 
which the ports enjoyed." The effect is clearly shown in -these two 
Appendixes to the Report of the Commrissioner for Railways, 1919-20. 
Appendix I: Annual Report of the Central Division. "Owing to 
coastal steamers not running for some time and scarcity of shipping 
space siibsequently, there was considerable increase in railway 
traffic from Southern states and Brisbane to Central Division ... 
which caused siibstantial increase in revenue." Appendix 2: 
Northern Division Report. "The irregularity of arrival of shipping 
had a very disturbing effect on our earnings ... It is noticed that 
in case of loss of shipping the loss in traffic to the railway is 
not overtaken and as shipping has a great effect upon our railway 
traffic, owing to our isolation, the shipping hold up meant a very 
much reduced revenue to us." 
70. In the past decade, with the exploitation of the mineral deposits 
of Central Queensland, especially coal, the establishment of an 
alumina plant at Gladstone, the increased export trade in meat to 
the American market and other developments, many of the old 
established ports like Bowen, Gladstone and Townsville have boomed 
and new ones have been established, such as Hay Point, outlet for 
the Goonyella coalfield. This study does not incorporate these 
new developments as the period under review, with regard to the 
Railway Department, closes at 1950. 
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At the same time, 
"individual ports were increasing their capacities to handle 
more traffic and to cater for the requirements of modern 
vessels. They were doing this without regard to the new 
situation created by the railways, or to one another, and as 
the State was their financier, without much anxiety as to 
the increase in their capital liabilities."^^ 
The points of emphasis here are that this expansion by both Railway 
Department and Harbour Boards with its consequent over-capitalization 
was quite uncoordinated, the losses on both sides had to be borne by 
the community as they were both public utilities, and any attempt by 
the Railway Commissioner to attract business, such as the wool trade, 
away from the ports, brought an immediate reaction of group pressures 
upon the Government of the day to restrain him. Whatever solutions 
were found, they were political, and not based on the premises of 
rationality, economy and business principles. 
Parallel with the uncoordinated development of the railway system, 
ports and coastal shipping went the equally uncoordinated growth in 
road traffic and transport, first publicly noted with alarm as a 
potential rival to the railways by the Commissioner in his Report for 
1924. There is hardly a year thereafter within our period when he does 
not warn of the inroads which road transport was making into railway 
71. Report upon the Enquiry into Railway Competition with Ports, 
op.cit., p. 14. cf. The Bureau of Economics and Statistics: 
Railway Economics, op.cit., pp. 55-57. 
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profits from the haulage of freight. "^^^ In 1945, another serious rival 
was thought to be entering the field. 
"It is inevitable that in the near future the railways will 
be subject to much greater competition from air transport 
than ever before. Already there is evidence of growing air 
movement, while many road services which were temporarily 
banned during most of the war period have now been relicensed. 
Further, a substantial volume of transport previously handled 
by coastal vessels which was diverted to the railways owing 
to wartime shortage of shipping is certain to be conveyed by 
sea when ships become available. It must be apparent that 
unless some extraordinary new development, of which there is 
as yet no evidence, occurs, railway revenues will decline 
seriously, whereas expenditure cannot be reduced in the same 
ratio."73 
If successive Commissioner's, each in his turn, played Cassandra 
to their Ministerial masters their warnings did not go entirely unheard. 
Both the Moore Government7'^ and the following A.L.P. Government75 in the 
period 1931-32 passed legislation "to create transport boards for the 
purpose of coordinating all forms of transport services" and through 
licencing, to regulate and control the expansion of road transport in 
72. For example, see Report of the Commissioner for Railways for year 
ended June 30th, 1926, where, after stating that motor transport 
has been seriously affecting the economic working of the railways, 
he states, "It is to be regretted that the individual overlooks 
the fact that he is part owner of the railways and avails himself 
of a small saving in freight charges by patronising motor transport, 
thereby tending to reduce the revenue of the railways, the loss on 
which he has to make up in another direction, and, at the same 
time, pay increased rates for road maintenance." 
73. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for year ended June 30th, 
1945. 
74. 22 Geo. V. No. 48. The State Transport Coordination Act of 1931. 
75. 23 Geo. V. No. 24. The State Transport Act of 1932. 
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Queensland.-^ ^ Though this was strenuously denied,77 the legislation 
was seen as an attempt to protect the railways from the encroachraent 
of road transport, and that something of that purpose was achieved 
was attested to by the Railway Commissioner in his Report to Parliament 
in the following year.'° 
Succeeding governments have continued the policy of regulation of 
road transport intra state, by licence and permit, with the imposition 
of a ton-mile tax on journeys competitive with railways,^ but since 
1954, with a change in interpretation of the relevant section of the 
Constitution, interstate road transport has been removed from the 
regulation and control of the States. While the regulatory tactic has 
reduced competition from road hauliers within the State, it has by no 
76. Q.P.D., Vol. CLX, 1931, p. 2534. 
77. The Secretary for Railways (Hon. Godfred Morgan, Murilla): "It has 
been said -that the Bill is introduced for the ptnrpose of protecting 
-the Railways of this State. I want to give that statement a most 
emphatic denial. This Bill will protect all modes of transport, 
including -the Railways." ibid. 
78. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for the year ended Jtane 30th, 
1933. "Road motor competition in both passenger and goods traffic 
continues to seriously affect the railway revenue, although a 
considerable measure of coordination of road and rail transport has 
been achieved under the provisions of the State Transport Act of 1932 
which became operative in April, 1933. The more efficient regulation 
of road motor services has enabled the railways to regain portion of 
the traffic of which they have been deprived by reason of uneconomic 
competition." [in the short space of two months!] 
79. H.M. Kolsen: The Economics and Control of Road-Rail Comipetition. 
Sydney University Press, 1968, p. 142. At the present moment, 
"regulation is through the State Transport Facilities Act 1946-59, 
the State Transport Act 1960, and the Roads (Contribution to 
Maintenance) Act 1957-8. The controlling body is the Department of 
Transport as set up by the State Transport Facilities Act 1964. 
There are three principal executives: the Commissioner (who is 
subject to the direction of the Minister), the Deputy-Commissioner, 
and -the Secretary." 
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means eliminated it.^ *^  
D 7 
As Kolsen has pointed out,°-^  the intention has clearly been 
the retention of traffic by rail and no attempt has been made to guide 
traffic into the "best" medium. Lack of coordination of all forms of 
transport is the nub of a problem which is not endemic to Australia but 
is world wide. The present situation is a misuse of the two forms of 
transport from the community viewpoint, and "encourages the road haulier 
to concentrate selectively on the full-load, high grade traffic between 
main centres", - what the Commissioner for Railways calls "picking the 
eyes out of the trade" - "to the exclusion of the low transport volume 
of sparsely populated areas" which is left to the railways, but "which, 
in the interests of national transport economics, could be road served 
with far greater frequency, effectiveness and economy."^2 
Little genuine effort appears to have been directed towards a proper 
coordination of national transport and because each respective system 
"just grew", like Topsy, it would not be easy at this stage to re-define 
areas of operation and re-deploy forces. There are very real obstacles 
in the way, including "a complicated, illogical, and unwieldly division 
of responsibilities between particular governments. Federal, State and 
local."^ -5 Men of experience and professional expertise such as the 
80. ibid. , pp. 132-3. 
81. ibid. , p. 142. 
82. Australian Institute of Political Science: Australia's Transport 
Crisis. Angus & Robertson, Melbourne, 1956, p. 69. Cf. A.R.U. 
(Q'ld. Branch): 24th State Conference Report, October 27th, 1966, 
pp. 1-2. 
83. ibid. , p. 6. 
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members of the Commonwealth Transport Committee, have met from time to 
time, deliberated, laid down general principles and made recommendations,^'^ 
but so far there are few results to be noted. 
Regulation of road haulage in Queensland has barely touched the 
problem of rationalization of the whole transport system,^5 ^ problem 
made Intractable by the fact that transport has always been and still is 
a "political football" in this State. All governments have been subject 
to pressures from a variety of sources: road hauliers, pastorallsts, 
grain growers, Chambers of Commerce and other merchant associations, 
shipping and mining interests. Harbour Boards and local authorities.^^ 
While they have basically adopted protection of the railways as their 
main guideline in policy, this has been subject to change at times in a 
quite arbitrary manner for political reasons. Consequently the 
84. For example. Summary of Report on the Co-ordination of Transport 
in Australia by the Commonwealth Transport Committee, Government 
Printer, Canberra, May, 1929. 
85. Cf. Summary of Recommendations and Conclusions contained in the 
Report of Ford, Bacon and Davis, Inc., on the Organisation, 
Facilities, and Operations of the Queensland Railways, op.cit. 
Though commissioned to examine, in the main, the internal 
organisation and operation of the Department, Ford, Bacon and Davis, 
Inc., did investigate competition from other forms of transport. 
They estimated(p. 2) that in 1961, road hauliers, exclusive of 
inter-state carriers diverted about 6% of increased ton-mile traffic. 
The corresponding railway revenue would have amotinted to more than 
$2 million in 1961. They also note a noticeable increase over the 
period 1951-61, in interstate tonnages carried by coastal shipping, 
and that "with an expanding interstate traffic both by sea and 
via the Uniform Gauge Railway, the Queensland Railways have been 
unable to increase -their tonnage." (p. 2.) 
86. Cf. Report upon the Enquiry into Railway Competition with Ports, 
op. cit. 
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Commissioner in attempting to place the service on a business footing 
and offer competitive rates,^7 ^ as had his own planning subject to 
Ministerial direction. Thus, competition within the transport system 
between the railways and other carriers has had a lasting effect upon 
railway economics, and this is ultimately reflected in industrial 
relations within the service. 
With regard to the domestic airline Industry, the government has 
been of the opinion, for some years, that as a consequence of its two-
airline policy, it has removed, through rationalization, possible sources 
of management conflict over aircraft types, routes, fares etc., while 
at the same time retaining the essential spirit of competition within 
the Industry.55 In fact, rationalization covers such a wide area. 
Including time tables, that the airlines compete for the very small 
percentage of potential customers, as yet uncommitted to either operator, 
on the insubstantial grounds of courtesy, service and the style and 
87. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for the year ended Jtine 30th, 
1929. "Not only do -the railways because of their developmental 
character fail to secure a full return in revenue, but they have 
not freedom of action in securing all the traffic available, because 
policy has to be considered, and the effect of -this must be 
reflected in the balance sheet." There is no doubt that the 
Railway Department because of its rigid organisation and 
antiquated methods has not exploited all its potential in competition 
with other carriers. This point was made also by Ford, Bacon and 
Davis, Inc., op.oit. , and many of their recommendations for over-
coming this have now been adopted, e.g. containerisation, setting 
up of a railway sales organisation. 
88. As noted earlier in this thesis, in Chapter 2, Part III, the 
constitutional basis for much of the Federal Government's airline 
policies has been its "customs and excise" power, controlling the 
import of new aircraft, and also its financial power. The recent 
High Court's ruling on corporations, it is believed, will give the 
Federal Government direct control over airline operations in the 
future. Cf. Australian Financial Review, September 6th, 1971. 
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colour of hostesses' uniforms. However, there is a spirit of rivalry, 
if not of genuine competition between the two companies, and through 
the machinery of the rationalisation system and through public 
relations exercises59 they continue to probe for chinks in each other's 
armour. 
Qantas is in a quite different position, exposed to all the 
vicissitudes and instability of the international airline industry, and 
the intense competition between the operators, though regulated to 
some extent by inter-governmental agreement, has a profound effect on 
the economic viability of Qantas, and thus on its industrial relations 
policies. 
The fact that Ansett/A.N.A. is the only major private enterprise 
company has had a marginal influence on the relationship between the 
operators with respect to their labour relations policies. Because by 
government regulation the domestic airline industry is restricted to two 
major companies, and the withdrawal of labour by the pilots from one 
airline would give its only competitor a substantial advantage, however 
temporary, cohesion and cooperation between them is highly desirable in 
this area. For their part, the pilots, believing that Ansett/A.N.A. is 
89. Cf. The Australian, December 13th, 1971, p. 1. "Ansett group 
wet nursed says Scherger", where the Chairman of T.A.A., Sir 
Frederick Scherger strongly attacked Sir Reginald Ansett, Chairman 
and Managing Director of Ansett Transport Industries over the 
benefits Sir Reginald's non-aviation enterprises were receiving 
indirectly from the two-airline policy. 
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economically in a slightly more vulnerable position than T.A.A.90 
direct their industrial relations policies towards both companies, but 
on many Issues push harder on Ansett/A.N.A., knowing that once Sir 
Reginald has reached an agreement with them, T.A.A. , unless the 
circumstances are exceptional, must follow suit. 
90. This belief is more psychological than factual, as the essence of 
the two airline policy is to equalise the position of Ansett/A.N.A. 




This study has had one main objective; to investigate two major 
groupings of employees within the transport industry, both reputationally 
militant, and using Dunlop's criteria for understanding union-management 
relationships as a framework for the inquiry, to establish the causes 
of militancy in these unions. 
This has been done, and with respect to a manual trade union, the 
A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch), and to an organisation of white collar 
employees, the A.F.A.P., evidence has been presented to call seriously 
into question the proposition that militancy arises from a single 
cause.-^  Militancy has been shown to have many roots and this conclusion 
is applicable not only to the organisations under review, but also to 
the great majority of conflict situations arising within a union-
management relationship.2 
Beyond this basic precept one cannot go with the same degree of 
certainty because although the multi-factoral basis of militancy has 
1. Cf. supra. Chapter 1. Desmond W. oxnam: "Issues in Industrial 
Conflict. Australian Experience, 1913-63", The Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 9, No. 1, March, 1967, p. 13. "Industrial conflict 
is a complex phenomenon which is not the product of any single cause. 
A distinction must be made between the incidents which precipitate 
a crisis and the underlying complex of factors which render the 
parties vulnerable to conflict over such incidents."; K.G.J.C. 
Knowles: "'Strike-proneness' and its Determinants", op.cit., pp. 224-
29. 
2. For additional supportive evidence, see Lloyd Ross: "Case Studies 
in Conflict", Conflict and Cooperation. Industrial Relations 
Society of N.S.W., Seminar, I960; also supra. Chapter 1. 
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been established, it has also been obvious in the course of this study 
that militancy in each union does not spring from identical sets of 
causes. What can be asserted with some confidence is that militancy 
expresses Itself in response to a combination of factors, and that 
this combination will vary from union to union and according to the 
economic, social and political circumstances of the times. 
Compared to the A.F.A.P., the A.R.U. has had a long history, and 
ample opportunity for its relationship with management to develop into 
a set pattern, one characterized, at best, by a guarded hostility and 
a lack of understanding of and respect for each other's viewpoint and 
beliefs. That the lines of development of this relationship have 
scarcely diverged from those established at the outset has been due 
mainly to the permanence of other factors leading to militancy. The 
Railway Department has been slow to improve conditions of work, to 
change its own organisational structure to make it more flexible and 
responsive to potential conflict situations, and to set up adequate 
machinery for continuous consultation with the railway unions; politics 
has continued to intrude upon railway management and industrial 
relations, and major decisions continue to be made less from the 
standpoint of railway economics than as a result of group pressures 
and the expediencies of party politics. 
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On the union side the situation has been even more static.-^  For 
over fifty years the affairs of the A.R.U. have been in the hands of 
but two men, Tim Moroney and Frank Nolan, both of whom after their 
initial election to office were never seriously challenged. Nor did 
they have to face their rank and file at frequent elections. While 
their virtual life tenure can be seen as a possible counterweight to 
other factors causing militancy, in that it has been suggested that 
union leaders elected for a finite term need to be more responsive 
to pressures from below and more "militant" than those with greater 
security of tenure,"^  this must be balanced, in its turn, against the 
philosophical attitudes and beliefs of Moroney and Nolan. These beliefs 
were themselves militant in that they denied the ability of 
3. Though beyond the limits of this study, it should be noted that 
changes have occurred since 1950 in the combination of factors 
productive of conflict situations within the A.R.U.-Railway 
Department relationship. There has been a decline in the relative 
importance of the railways vis-a-vis other means of transport; 
working conditions have improved particularly within the 
construction and maintenance sections, due mainly to increased 
mechanization, which has, in turn, created further problems of 
redundancy; the membership level of the A.R.U. has dropped from 
9,358 in 1950 to approximately 7,000 and the leadership of the 
Combined Railways Unions has clearly passed from the A.R.U. to 
F. Doyle of the A.F.U.L.E. Since the split within the labour 
movement in Queensland in 1956, the A.L.P. has been in opposition, 
and the Trades Hall group of unions, of which the A.R.U. has now 
become a prominent member, has replaced the A.W.U. as the dominant 
union influence within the party. Nolan's successor as General 
State Secretary, R.J. Patterson, though newly appointed and therefore 
something of an unknown quantity appears much more the union 
bureaucrat than the ideologue. A superficial assessment of these 
changes would suggest that on balance, the A.R.U. is likely to be 
less militant in the future than it has been in the past, but a 
closer examination, over time, would be necessary before a precise 
evaluation could be made. 
4. V.L. Allen: Power in Trade Unions. Longmans, Green & Co., London, 
1954. 
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representative, parliamentary government, even that representative of 
the workers, to gain for the working man anything which he could not 
gain for himself, using the power of his labour combined with that of 
all other workers, in direct industrial action. 
Consequently, as has been seen, the "syndicalist" views of the 
A.R.U. leaders have been a major cause of militancy in that union, but 
it is doubtful whether Moroney and Nolan could have retained the support 
of their rank and file for direct industrial action over such a long 
period had not other factors also been operative; in particular, those 
relating to the harsh and often dangerous conditions under which many 
railwaymen worked, together with the problems of redundancy, arising 
from technological change.5 
In the course of this study other elements contributing to conflict 
situations in the railway service have been identified, one of which, 
the extent of sectionalism and inter-union rivalry, may be more 
pertinent to industrial relations in Queensland than elsewhere. In this 
State, compulsory unionism, together with the practice of "bracketing" 
does seem to have reinforced and perpetuated internecine rivalry arising 
from other causes, and to have been responsible for numerous demarcation 
disputes within the industry. Amalgamation as desired by the A.R.U. 
would have eliminated this rationale for militancy, though this is not 
5. The signalmen have become a noticeably militant section within the 
South Australian railway service in recent years and this has been 
attributed to the fact that technological change is in the process 
of eliminating most if not all of their jobs. The South Australian 
delegates, in discussion at the No. 4 Review Course in Railway 
Administration, op.cit. 
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to say that it would have decreased militant action overall, for size, 
in Itself, does not make a union "militant" or "non-militant", but only 
a more formidable opponent for management if the union is determined to 
pursue a course of direct action.^ 
Militancy in the A.F.A.P. has been shown to be the outcome of a 
quite different combination of factors from that created within the 
A.R.U.-Railway Depar-tment relationship. Working conditions and the 
stress, tension and danger associated with flying have been major 
contributory factors, allied with a powerful desire for recognition as 
a professional and elite group with commensurate status and salary. 
The Federation's organisational structure, its wealth and its 
leadership have been other elements in the combination producing 
militancy. A tactical appreciation of the pilots' strategic position 
within the airline industry has also been of importance, though the 
operators are less vulnerable at a time of high unemployment in the 
industry, such as at present, than they were during the acute pilot 
shortage of the mid-1960's, when substantial gains were made through 
direct action by the Federation. 
The arbitration system as a framework within which the majority 
6. The impending merger of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the 
Sheet Metal Working, Agricultural Implement and Stonemaking 
Industrial Union and -the Boilermakers and Blacksmiths Society 
into the 162,000 member Amalgamated Metalworkers Union will create 
Australia's largest union. While employers are reported to be 
anxious to see the amalgamation take place, as a solution to the 
numerous demarcation disputes within the metal trades industry, 
there is also much trepidation as it is alleged that the merger 
will create "one of the most militant left wing unions in the 
country." The Sunday Australian, January 2nd, 1972, p. 1. 
278. 
of union-management relationships have developed in Australia has been 
a stable element in industrial relations, as they have concerned the 
A.R.U., throughout the period encompassed by this study, i.e. to 1950. 
Though ideologically antagonistic to arbitration, the A.R.U. like the 
other railway unions, continued to work the system and consequently no 
in-depth investigation of arbitration as a variable factor in militancy 
has been necessary. 
In the case of the A.F.A.P., the arbitration system has not been 
a constant, with the result that changes in the methods of achieving 
agreement with the operators over a wide spectrum of issues and demands 
have had to be examined and their effects, if any, on pilot militancy 
noted. As has been suggested, recent alterations in the composition of 
the Flight Crew Officers' Industrial Tribunal and other developments 
make it possible that the Federation, given the right circumstances, 
will react militantly to any further attempts to force it back 
completely into the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration system. 
The pilots have consciously chosen the weapons usually associated 
with manual unions to achieve their narrow, mainly economic, industrial 
goals. While the A.R.U. has also been interested in gaining economic 
advantage for its members, and would have had difficulty in retaining 
the support of its rank and file had this not been so,7 Its militancy 
7. Victor Allen: "The Paradox of Militancy", ed. Robin Blackburn & 
Alexander Cockburn: The Incompatibles: Trade Union Militancy and 
the Consensus. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 
1967, p. 242. "Trade tmions are compelled to pursue short term 
aims whatever their value because they have to try to provide 
material evidence to -their members that they are always acting in 
their interests." 
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has had the more far-reaching aims of ultimate social and political 
change, because their leaders believed as part of a wider philosophy 
that "trade unions alone were the chosen instruments for achieving 
socialism."° 
In this belief they have stood comparatively alone among Australian 
trade unions since the failure of the O.B.U. movement in the early 
1920's. Actually, until the last decade, workers' control enjoyed only 
intermittent support in this century, both in the United Kingdom and 
in Australia. After the failure of the British General Strike in 1925, 
guild socialist and syndicalist ideas which had contributed to an 
earlier workers' control movement were no longer Influential in the 
labour movement, though Industrial unionism and workers' control remained 
fundamental beliefs for some unions such as the National Union of 
Railwaymen which continued to reaffirm its demand for nationalization 
and to declare that "no system of State ownership ... will be acceptable 
to the organised railwaymen which does not allow them a due measure 
of control and responsibility in the safe and efficient working of the 
railway system."9 
Ultimately, reformism within the European socialist movement-^^ 
found its British cotmterpart in the commitment of a majority of trade 
8. Perry Anderson: "The Limits and Possibilities of Trade Union 
Action", ibid. 
9. Sterling D. Spero: "Labour Relations in British Nationalized 
Industry", op.cit., p. 6. Spero cites the Union of Post Office 
Workers as the only Civil Service union at that time formally on 
record in favour of workers' control; see Sterling D. Spero: 
"Government as Employer", op.cit., pp. 485-6. 
10. Cf. Peter Gay: The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism - Eduard 
Bernstein's Challenge to Marx. Collier Books, New York, 1962. 
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unions to parliamentary democracy and to the fortunes of the British 
Labour Party.-^ -^  In the years prior to and after the victory of the 
party in the 1945 General Election,the objectives for a democratic 
socialist government were thrashed out,-^ 2 -(-Q include a rationally 
planned economy, producing for use rather than for private profit, and 
the freeing of the worker from his bondage to the exploiting employer, 
"as expressed in such slogans as 'public ownership under democratic 
management', 'industrial democracy' and 'workers' control'."-^ -^  When, 
as the Government, the party found itself responsible for the 
implementation of its policy of public ownership, it was faced, as Spero 
has pointed out, "with the potential contradiction between workers' 
control and social planning ... The employees of an industry were, 
after all, a special Interest whose particular objectives might well 
clash with the interests of the public for whose benefit the industry 
was to be run."-^ '^  In the event workers' control became, when 
Implemented, workers' participation and even that went little beyond the 
appointment by the government of working class representatives to the 
boards of the nationalised Industries. 
A ftarther term in office for Labour in the sixties did little more 
11. "The reformist version was simply the belief that trade union wage 
demands could ultimately lead to a transformation of the conditions 
of the working class, without any change in -the social structure 
of power." Perry Anderson: op.cit. , p. 264. 
12. See, for example. Socialist Union: Twentieth Century Socialism. 
The Economy of To-morrow. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 
England, 1956; C.A.R. Crosland: The Future of Socialism. Jonathon 
Cape, London, abridged and revised edition, 1964 and the extensive 
writings of R.H.S. Grossman. 
13. Sterling D. Spero: "Labour Relations in British Nationalised 
Industry", ibid. 
14. ibid. , p. 7. 
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to convince disenchanted socialists that their objectives could be 
achieved through legislation. At the same time, general dissatisfaction 
with so many aspects of present day society found expression in a 
revival of the idea of participation. As applied to the trade union 
movement, this discontent manifested Itself, in one way, in the 
rediscovery of the concept of workers' control, and the establishment of 
a movement around it which is now providing an aggressively militant 
element within the British trade union movement. Its organising centre 
is the Institute for Workers' Control in Nottingham and "among its 
supporters are Influential trade union leaders like the new President 
of the Amalgamated Engineering Federation, Hugh Scanlon, and Jack Jones, 
head of the 1.5 million strong Transport and General Workers' Union. 
Like Moroney and Nolan in years gone by, though on a much larger 
and more sophisticated scale, the Institute turns out a stream of 
pamphlets and books on the problems of each Industry and the solutions 
workers' control can offer.-^ ^ While the A.R.U. leaders, trapped in the 
practical difficulties arising from sectionalism in the railway service 
concentrated most of their energies on the attempted achievement of 
industrial unionism, and took the concept of workers' control little 
beyond a continual re-statement of general principles, the contemporary 
converts have enunciated their ideology in some depth. 
Generally speaking, they are concerned, in the short term, to demand 
15. Cf. ed. Tony Topham: Democracy on the Docks. Institute for 
Workers' Control, Nottingham, 1970; ed. Ken Coates: Democracy in 
the Motor Industry. Institute for Workers' Control, Nottingham, 
1969. 
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control of (not participation in) some of the less important decision-
making areas in Industry viz. hiring and firing, allocation of jobs, 
speeds of work, etc. From here control would escalate to the higher 
levels of authority, so that ultimately a situation of "Impasse" will 
be reached, one of "dual power" held conjointly by workers and the 
leaders of capitalism.-^ ^ What, in the long term, would be the natural 
consequence of this "dual control" is not made clear, as yet, for 
like the earlier syndicalists the new breed do not seem to have solved 
the problem of how to reconcile capital and labour when the fundamental 
alms of each are basically irreconcilable - short of revolution. 
Though not of the same dimensions, there has been a similar 
dusting off and re-emphasis of the concept of workers' control within 
the Australian trade union movement, but in this instance, the impetus 
has come from the Communist Party. In line with recent Party Congress 
demands that the trade unions more vigorously pursue through increased 
militant activity, their dual role, which is seen as "defending the 
workers' immediate Interests and as a training ground for the 
revolutionary transformation of society,"-^ 7 Communist trade union 
leaders like Jack Mundey of the Builders Labourers Federation-^ 5 ^ ^d 
16. Cf. ed. Ken Coates & Tony Topham: Workers' Control. Pan-ther 
Modern Society Series, London, 1970; ed. Ken Coates: Can the 
Workers run Industry?. Sphere Books, London, 1968; Richard 
Fletcher: Problems of Trade Union Democracy, institute for 
Workers' Control, Nottingham, Pamphlet Series No. 21; Hugh Scanlon: 
Workers' Control and the Transnational Comrpany. institute for 
Workers' Control, Nottingham, Pamphlet Series No. 22. 
17. Modem Unionism and the Workers' Movement. Communist Party of 
Australia, 22nd Congress, March, 1970, p. 3. 
18. Cf. Jack Mtindey: "Towards New Union Militancy", Australian Left 
Review, No. 26, August-September, 1970, pp. 1-8; Building Workers' 
contribution to Seminar on Workers' Control, A.B.W.I.U.-Plasterers' 
Education Committee Project, August, 1969, pp. 1-14. 
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Laurie Carmlchael of the Amalgamated Engineering Union have been 
vigorously propagandizing industrial unionism and workers' control as 
ultimate goals for the trade union movement. However, unlike the 
"syndicalists", workers' control, for Communists, is not the final end 
in itself, because they have never seen trade unions, in themselves, as 
vehicles of advance towards socialism.-^ 9 jj^  their view workers' control 
has a practical, though limited application only. 
"The demand for workers' control has revolutionary implications. 
It is an important means of advancing the fighting capacity and 
political consciousness of the working class. Correctly 
approached it is a demand that cannot be fully absorbed, yet 
which is realistic, sensible and which can gain mass support. 
It carries with it some of the features of the new socialist 
society we aim to create. It prepares the workers today for 
their role in such a future society. The practical challenge 
lies in the articulation of specific radical demands covering 
the whole field of trade union activities and militant methods 
of action which further develop the traditional means of 
struggle based on mass participation."^^ 
As it lies outside the scope of this thesis it would be 
injudicious to speculate as to the extent to which this revival of the 
movement for workers' control has been a factor in the recent Increase 
in the use of direct action by some Australian trade unions, though 
there is clear evidence of a substantial rise in the number of industrial 
disputes in the engineering, metals, vehicles group and also in the 
building and construction industry (see Table X); groups within which 
some Communist union leaders are known to be providing militant 
19. "Trade unionism, in whatever form, was an incomplete and deformed 
variant of class consciousness, which must at any cost be 
transcended by a growth of political consciousness, created and 
sustained in a party." Perry Anderson: op.cit., p. 264. 
20. Modern Unionism and the Workers' Movement, op.cit., p. 8. 
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leadership. However, even a superficial examination points to a 
multiplicity of causes for the present escalation. 
From 1969 to date, the number of Instances of direct industrial 
action taken by trade unions in many industries has shown a marked 
Increase over the period immediately preceding. Yet the most recent 
figures available, as set out below, (Table X) do not tell the whole 
story. Firstly they are Incomplete for 1971, a year when it is known 
from newspaper reports that there was a further upsurge of militant 
activity in the building trades and in vehicle manufacturing, amongst 
others, and an outburst in the transport industry, with a lengthy 
strike of bus employees in N.S.W. Second, the figures shown refer only 
TABLE X 
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES('a>' : INDUSTRY GROUPS: AUSTRALIA 
Period 
Year 
1 9 6 6 
1967 
1 9 6 8 
1 9 6 9 
1 9 7 0 
'Quarter ended -
S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 9 
December 1 9 6 9 
March 1 9 7 0 
Jtine 1 9 7 0 
S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 0 
December 1 9 7 0 








2 3 5 










































4 4 8 





2 0 1 





2 3 1 
313 









2 4 8 
185 
235 
2 7 3 









1 0 3 
298 
2 9 1 
































1 , 2 7 3 
1 , 3 4 0 
1 , 7 1 3 
2 , 0 1 4 
2 , 7 3 8 
5 7 3 
542 





(a) Refers only to disputes involving a stoppage of work of ten man-days 
or more. 
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1 9 6 8 
1969 
1970 
[ Q u a r t e r ended -
S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 9 
D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 9 
March 1970 
J t rne 1 9 7 0 
S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 0 
D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 0 
March 1 9 7 1 
Year 
1 9 6 6 
1967 
1 9 6 8 
1 9 6 9 
1 9 7 0 
Quarter ended -
S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 9 
D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 9 
March 1 9 7 0 
J u n e 1 9 7 0 
S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 0 
D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 0 
M a r c h 1 9 7 1 
4 6 . 7 
4 0 . 9 
4 6 . 2 
5 3 . 7 
6 3 . 7 
9 . 6 
9 . 4 
2 6 . 5 
7 . 7 
2 0 . 8 
8 . 6 
2 1 . 6 
Tota 
6 7 . 9 
4 8 . 4 
6 1 . 1 
7 6 . 1 
1 7 8 . 4 
1 3 . 3 
1 8 . 2 
4 6 . 6 
8 4 . 2 
3 3 . 8 
1 3 . 7 
5 3 . 5 
8 . 4 
7 . 2 
1 1 . 4 
2 0 . 8 
2 6 . 4 
6 . 4 
1 .6 
1 .2 
8 . 2 
7 . 4 
9 . 7 
2 . 3 
1 1 5 . 9 
2 4 2 . 1 
2 7 1 . 7 
3 6 6 . 9 
3 6 1 . 0 
3 6 . 7 
4 1 . 8 
6 2 . 0 
6 4 . 5 
1 8 9 . 9 
4 4 . 7 
3 5 . 1 
9 0 . 3 
4 9 . 8 
8 0 . 2 
1 6 9 . 7 
2 5 3 . 9 
3 7 . 5 
2 3 . 1 
2 2 . 5 
3 9 . 0 
1 6 0 . 6 
3 1 . 8 
1 8 . 6 
t l Working Days Los 
1 9 . 6 
1 0 . 6 
6 7 . 7 
7 6 . 9 
7 6 . 5 
1 1 . 0 
1 6 . 7 
2 . 6 
1 4 . 4 
2 5 . 9 
3 3 . 5 
5 . 3 
1 
1 5 0 . 3 2 1 1 . 3 
2 5 9 . 3 
4 2 3 . 5 
6 4 3 . 6 
6 2 5 . 9 
8 2 . 7 
1 2 5 . 6 
1 3 7 . 7 
1 4 9 . 7 
2 2 4 . 9 
1 1 3 . 6 
9 0 . 7 
1 5 7 . 7 
1 3 0 . 3 
3 2 0 . 7 
4 6 4 . 0 
8 8 . 4 
9 6 . 7 
4 8 . 3 
8 5 . 5 
2 1 1 . 5 
1 1 8 . 7 
4 1 . 7 
7 7 . 2 
2 6 . 6 
8 1 . 1 
1 8 7 . 7 
2 2 7 . 8 
2 2 . 1 
4 0 . 8 
2 4 . 8 
8 2 . 9 
8 1 . 8 
3 8 . 3 
8 3 . 6 
t ('00 
1 4 4 . 5 
8 4 . 5 
1 1 9 . 5 
2 7 6 . 4 
6 4 2 . 6 
4 7 . 9 
4 4 . 9 
4 1 . 9 
3 3 0 . 8 
5 8 . 9 
2 1 1 . 1 
1 0 6 . 8 
9 . 0 
2 8 . 3 
1 0 5 . 6 
1 5 1 . 9 
1 9 2 . 0 
2 3 . 3 
3 7 . 9 
5 0 . 4 
4 7 . 3 
6 0 . 2 
3 4 . 1 
3 9 . 6 
0) 
4 . 8 
1 7 . 9 
17.3 
1 3 6 . 2 
1 4 8 . 3 
1 7 . 3 
1 9 . 8 
6 9 . 1 
3 1 . 7 
3 1 . 0 
1 6 . 6 
1 6 . 7 
2 8 . 5 
4 8 . 4 
5 1 . 4 
2 0 5 . 0 
1 1 6 . 4 
4 . 0 
1 0 . 1 
7 . 5 
4 6 . 4 
4 4 . 3 
1 8 . 2 
5 . 6 
1 1 2 . 5 
7 0 . 6 
7 7 . 0 
2 8 3 . 2 
1 2 0 . 1 
1 7 . 9 
1 0 . 8 
7 . 2 
3 9 . 7 
4 2 . 8 
3 0 . 4 
4 3 . 3 
1 8 . 9 
4 0 . 0 
7 2 . 5 
1 2 9 . 6 
1 2 6 . 0 
3 . 2 
3 5 . 6 
2 8 . 0 
2 2 . 9 
3 2 . 5 
4 2 . 6 
4 5 . 1 
3 9 4 . 9 
4 8 3 . 3 
7 2 0 . 3 
1 2 8 5 . 2 
1 3 6 7 . 4 
1 4 2 . 8 
2 0 0 . 4 
2 2 2 . 9 
3 1 9 . 0 
5 9 7 . 5 
2 2 8 . 0 
2 5 1 . 5 
2 1 . 3 
5 6 . 4 
1 2 3 . 0 
1 4 4 . 9 
1 3 7 . 9 
6 . 4 
3 8 . 9 
3 5 . 1 
2 3 . 4 
3 8 . 2 
4 1 . 2 
4 5 . 0 
7 3 2 . 1 
7 0 5 . 3 
1 0 7 9 . 5 
1 9 5 8 . 0 
2 3 9 3 . 7 
2 8 4 . 8 
3 7 1 . 6 
3 8 8 . 5 
7 5 9 . 4 
6 6 7 . 1 
5 7 8 . 8 
4 0 2 . 9 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra. 
Quarterly Summary of Australian Statistics, September, 1971, 
No. 281, p. 23. 
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to disputes involving a stoppage of ten man-days or more, and also 
cannot record other instances of direct action which have not required 
the withdrawal of labour. 2-^  
This substantial increase in direct action generally, together 
with other reasons of a party political nature has prompted the government 
to propose legislation which it hopes will go a long way towards 
curbing "industrial anarchy". "^^ While this attempt at greater control 
over industrial relations and unions - a proposed ban on political 
strikes and extended provision for secret ballots in relation to strikes, 
for example - may, in the short term Induce some degree of industrial 
peace, in the long run it could be a factor inspiring further industrial 
action. Of much greater importance, however, is the fact that measures 
of this kind do nothing to get at the root causes of militancy, such 
as have been examined in this study. 
Legislation will not solve the problems of Industrial relations; 
Indeed some elements in the labour-management relationship are 
basically incompatible and as such may well defy the best efforts at 
reconciliation. However, the number of instances of militant action 
can be si±)stantially reduced, though it is unlikely that it can be 
21. For example, the Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union has for the 
past month, "imposed a ban on all overtime in the P.M.G. lines 
section, together with a work-to-regulations campaign, a ban on the 
installation of new telephones in business premises and on all 
private contract work." The Courier-Mail, January 6th, 1972. 
To this has now been added a ban on the processing and delivery of 
telephone accounts. 
22. Cf. Professor Keith Hancock: "The Real Price of Industrial Peace", 
The Sunday Australian, December 12th, 1971. 
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entirely eliminated except under a totalitarian system; even then the 
experiences of Eastern European commtanist states since the mid-1950's 
show that direct action by industrial workers is possible if 
conditions become sufficiently unsatisfactory. For this reason, a 
minimal degree of militancy may be a healthy sign in any democratic 
community. 
Much can be done, however, to minimize conflict situations once 
the real causes are recognised, provided there is a determination and 
will to do so on both sides. 
"The whole field of industrial relations is essentially a part 
of human relations. Every action that is taken, is by people 
and will affect people. The quality of industrial relations 
depends a good deal on the interpersonal relationships between 
management and workers, management and unions and unions and 
workers. Both management and unions have a significant 
contribution to make in the development of cordial interpersonal 
and industrial relations."^-^ 
23. White Paper on Improving Industrial Relations in Australian 
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APPENDIX A 
SUMMARY OF CONSTRUCTION OF THE MAIN LINES OF QUEENSLAND 
The Southern and Western railway, begun from Ipswich in 1865, reached 
Toowoomba 1867, extended to Dalby in 186 8 and Warwick in 1871: connected 
to Brisbane 1875, reached Wallangarra on New South Wales border in 1887, 
Charleville in 1888, Goondlwlndl in 1908, and Dirranbandi in 1913. 
The Great Northern (later Central) Railway, from Rockhampton to Westwood, 
1867. Gradually extended after 1874 to serve Peak Downs copper field. 
Reached Emerald 1879, Clermont 1884, and Longreach in 1892. A branch 
from Rockhampton to Mt. Morgan was opened in 1898. 
The Great Northern Railway, built at first to serve the Charters Towers 
goldfleld. Opened from Townsville, 1880, reached Charters Towers 1882. 
Extensions to Hughenden 1887, and Wlnton 1899. Minerals prompted further 
extensions to Cloncurry in 1908 and Mt. Isa in 1929. The Central and 
Great Northern lines were also connected by an inland link from 
Longreach to Wlnton, completed in 1928. The Great Western Railway Act 
of 1910 provided for a north-south trunk line across western Queensland, 
joining the western extremities of the three main inland lines, but 
only a few sections (to Qullple, Yaraka and Dajarra) were completed. 
The Maryborough Railway built to serve the goldfleld at Gympie and 
opened in 1881. 
The Bundaberg Railway, opened from Bundaberg in 1881 and connected to 
the Mount Perry copper mines in 1884. 
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The Mackay Railway, opened in 1885 to serve the sugar lands in the 
Pioneer River valley. Extended to Netherdale, at the top of the Pioneer 
Valley in 1910, incorporating two shire-owned lines. 
The Cooktown Railway opened in 1885 with the goal of reaching the 
Palmer goldfleld; it reached Laura in 1888, by which time completion was 
unwarranted. 
The Cairns Railway commenced 1887 to connect with the Herberton tin 
fields. This line, involving the difficult construction up the Barron 
Gorge, opened to Mareeba in 1893 and Herberton 1910, and Ravenshoe 1915. 
The Chlllagoe Company connected its Chlllagoe copper fields to it by 
a private line, 103 miles long,in 1900. 
The Emm Park Railway, opened from North Rockhampton in 1888 and 
connected to Broadmount, an early attempt at a deep water port for 
Rockhampton, in 189 8. 
The Normanton Railway was originally intended to connect the Cloncurry 
gold and copper field with the Gulf of Carpentaria but was built 
instead to the Croydon goldfleld between 1889 and 1891. 
The Bowen Railway opened to Wangaratta in 1890. 
Connections between these lines were gradually provided. A coast line, 
providing a through connection to Brisbane opened to Bundaberg in 1891, 
Gladstone 1897, and Rockhampton 1903. Under the North Coast Railway 
Act of 1910, a coastal trunk line was authorised and work on this 
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through coastal route, 1,043 miles, was completed in 1924. It absorbed 
the Shire lines built to Proserpine, Ayr and Bablnda in its length. 
This left only the Cooktown and Normanton lines isolated. 
The Kyogle Railway, the 4'8V connection of 69 miles from South Brisbane 
to the Border Tunnel, built by agreement between the Commonwealth, New 
South Wales and Queensland opened in September, 1930. 
Branch Lines 
The first true branch line was the line to Fassifern, the first section 
of which was opened from Ipswich to Harrisvllle in 1882. Between 1885 
and 1894, 491 miles of branch line was constructed out of a total 
building of 1,182 miles. The most Intensive period of branch line 
building was between 1905 and 1924. Out of 2,983 miles built, 1,728 
were branch lines. Most of the branch lines were built in the south-
eastern part of the state to aid agricultural development. 
Collated from Queensland Railways, 1865-1965, Railway Historical 
Society, Q'ld. Division, 1965, no publication details; and J.W. Knowles; 
"One Htindred Years of Railways in Queensland", The Australian Railway 
Historical Society, Bulletin No. 338, Vol. XVI, New Series, December, 
1965. 
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APPENDIX B: MAP OF RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION IN QUEENSLAND 
QUEENSLAND RAILWAY SYSTEM 
4 0 
I .7I965 
0 40 80 120 
SCALE OF MILES 
REFEREWCE 
Construction First Half Century bliown ' 
Construction Secuxid Half Century shown—— ^ — 
Octrperitctnio, 
N E W SOUTH WALEg 
Source: Commissioner of Railways: A Century of Service, The Storij of the 
Queensland Government Railways, 1865-1965, B r i sbane , 1965. The 
Hayes C o l l e c t i o n , Fryer L i b r a r y , Un ive r s i t y of Queensland. 
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APPENDIX C 
ROYAL COMMISSIONS - QUEENSLAND RAILWAYS i860 TO 1950 
Re Extensions to Southern and Western 
Railway 
Railway construction 
Extending the Southern & Western Railway 
to navigable water 
On the allegations contained in Mr. 
Hemmant's petition and all matters 
connected therewith 
Traffic Depar-tments 
Timbers used on the Cairns Railway 
Proposed railway extensions, St. George, 
Nanango, Bowen. 
Proposed railway between Beaudesert 
(Q'ld.) and Kyogle (N.S.W.) 
Proposed railway between Nanango and 
Yarraman or Tarong and Yarraman 
Railway from Jundah to Taroom 
Payment of "Dirt money" to employees 
of the Q'ld. Railway Department. 
Proposed railway from Oona to Mount 
Oxide. 
Extension of the Mount Molloy line. 
Proposed railway between Kingaroy and 
Bell via Kumbia or between Tarong and 
Cooyar• 
Proposed railway from Jandowae to 
Proston or Mundubbera. 
Q'ld. Pari. Papers 
1871 - p. 675. 
1872 - p. 1327. 
1878 - V.2, p. 319. 
1881 - V.2, pp. 403 & 781. 
1883-4 - p. 1611. 
1887 - V.3, p. 1241. 
1900 - V.3, p. 85. 
1916-17 - V.3, p. 509. 
1916-17 - V.3, p. 781 
1916-17 - V.3, p. 959. 
1916-17 - V.3, p. 1067. 
1916-17 - V.3, p. 1297 
1917 - V.3, p. 245. 
1917 - V.3, p. 401. 
1917 V.3, p. 541. 
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Proposed branch line from the Townsville-
Bowen railway (Haughton River). 
Proposed branch line from Gargett to 
Owens Creek. 
Railway administration. 
Proposed branch line from Brooloo to 
Kenilworth. 
Proposed line from Mulgowie to Thornton 
Proposed line from Woodford to Peachester 
Proposed line from Peeramon to Boonjee 
Proposed deviation from Owanyilla through 
Tinana to Maryborough; removal of railway 
workshops, Maryborough; establishment of 
electric light plant, Maryborough; loop 
line to eliminate dead end at Maryborough. 
Proposed line from Mount Larcom to 
Bracewell. 
Proposed tramway from Pikedale to the 
main Southern Railway. 
Q'ld. Pari. Papers 
1917 - v.3, p. 631. 
1917 - V.3, p. 663. 

















1919-20 - V.3, p. 661 
1919-20 - V.3 
1919-20 - V.3 
Proposed line from Dunwinnie to St. George 1919-20 -V.3 
Proposals for railways in the Gulf 
districts 
Proposed railways to open up the North 
Burnett and Callide Valley. 
Proposed removal of the locomotive depot 
from Toowoomba to Willowburn. 
Proposed Dirranbandi extension. 
Proposed tramway from the iron mines at 
Mount Blggenden to the Gayndah line. 
Construction of the Railway from Goondoon 
to Kalliwa Creek. 
1919-20 - V.3 
1919-20 - V.3 
1919-20 - V.3 
1919-20 - V.3 
1919-20 - V.3 











Q'ld. Pari. Papers 
Proposed railway from Charleville to 
Blackall 
Proposed branch railway from the Mount 
Mulligan railway to Wolfram Camp. 
Proposed railway from Croydon to 
Forsayth. 
Proposed extension of the Mount Molloy 
railway to Port Douglas. 
Proposed railway from Springsure to the 
terminus of the line north from Roma 
Proposed extension of the Dawson Valley 
railway from Baralaba to Castle Creek 
Proposed extension of Belmont tramway to 
Mount Cotton; proposed branch from 
Sunnybank to Mount Cotton. 
Proposed extension of the Innisfail 
tramway from Nerada. 
Proposed conversion of portion of 
Innisfail tramway from 2ft. gauge to 
3ft. 6 in. gauge. 
Proposed extension of Alton Downs railway 
to Louisa Creek. 
Proposed extension from Yeppoon to 
Byfield. 
Completion of section D of the Great 
Western Railway; proposed railway to Mount 
Isa mineral field. 
Proposed railway from Inglewood to Texas 
and Silverspur. 
Railway workshops. 
Extension of Great Northern Railway to 
Camooweal. 
Railways generally. 
1920 - V.2, p. 875 
1920 - V.2 




1921 - V.2 
1922 - V.2 
1922 - V.2 
1923 - V.2 
1923 - V.2 
1924 - V.2 






























Q'ld. Pari. Papers 
Construction of an inland railway system 
between the Central and Southern railway 
systems. 1939 - V.l, p. 1149. 
Extracted from: Royal Commissions held in Queensland, 1860-1966. 
Queensland Parliamentary Library (unpiiblished) . 
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APPENDIX D 
SELECT COMMITTEES ON RAILWAYS i860 TO 1950 
On Mr. John Bourne's contract for the 
Dalby railway. 
On Roads, Tramways and other feeders to 
the railway lines. 
On working and management of the Southern 
and Western Railway Department. 
On route of railway line from Warwick 
towards Stanthorpe. 
On railway workshops. 
On contract for and carriage of steel 
rails - Mr. Hemmant's petition. 
On Gympie Agricultural Society claim 
for compensation. 
On -the proposed railway from Hughenden 
towards Wlnton. 
On the proposed extension from Mirani to 
Cattle Creek (Mackay line). 
On the proposed branch railway from Mayne 
to Enoggera. 
On the sale of pastoral lands and -the 
construction of railways in the Western 
interior. 
On the proposed low-level deviation. North 
Coast Line, Gladstone to Rockhampton. 
On the proposed Redbank and Bundamba loop 
line. Southern & Western Railway, and 
portion of McQueen's Branch Line. 
On the proposed extension of the Gayndah 
branch line from Degilbo to Wetherton. 
On the proposed branch railway. Western 
Line, from Dalby to Cattle Creek. 
Q'ld. Pari. Papers 
1872 - p. 1371. 
1874 - Vol.11, p. 775. 
1877 - Vol.Ill, p. 473. 
1878 - Vol.11, p. 459. 
1879 - Vol.11, p. 535. 
1880 - Vol.11, p. 737. 
1882 - Vol.11, p. 987. 
1895 - Vol.Ill, p. 791. 
1895 - Vol.Ill, p. 849. 
1895 - Vol.Ill, p. 905. 
1902 - Vol.Ill, p. 77. 
1902 - Vol.Ill, p. 619. 
1902 - Vol.Ill, p. 639. 
1904-5 - Vol.11, p. 645. 
1904-5 - Vol.11, p. 655. 
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Q'ld. Pari. Papers 
On the proposed extension of the 
Goondlwlndl branch line from Thane to 
Goondlwlndl. 
On the proposed extension of the Northern 
Line from Richmond to Cloncurry. 
On -the proposed branch railway from 
Blackall to Jericho. 
On the proposed extension of the Gayndah 
branch line from Wetherton to Gayndah. 
On the proposed extension of -the Northern 
line from Richmond to Cloncurry (Section 
No. 2). 
Caboolture to Woodford Railway, North 
Coast Line. 
On the proposed Boyne Valley Branch 
Railway. 
New Zealand Gully to Yeppoon Railway, 
Emu Park Line. 
On the proposed extension of the Atherton 
Railway, Cairns Line. 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Kannangur to Blackbutt, Brisbane Valley 
Branch. 
On the proposed branch railway from Dalby 
towards Tara, Western Line. 
On the proposed extension of the Blackall 
Branch Railway, Central Division. 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Goondlwlndl to Talwood. 
On the proposed branch railway from Tolga 
to the Johnstone River, Cairns Line. 
On the proposed Railway from Warwick to 
Maryvale. 
1905 - Vol.11, p. 939 
1905 - Vol.11 
1905 - Vol.11 
1905 - Vol.11 
1906 - Vol.11 
1908 - Sess.l 
1908 - Sess.l 
1908 - Sess.l 
1908 - Sess.l 
1908 - Sess.l 
1908 - Sess.l 
1908 - Sess.l 













1908 - Sess.l, p. 671 
1908 - Vol.Ill, p. 383. 
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On the proposed branch railway from 
Kingsthorpe to Goombungee and Main Range, 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Pittsworth to Milmerran. 
On the proposed extension from Kingaroy 
to Nanango. 
Q'ld. Pari. Papers 
1908 - Vol.Ill, p. 393. 
1909 - Vol.11, p. 759. 
1909 - Vol.11, p. 771. 
On the proposed extension of the McGregor 
Creek Tramline towards Silent Grove and 
the Cattle Creek Tramline towards the 
Eungella Range. 1909 - Vol.11, p. 783. 
On the proposed railway from Mt. Morgan 
to the Dawson River. 1909 - Vol.11, p. 795. 
On the proposed branch railway from 
Oakey to Cooyar. 1909 - Vol.11, p. 823. 
On -the proposed branch line from Port 
Alma to a point on the main line of 
railway from Rockhampton to Gladstone. 1909 - Vol.11, p. 833. 
On the proposed extension from Talwood 
to the Moonie River. 
On the proposed extension of the Boyne 
Valley Railway from Nevertire to Many 
Peaks. 
1909 - Vol.11, p. 879. 
1909 - Vol.11, p. 889. 
On -the proposed extension of the Isis 
branch from Cordalba to Dallarnil 1909 - Vol.11, p. 899. 
On -the proposed branch railway from 
Rosewood to Marburg. 1909 - Vol.11, p. 911. 
On -the proposed branch railway from 
Keefton to Imbil. 
On -the proposed extension from Woodford 
to Kilcoy. 
On -the proposed branch railway from Allora 
to Goomburra. 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Gayndah to Miandi±ibera. 
1910 - Vol.Ill, p. 503. 
1910 - Vol.Ill, p. 515. 
1910 - Vol.Ill, p. 527. 
1910 - Vol.Ill, p. 539. 
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On -the proposed railway extension from 
Blackbutt to Yarraman 
Q'ld. Pari. Papers 
1910 Vol.Ill, p. 561. 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Bullamon to Dirranbandi 
On -the proposed railway from Miles to 
Taroom (First section) to Jundah Railway. 
On the proposed railways from Munbilla 
to Mt. Edwards, Kingaroy to Tarong, 
Pialba to Urangan, Roma to Orallo. 
1910 - Vol.Ill, p. 573. 
1910 Vol. Ill, p. 985. 
1911-12 - Vol.Ill, p. 155. 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Malanda towards Millaa Millaa. 1911-12 - Vol.Ill, p. 185. 
Further report on the proposed railway 
from Pialba to Urangan. 1911-12 - Vol.Ill, p. 173. 
On the proposed branch railway from 
Cloncurry to Mt. Cuthbert (First 
section). 1911-12 - Vol.Ill, p. 1345. 
On the proposed branch railway from 
Chlllagoe Go's. Railway to Mt. Mulligan. 1912 - Vol.Ill, p. 555. 
Upon -the Great Western Railway Act, 
Amendment Bill (Progress Report). 1913 - Vol.Ill, p. 487. 
On -the proposed railway extension from 
Cloncurry to Mt. Cuthbert (Second 
section). 1914 - Vol.Ill, p. 363, 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Enoggera to Terror's Creek. 
On the proposed extension from Inglewood 
to Texas and Silverspur. 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Rockhampton to Alton Downs. 
On the proposed extension from Mt. 
Edwards to Maryvale. 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Miles to Taroom (Second section). 
1914 - Vol.Ill, p. 375. 
1914 - Vol.Ill, p. 387. 
1914 Vol.Ill, p. 399. 
1914 - Vol.Ill, p. 415. 
1914 - Vol.Ill, p. 451. 
On the proposed branch railway from 
LanefieId to Rosevale. 1914 - Vol.Ill, p. 463. 
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On the proposed railway extension from 
Murgon to Proston, also the proposed 
branch railway to Windera. 
On the proposed branch railway from 
Gatton to Mt. Sylvia 
Q'ld. Pari. Papers 
1914 - Vol.Ill, p. 475. 
1914 - Vol.Ill, p. 487. 
On the proposed branch railway from 
Goondoon towards Kalliwa Creek 1914 - Vol.Ill, p. 499. 
On the proposed extension from 
Dirranbandi 1914 - Vol.Ill, p. 511. 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Mundubbera to the Northern Burnett. 1914 - Vol.Ill, p. 523. 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Mt. Russell to Cecil Plains. 1914 - Vol.Ill, p. 535. 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Malanda to Millaa Millaa. 1914 - Vol.Ill, p. 559. 
On the proposed extension from Tara 
towards Surat. 1914 - Vol.Ill, p. 547. 
To inquire into and Report upon the 
charges made against the Hon. W.T. 
Paget relative to the purchase of certain 
cement and any circumstances connected 
therewith. 1914 - Vol.Ill, p. 571. 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Longreach to Wlnton. 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Many Peaks to New Cannindah (Report and 
further report). 
1914-16 - Vol.Ill, p. 1219. 
1915-16 - Vol.Ill, p. 1231, 
p. 1239. 
On the proposed branch railway from 
Merinda to Bowen coalfields (Report and 
further report). 
On the proposed railway extension from 




Vol.Ill, p. 1255, 
p. 1265. 
Vol.Ill, p. 1283, 
p. 1291. 
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On the proposed railway extension from 
Many Peaks to New Cannindah. 
On the proposed extension from Orallo to 
InJune Creek. 
On the Chlllagoe and Etherldge Railways 
Purchase Bill 
On the Mt. Molloy Railway Bill 
On the proposed extension from Many Peaks 
to New Cannindah. 
On the proposed Mt. Molloy Railway 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Many Peaks to New Cannindah 
Qn the proposed Haughton River Loop Line 
On the proposed railway extension from 
Yarraman to Nanango. 
On the Chlllagoe and Etherldge Railways 
Bill (Report and further report). 
On the proposed extension of the Mary 
Valley Railway from Brooloo to Kenilworth. 
On the proposed Boyne Valley Extension 
from Many Peaks to the Northern end of 
the approved line from Mundubbera to the 
Northern Burnett; and the proposed 
railway from Monto to Rannes to open up 
the Callide Valley and Prairie Lands. 
On the proposed branch railway from 
Gargett to Owen's Creek. 
On the proposed line towards Burketown 
from Dobbyn to Myally Creek. 
On the proposed branch railway from 
Peeramon towards Boonjee. 
Q'ld. Pari. Papers 
1916-17 - Vol.Ill, p. 351. 
1916-17 - Vol.Ill, p. 379. 
1916-17 - Vol.Ill, p. 387. 





- Vol.Ill, p. 159 
- Vol.Ill, p. 325 
- Vol.11, p. 1337 
- Vol.11, p. 1343 
1918 - Vol.11, p. 1355. 
1918 - Vol.11, p. 1363, 
p. 1467. 
1919-20 - Vol.Ill, p. 499. 
1919-20- Vol.Ill, p. 519. 
1919-20 - Vol.Ill, p. 547. 
1919-20 - Vol.Ill, p. 573. 
1919-20 - Vol.Ill, p. 595. 
Extracted from: Queensland Pccoliamentary Papers. 
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APPENDIX E 
"The Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916' 
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION OF AN INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION 
OR TRADE UNION OF EMPLOYEES AS AN INDUSTRIAL UNION 
I, JOHN JAMES McGEE, Industrial Registrar, hereby certify that on the 
seventeenth day of February, one thousand, nine hundred and seventeen, 
an Industrial Association (or Trade Union) of Employees, called The 
Queensland Railway Union of Employees, was, at Brisbane, in the State 
of Queensland, registered by that name under "The Industrial Arbitration 
Act of 1916" as an Industrial Union of Employees. 
Dated at Brisbane, in the Stata of Queensland, this seventeenth 
day of February, 1917. 
(sgd) JOHN J. McGEE 
Industrial Registrar. 
I, ALEC CHARLES MARSHALL, Industrial Registrar HEREBY CERTIFY that the 
above is a true and correct copy of the certificate of Registration of 
the "Australian Railways Union of Employees, Queensland Branch", which 
was registered as an Industrial Union of Employees under "The Industrial 
Arbitration Act of 1916" under the title of "The Queensland Railway Union 
of Employees" on the seventeenth day of February, 1917, and that the 
title was altered to "Australian Railways Union of Employees, Queensland 
Branch" on the nineteenth day of November, 1921. 
Dated this thlrtyfirst day of October, 1967. 
Industrial Registrar. 
Extracted from the files of the Industrial Commission, Brisbane. 
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APPENDIX F 
REGISTRATION UNDER THE INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION 
AND ARBITRATION ACT 
RaiIway Unions 
1. Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen's Association of Australasia 
(File No. 16) 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Certificate. 
Callings covered: 
Membership at Registration: 
Courier Mail, 15/2/17 
2/3/17. 
Engine Drivers (all classes) 
Firemen 
Crane Drivers 
Dynamo and Motor Attendants 
Greasers 
Boiler and Engine Cleaners 
Trimmers 
(and s imilar occupations on land, 
harbours and r i v e r s ) . 
2,000 approx. 
2. Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen, Queensland 
(File No. 93) 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Certificate: 
Callings Covered: 
Membership at Registration: 
The Dally Standard, 12/7/21 
11/8/1921 
Loco Drivers 
Loco Firemen and Cleaners 
Assistants to above. 
876. 
NOTE: The A.R.U. apparently did not lodge a formal objection to the 
registration of this union. 
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3. The Queensland Railway Union of Employees 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Certificate: 
Callings Covered: 
Membership at Registration: 
Office-bearers at Registration: 
Salaried Officers: 
Objection to Registration: 
(File No. 3) 
The Dally Standard, 3/2/17 
17/2/17 
96 separate callings, including clerks, 
typists , guards, stationmasters, 
engine drivers, and tradesmen of 
various kinds. Also included blanket 
coverage of "generally all those 
trades and occupations necessary in 
the conduction of the Queensland 
Railway system". The members of the 
Queensland Railway Union exercise 
their callings in all localities or 
Districts in the State of Queensland 
where the Queensland Government 
Railways are operating. 













President: Robert McGregor 
Vice-President: Thomas Villiers 
Vice-President: Timothy Moroney 
Treasurer: William B. Stanley 
Councillors: Alex F. McDonald et al. 
General Secretary: Frank A. Cooper 
Assistant Secretary: Charles A. King. 
A.S.E. objected to coverage by Q.R.U. 
of blacksmiths and other metal workers. 
Argued that: the Q.R.U. has been 
operating as a trade union within the 
Queensland Government Railways service 
since 1912 but has, as members, very 
few employees in the callings referred 
to above. 
330. 
The A.S.E. also argued that 
coverage of these callings by the 
Q.R.U. would not only be detrimental 
to the A.S.E. but "may lead to 
industrial dissension between the 
members of the two unions as well as 
overlapping of jurisdiction". 
NOTE: This objection was overruled 
by the Industrial Commission because 
the A.S.E. was not an Industrial 
Union. 
Amalgamation and Change of Name: 
Statutory Declaration presented to Court of Industrial Arbitration 
of Queensland, 21/2/1921 (Signed Moroney, witnessed Villiers). 
"1. I am the General Secretary of the Q.R.U. 
2. The Q.R.U. amalgamated with the N.S.W. Railway and Tramway 
Association, Victorian Railways Union, South Australian Railway 
and Tramways Association, and Tasmanian Railways Union on the 
22nd of September, 1920. 
3. By this amalgamation a Union was formed bearing the name of 
Australian Railways Union. 
4. The Q.R.U. and the other organisations mentioned have now ceased 
to exist as separate State organisations and have become Branches 
of the A.R.U. in the several States mentioned. 
5. The A.R.U. was granted registration as an Organisation of 
Employees linder the Commonweal-th Arbitration and Conciliation Act 
of 1906, on the 8th of February, 1921, with branches in the States 
mentioned. 
NOTE: Abbreviations are spelled out in full in the original. 
Registration of the new organisation, i.e. A.R.U. was apparently 
approved on 19/11/1921. 
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Queensland Railway Guards and Shunters Association 
(File No. 18) 
The Daily Standard, 20/2/17 
6/3/17 
Guards and shunters. 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Certificate 
Callings Covered: 
Change of Name: 
Extension of Callings Covered: 
Membership at Registration: 
Queensland Railway Guards, Shunters and 
Conductors Association - approved 
22/8/1934. 
Now Includes Conductors, Foremen 
Shunters, Number Takers, Ticket 
Inspectors, and Porters. 
454, 
5. Railway Maintenance Union of Employees, Southern Queensland 
(File No. 17) 
Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, l'^/2/ll 
Registration Certificate: 4/3/17 
Callings Covered: 
Area Covered: 
Change of Name: 
Extension of Callings Covered: 
Extension of Area Covered: 
Membership at Registration: 
Bridge and Station Carpenters and 
Labourers; Painters; Tarrers; Plumbers 
Fencers; Gangers; Lengthsmen; Flying 
Gangmen; Gardeners. 
South of Gladstone. 
Queensland Railway Maintenance Union 
of Employees - approved 9/2/31 
Now includes Bricklayers; Concretors; 
Signal Light and Store Men. 
Now covers whole State. 
710 approx. 
332. 
Railway Officers Union, Queensland 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Certificate, 
Callings Covered: 
Change of Name: 
Membership at Registration: 
(File No. 41) 
Courier Mail 
19/4/17 
Senior officers and other "white collar" 
groups; Foremen and equivalents; 
Inspectors; Station Masters. (In effect, 
all salaried staff.) 
Railway Salaried Officers Union -
approved 20/10/27 
265, 
NOTE: File doesn't indicate whether objections were lodged, though 
it is likely that many unions would have objected. 
7. Queensland Railway Signalmen 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Certificate: 
Callings Covered: 
Change of Name: 
(File No. 9) 
The Daily Standard, 9/2/17 
23/2/17 
Signalmen 
Queensland Railway Signalmen's Union 
- approved 3/10/44 
Membership at Registration: 75. 
333. 
8. Queensland Railway Stat ion Masters, Assistant Stat ion Masters 
and Night Officers Union 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Certificate: 
Callings Covered: 
Change of Name: 
Membership at Registration: 
(File No. 21) 
Courier Mall, 27/2/17 
13/3/17 
Station Masters; Assistant S.M.'s; 
Night Officers. 
The Queensland Railway Station Masters 
Union - approved 28/11/51 
252. 
9. Queensland Railway Traffic Employees Union 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Certificate: 
Callings Covered: 
Extension of Callings Covered: 
(File No. 57) 
The Daily Standard, 29/8/17 
20/9/17 
Guards; Shunters; Goods Shed Employees 
Signalmen; Porters; Clerks; Storemen; 
Carriage Shed Employees; Labourers. 
In 1933 coverage was extended to 
groups of salaried officers, and 
Station Masters. 
Membership at Registration: 69. 
334. 
Associated Unions 
1. The Federated Electrical Trades Union 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Certificate. 
Change of Name: 
The Dally Standard, 26/3/17 
14/5/17 
The Electrical Trades Union of 
Employees of Australia, Queensland 
Branch - approved 3/10/21 
2. The Amalgamated Society of Engineers and Metalworkers, Queensland 
(File No. 7) 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Certificate: 
Change of Name: 
The Daily Standard, 7/2/17 
21/2/17 
The Amalgamated Engineering Union, 
Queensland - approved 31/10/22 
3. Federated Ironworkers Association of Australia (Queensland 
Branch) 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Certificate: 
(File No. 72) 
The Daily Standard, 4/11/18 
5/12/18 
4. The Federated Moulders (Metals) Union of Employees of 
Australasia, Queensland Branch 
(File No. 30) 





5. Operative Painters and Decorators of Australia, Queensland Branch 
(File No. 22) 
Registration Certificate: 29/5/28 (After Case No. 107 of 1928). 
Change of Name: Operative Painters and Decorators of 
Queensland - approved 23/12/37 
Operative Painters and Decorators Union 
of Australia, Queensland Branch -
approved 4/10/46. 
The Queensland Branch of the Australian Coachmakers Federation 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Certificate: 
Change of Name: 
(File No. 24) 
The Dally Standard, <i/2/ll 
17/3/17 
Australian Coachmakers Employees 
Federation, Queensland Branch -
approved 31/5/18 
The Vehicle Builders Employees 
Federation of Australia, Queensland 
Branch - approved 7/12/38. 
Sheet Metal Working Industrial Union of Employees, Queensland 
Branch 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Certificate: 
Change of Name: 
(File No. 28) 
The Daily Standard, 10/3/17 
23/3/17 
The Sheet Metal Working, Agricultural 
Implement and Stove Making Industrial 
Union of Employees of Australia, 
Queensland Branch - approved 10/7/45. 
335. 
Peripheral Unions 
1. Australian Workers' Union 
Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 13/3/17 
Registration Certificate: 22,f?,/!! 
2. The Boilermakers and Blacksmiths Society of Australia, 
Queensland Branch 
Notice of Intention: Courier Mail, 4/3/55 
Registration Certificate: 28/4/56 
3. The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners of Australasia 
Registration Certificate: 9/5/27 (After Case No. 114 of 1927) 
4. Federated Clerks Union of Australia (Central and Southern 
Queensland Branch) 
Notice of Intention: Courier Mall & Telegraph, 17/5/46 
Registration Certificate: 3/6/46 
North Queensland Branch 
Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 17/3/25 
Registration Certificate: 10/7/25 
337. 
5. Australasian Meat Industry Union of Employees (Queensland Branch) 
(File No. 25) 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Certificate: 
The Daily Standard, 3/3/17 
19/3/17 
NOTE: Registration cancelled 24/5/45 (Cases 105 and 107 of 1945) 
Registration restored 15/9/46 (Case 170 of 1946) 
6. Federated Society of Boilermakers and Iron Ship Builders of 
Australia (Queensland Branch) 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Certificate: 
Change of Name: 
The Dally Standard, 17/3/17 
31/3/17 
The Boilermakers Society of Australia 
(Queensland Branch) - approved 25/8/37. 
Unsuccessful Attempts to Register Unions 
or Unions Registered but now Defunct 
1. Federated Locomotive Engine Drivers, Firemen and Cleaners 
Association, Queensland Division 
Notice of Intention: 
Registration Cancelied: 
The Daily Standard, 17/2/17 
6/7/21 (Case No. 277 of 1921) 
NOTE: Note similarity of name to that of F.E.D.F.A. 
338. 
2. Queensland Railway Leading Hands and Mechanics Union 
Notice of Intention: Courier Mail, 22/4/18 
Objections: Q.R.U., A.S.E., and Federation of 
Boilermakers and Iron Ship Builders, 
Registration Refused: 15/5/18. 
3. Australasian Society of Engineers 
Notice of Intention: The Dally Standard, 11/8/22 
Objections: 15 Unions objected. 
Application Refused: 8/9/22 after hearing. 
NOTE: 
Q.R.U. lodged objection to registration of each of the following 
unions; 
F.E.D.F.A. 
Railway Guards and Shunters 
Railway Maintenance Union 
Queensland Railway Signalmen 
Queensland Railway Station Masters etc. 
In each Instance the objection contained the following clause: 
"That the Registration of Sectional Associations of 
callings for which one general union of railway employees 
(the Queensland Railway Union) is registered is against the 
interests of the employer, the employees and the public and 
contrary to the intention of the Act." 
An objection making a similar point, though worded differently 
339. 
was also lodged against registration of the Queensland Railway Traffic 
Employees Union. 
Compiled from the files of the Industrial Commission, Brisbane. 
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APPENDIX G 
LIST OF INDUSTRIAL UNIONS BRACKETED WITH THE 
QUEENSLAND RAILWAY UNION OF EMPLOYEES 
Title 
Queensland Railway Signalmen's Union of 
Employees, Brisbane, Ipswich, Toowoomba, 
KiHarney Junction and Warwick. 
Australasian Institute of Marine Engineers 
Union of Employees, Queensland District. 
Federated Locomotive Engine Drivers', Firemen's 
and Cleaners' Union of Employees, Queensland 
Division. 
Railway Maintenance Union of Employees, Southern 
Queensland. 
Queensland Railway Guards & Shunters' Association 
The Australasian Building Industry Union, 
Queensland 
Queensland Railway Station Masters', Assistant 
Station Masters' and Night Officers' Union. 
Operative Painters and Decorators of Australasia, 
Queensland Branch 
The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners. 
Queensland Branch of the Australian Coach Makers' 
Union, Brisbane and Ipswich. 
Federated Society of Boilermakers and Iron 
Shipbuilders' of Australia, Queensland Branch. 
Federated Moulders' (Metals) Union. 
Federated Electrical Trades Union. 
The Australian Workers' Union. 
Federated Clerks' Union 
The Australian Pliombers and Gasfitters Union 



















Queensland Government Professional Officers 
Association. 
The Steam Engine Makers' Society 
Australasian Association of Operative Plasterers, 
Blacksmi-th Society of Australasia 
United Operative Stonemasons Society 
Queensland Railway Traffic Employees' Union. 
Australian Builders' Labourers Federation. 
Federated Ironworkers. 









NOTE: The Q.R.U. was not bracketed with the Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers and Metal Workers Union, as both this union and the 
Q.R.U. objected to bracketing. 
Compiled from the files of the Industrial Commission, Brisbane. 
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APPENDIX H 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE QUEENSLAND RAILWAY UNION, SOUTHERN 
DIVISION AS STATED IN ITS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION 

























































































































































































































































































Signalmen's Branch of the Q.R.U. - 26 members. 
Trade Categories include assistants and apprentices, as do 
other groups such as clerks and porters. 
Night Officers and Relieving Officers have been Included 
with Station Masters. 
Compiled from files of the Industrial Commission, Brisbane. 
NOTE: 
At the time of its application for registration (which was granted 
February 17th, 1917) the union lodged a list comprising names of 
members their calling and the branch of which they were members. It is 
344. 
from these lists that the above statistics have been compiled. It is 
clear that the list was Incomplete even for the Southern Division, and 
must have been lodged just prior to the amalgamation of this Division 
with the Central and Northern Divisions. It does, however, provide a 
useful picture of the spread of callings represented within the all-
grades union, and the high percentage of semi and unskilled workers 
out of the total membership. 
345. 
APPENDIX 
DEVELOPMENTAL AND RURAL SUBSIDIES 
On the non-competitive routes, the airlines rely to some extent 
on subsidy. In the case of the purely "developmental" air carriers, 
MacRobertson Miller Airlines Ltd. and Connellan Airways Ltd., this 
subsidy support is geared to provide a reasonable return on capital, 
for without the services provided by these airlines, the more remote 
areas of West Australia and the Northern Territory would be very 
poorly served by communications and isolated altogether for some months 
in each year. 
The two major carriers - Ansett-A.N.A. and T.A.A. provide some of 
the "developmental" type air services to other areas-^  for which they 
receive subsidy payments, while feeder airlines, several of which are 
subsidiaries of Ansett Transport Industries, operate subsidized 
"essential" rural services in New South Wales and Queensland. The 
losses Incurred by the major operators on their feeder type services 
make serious inroads into the profits accruing from trunk route 
services. 
1. E.g. the Bass Strait-Tasmania Island services and Cape York 
services operated by Ansett-A.N.A. and the Queensland Channel 
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The Rationalization Committee established under Clause 3 of the 
Civil Aviation Agreement 1957 is concerned with deployment under 
controlled competition of the respective airline fleets. The airlines 
are required to review and keep under review air routes, timetables, 
fares and freights and other related matters, and, if unable to agree 
on any such matter, may refer it to the Rationalisation Committee. 
This Committee is constituted by a person nominated by the Minister, 
known as the Co-ordinator, and two members nominated by the Company and 
the Commission respectively. As originally constituted Mr. D.G. Anderson, 
the Director-General of Civil Aviation was nominated as Co-ordinator by 
the Minister, and Mr. R.M. Ansett and Sir Giles Chlppindale were the 
airline members. 
At June 30th, 1961, 23 references had been made to the Committee, 
of which 21 had been resolved. Thirteen had been initiated by the 
Company, 3 by the Commission and 5 jointly; of these, 15 were decided 
by the Co-ordinator, and 5 by mutual agreement or withdrawal. As at 
June 30th, 1969, 56 references had been made to the Committee. In 
recent years, the number of appeals to the Committee would appear to have 
declined, the yearly average for the five years, 1965-59, being two. 
In the event of dissatisfaction continuing over a decision of the 
Co-ordinator, provision is made, in Clause 13 of the Civil Aviation 
Agreements - 1961, for the matter to be dealt with by an Arbitrator 
and there are several instances where this has been done. 
348. 
Experience Indicates that three main types of problem gravitate 
to the Committee: 
(i) the development of route patterns by extending 
competition or adding new points, 
Hi)* changes in fares and freight rates, 
(.Hi) the rationalization of capacity to be provided on 
competitive routes by fixing profitable load 
factors and in some cases, determining the respective 
shares of the capacity to be provided by each 
operator. 
In the Minister's opinion, the effect of the more Important decisions 
of the Committee has been to maintain rather than suppress the keen 
competitive element which is a primary justification for the two 
airline policy. The work of the Committee has been a major factor in 
improving the stability and economic returns of the industry. 
Compiled from: Reports on Civil Aviation in Australia & Papua-New 
Guinea, the Department of Civil Aviation, Melbourne, 
1945-1959, and Annual Reports of the Minister for 
Civil Aviation, 1960-69. Commonweal-th Government 
Printer, Canberra. 
While under Regulation 106, the Minister approves fares and freight 
rates, the Rationalization Committee also gives consideration to 
variations in the fares and freight rates charged by the Company 
and the Commission on competitive routes. 
349, 
APPENDIX K 
LICENSING OF FLIGHT CREW 
A flight crew licence is granted by the Department of Civil 
Aviation to an applicant following medical, theoretical and practical 
flight tests. A person who is to command a hea-yy aircraft engaged in 
airline operations must hold a first class Airline Transport Pilot 
Licence and to qualify for this licence he must pass the most exacting 
tests. His privileges are extensive and include the right to fly 
aircraft carrying large numbers of fare paying passengers. 
Air Navigation Orders specify in detail the standards that are to 
be met by applicants for flight crew licences. For the period 1945-46, 
exemption from normal flying tests for the issue of a civil pilot's 
licence was given in all instances to R.A.A.F., R.A.F. or equivalent 
Service personnel where:-
(a) the applicant for an "A" licence has satisfactorily 
completed an E.F.T.S. course of flying training; 
(&) the applicant for a "B" licence has satisfactorily 
completed a full course of flying training (S.F.T.S.) 
and has graduated and received a flying badge. 
Under these exemptions, the Department Issued 112 "A" licences and 664 
"B" licences in the twelve months ended 30/6/46. Of the total number 
of 1,019 "B" licences in force at 30/6/46, 478 were held by pilots 
engaged in airline transport operations. 
Under new licensing procedures covered by Air Navigation Orders, 
Part 40, a new class of licence was introduced on April 1st, 1947 viz. 
350. 
the Airline Transport Pilot Licence which was issued in three classes. 
This involved higher and more detailed requirements to be possessed 
by pilots. 
The Senior Commercial Pilot Licence was introduced in January, 1949 
and authorised the holder to act as pilot in command of aircraft of 
more than 12,500 pounds gross weight on international operations but 
not on regular public transport services. For the years, 1951-1952, 
the Issuing of Airline Transport Pilot licences in three classes was 
dropped, to be replaced ultimately by the system subsequently in use 
viz. the Airline Transport Pilot Licence, 1st and 2nd Class. 
Since 1959 airline pilots and senior commercial pilots have been 
required to have electrocardiograms at initial examinations and at 
intervals thereafter. 
The disqualification rate of flight crew seeking renewal of licence 
was low for the period under review, though rising. The rate was 1.7 
per 1,000 per annum for the years 1953-1959, for 1960-62 it was 4.2 per 
1,000 and it was expected that the rate would become higher due to the 
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AII^INE PILOTS 
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However it would appear that a levelling off process has taken 
place as the failure rate for renewal of licence for Senior Commercial 
Pilots and Airline Transport Pilots, taken together, was 3.6 per 1,000 
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SAFETY IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
Safety is the most important consideration in the airline industry, 
and Australia has been fortunate in achieving an enviable record in 
this field. Climatically, the country provides some of the best 
conditions for flying in the world, and the Department of Civil Aviation, 
through the imposition of rigorous standards for pilot licensing, the 
provision of navigational aids, the maintenance of airports etc. has set 
high standards for operational procedure in accordance with those laid 
down by international agreements. 
Within the Depar-tment of Civil Aviation, an Accident Investigation 
Branch was formed in May, 1946. Its activities were complementary to 
those of the Accident Studies Branch, within the Directorate of Air 
Navigation and Safety. In order to disassociate Accident Investigation 
from any part of the Department which was charged with the responsibility 
of promoting safety or policing safety standards, it was decided that 
the Accident Investigation Branch should be part of the Directorate of 
Air Transport and External Relations. It would appear that there must 
have been considerable overlapping of functions between the Accident 
Investigation Branch and the Accident Studies Branch. With the 
reorganisation of the Department after 1952, under four Assistant 
Directors-General, responsibility for the investigation and analysis 
of accidents and incidents and the preparation of appropriate 
recommendations for the improvement of safety in aircraft operations 
was located in the Division of Air Safety Investigation, headed by an 
354. 
Assistant Director-General. 
From the graph below the steady improvement in world airline safety 
can be noted and the pleasing relationship of the Australian figures with 
those for world wide operation, and, particularly, with those for the 
two countries acknowledged as leaders in civil aviation development. The 
figures support the claim that Australia has achieved a level of airline 
safety second to none. To date, the Introduction of turbo-jet airliners 
on to domestic services in Australia in November, 1964 has not altered 
this situation. 














































\ WORLD (ICAQ MEMBER 
STATES) 
O. J_ 
1954-58 1955-59 1956-60 1957-61 1958-62 1959-63 1960-64 1961-65 
PASSENGER FATALITY RATES. SCHEDULED AIRLINES SERVICES 
FIVE YEAR PERIODS 1954-1965 
What needs to be remembered i s the impact that a single a i r l i ne 
accident can produce, especial ly tha t of a pure j e t . Not only i s the 
number of f a t a l i t i e s l ike ly to be high, but the confidence of the 
t r ave l l i ng public in the safety of a i r l i n e t r ave l would be undermined, 
355. 
For this and other reasons, safety will remain of paramount importance 
to all connected with the industry - in particular, the Department of 
Civil Aviation, the airline operators and the flight crews. 
ACCIDENT AND FATALITY RATES - REGULAR 


















Type of Service 
Domestic & International 
combined 
If II M 
II II 11 
II II II 


















































































Compiled from: Reports on Civil Aviation in Australia and New Guinea, 
1945-59 and Annual Reports of Minister for Civil 
Aviation, 1960-69. 
